Wellston Kennel Club v. Castlen

• Decision Date: 16 December 1932
• Docket Number: No. 32338.,32338.
• Citation: 55 S.W.2d 288
• Parties: WELLSTON KENNEL CLUB, a Voluntary Association, v. HARRY W. CASTLEN, Prosecuting Attorney of St. Louis County: ALFRED C. LILL, Sheriff of St. Louis County; STRATTON SHARTEL, Attorney-General of Missouri; ROBERT F. STANTON, County Counselor of St. Louis County, and R.H. BAUMER, Constable of St. Ferdinand Township, St. Louis County, Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

55 S.W.2d 288

WELLSTON KENNEL CLUB, a Voluntary Association, v. HARRY W. CASTLEN, Prosecuting Attorney of St. Louis County: ALFRED C. LILL, Sheriff of St. Louis County; STRATTON SHARTEL, Attorney-General of Missouri; ROBERT F. STANTON, County Counselor of St. Louis County, and R.H. BAUMER, Constable of St. Ferdinand Township, St. Louis County, Appellants.

No. 32338.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

Court en Banc, December 16, 1932.

Appeal from Circuit Court of St. Louis County. — Hon. Jerry Mulloy, Judge.

REVERSED.

Harry W. Castlen, Prosecuting Attorney, Herbert W. Ziercher, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Stratton Shartel, Attorney-General, Albert Miller, Assistant Attorney-General. Robert F. Stanton and George F. Heege for appellants.

(1) Plaintiff's incapacity to sue appearing upon the face of the petition, advantage thereof must be taken by demurrer. Sec. 770, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. Maplewood v. Surety Co., 323 Mo. 159; Wilson Co. v. Insurance Co., 300 Mo. 39; Crowl v. Linseed Co., 255 Mo. 327; Baxter v. Transit Co., 198 Mo. 14; Fuggle v. Hobbs, 42 Mo. 540; Wood Preserving Co. v. Paving Co., 245 S.W. 351; Byrd v. Insurance Co., 28 S.W. (2d) 424. And the demurrer in such case must be a special one. Sec. 770, R.S. 1929; Harger v. Barrett, 319 Mo. 639; Crowl v. Linseed Co., 255 Mo. 327; Baxter v. Transit Co., 198 Mo. 14; Canada v. Daniel, 175 Mo. App. 63; Waller v. Jones, 218 Mo. App. 135; Zeideman v. Molasky, 118 Mo. App. 122; Randolph v. Railway Co., 18 Mo. App. 614; McClurg v. Phillips, 49 Mo. 316. Subdivision "seventh" of Section 728, R.S. 1929, does not confer on plaintiff the right to sue. Mayes v. United Garment Workers, 320 Mo. 19; Newton County Farmers & Fruit Growers Exchange v. Ry. Co., 326 Mo. 622; Clark v. Grand Lodge, 43 S.W. (2d) 405; Railroad Co. v. Express Co., 145 Mo. App. 375; Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co., 152 Mo. App. 390. It appearing upon the face of plaintiff's petition that plaintiff has no powers nor privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships, it has not a suable entity; and, therefore, cannot maintain this action. Sec. 11, Art. XII. Const. of Mo.; Sec. 4526, R.S. 1929; Newton County Farmers & Fruit Growers Exchange v. Ry. Co., 326 Mo. 622; Mayes v. United Garment Workers, 320 Mo. 19; Clark v. Grand Lodge, 43 S.W. (2d) 405. And power or privilege must be conferred by statute. Newton County Farmers & Fruit Growers Exchange v. Ry. Co., 326 Mo. 622; Clark v. Grand Lodge, 43 S.W. (2d) 405. The word "corporation" as defined in the Constitution does not inclnde all joint stock companies and associations; only those "having any powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships." Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo. 801; Spotswood v. Morris, 12 Idaho. 374; Great So. Fireproof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 44 L. Ed. 842; People v. Coleman, 6 N.Y. Supp. 394; affirmed in 133 N.Y. 279, 16 L.R.A. 183. The general rule that voluntary or unincorporated associations can neither sue nor be sued is less strictly drawn when the question concerns the party defendant than in case of the party plaintiff. Newton Co. Farmers & Fruit Growers Exchange v. Ry. Co., 2 S.W. (2d) 127; 30 Cyc. 98. (2) Failure of petition, declaration or complaint to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action may be objected to at any time, and in any manner, and is not waived by failure to raise the objection by demurrer or answer. Mississippi Co. v. Byrd, 319 Mo. 697, 4 S.W. (2d) 812; Jackson v. Johnson, 248 Mo. 693; State v. Trimble, 213 Mo. App. 139, 262 S.W. 357; Druender v. Frank, 267 Mo. 713; Ivory v. Carlin, 30 Mo. 142; Syme v. Indiana, 28 Mo. 335; Colvin v. Railroad Co., 200 S.W. 715; Caskey v. Edwards, 128 Mo. App. 237; Jones v. Lumber Co., 175 Mo. App. 34. (3) It appears upon the face of plaintiff's petition that said petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action: (a) Because defendants being public officers the law casts both a right and a duty upon them, involving the exercise of discretion, and their conduct with respect thereto is not subject to be controlled by injunction. Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo. App. 413; Seleeman v. Matthews, 321 Mo. 1051; 32 C.J. 242, sec. 384; 32 C.J. 253, sec. 398; 22 Cyc. 879-80; 22 R.C.L. 490, sec. 170; 22 R.C.L. 493. sec. 173; 2 High on Injunctions (4 Ed.) 1324-25, sec. 1311; 4 Pomeroy's Equitable Jurisdiction (4 Ed.) 4064, sec. 1751; State ex rel. Shartel v. Westhues, 320 Mo. 1111; Russo v. Miller, 221 Mo. App. 292; Oliver v. Orrick, 288 S.W. 969; Modern Horseshoe Club v. Stewart, 242 Mo. 421. (b) Because public policy forbids the court to hamper or thwart, by injunctive process, the power and discretion of defendants, they being public officers, in the performance of the duties cast upon them pertaining to the public weal. Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo. App. 413. (c) Because this cause is not one of equitable cognizance for the following reasons: (d) A court of equity will not interfere by injunction to restrain or control the exercise of discretion by defendants, public officers, in the prevention of crime and in the maintenance of peace. Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo. App. 406; Decker v. Diemer, 229 Mo. 296; Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. 352, 19 L. Ed. 65; 2 High on Injunctions (4 Ed.) sec. 1326; Kerr on Injunctions, p. 4; Spelling on Injunctions, secs. 628, 691; 3 Abbott on Municipal Corp., secs. 1130, 1137; 22 Cyc. 879, 889; Ballentine's Law Dict., p. 979; 3 Bouvier Law Dict., pp. 2615-23; Fruend on Police Powers, sec. 86. (e) Because equity has no jurisdiction in criminal matters and will not enjoin the commission of a crime nor an arrest therefor, nor will equity inquire whether a crime has been committed. Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo. App. 413; Sterman v. Kennedy, 15 Abb. Pr. (N.Y.) 201; Kramer v. Police Dept., 53 N.Y. 492; Campbell v. York, 30 Misc. Rep. 340; Delaney v. Flood, 183 N.Y. 323; Stevens v. McAdoo, 112 N.Y. App. Div. 458; Shepard v. Bingham, 125 N.Y. App. Div. 784; Athletic Club v. Speer, 29 Colo. 158; Adams v. Oyster & Fish Co., 34 Colo. 219; Chicago v. Wright, 69 Ill. 318; Moses v. Mayor, 52 Ala. 208; Caille Co. v. Haager, 50 S.W. 244; State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 Mo. 449; Ex parte Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 31 L. Ed. 402; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 531, 43 L. Ed. 542. (f) Because plaintiff has a complete and adequate remedy at law, in that defendants may be prosecuted criminally for an unauthorized abuse of authority; and defendants may be required to answer at law for civil damages, or in case of illegal arrests habeas corpus may be resorted to. Secs. 3945, 3954, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. v. Kreuger, 217 S.W. 310, 280 Mo. 299; Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo. App. 413; Sullivan v. Gas Co., 148 Cal. 368; Fincke v. Police Comm., 66 How. Pr. 318; Kenny v. Martin, 11 Misc. Rep. 651; Suesskind & Rehfeldt v. Bingham, 125 N.Y. App. Div. 787; Moore v. Owen, 109 N.Y. Supp. 585; Russo v. Miller, 3 S.W. 269. (g) Plaintiff's petition shows that the enterprise (dog racing), which plaintiff intends to conduct, is in violation of the criminal laws of this State. Secs. 4285, 4286, 4287, 4288, 4291, 4303, 4314, R.S. 1929; Art. 14, sec. 10, Const. of Mo.; State ex rel. Cantley v. Meyer Tailoring Co., 25 S.W. (2d) 98; State ex rel. v. Hughes, 253 S.W. 229; State v. Becker, 248 Mo. 559; State ex inf. Gentry v. Ramona Kennel Club, 8 S.W. (2d) 1, 320 Mo. 740; Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo. App. 406; State v. Stolberg, 2 S.W. (2d) 618, 318 Mo. 958; Fleming v. Wengler, 190 S.W. 875, 269 Mo. 366; State v. Huber, 263 S.W. 94, 304 Mo. 15; St. Louis, etc., v. Carmody, 52 S.W. 365, 151 Mo. 566; State v. Emerson, 1 S.W. (2d) 109, 318 Mo. 633.

T.J. Rowe, Henry Rowe and Thos. J. Rowe, Jr., for respondent.

(1) The Constitution and statutes of Missouri invest joint stock companies with the power to sue and be sued the same as corporations. Const. of Mo., sec. 11, Art. XII; secs. 4526, 4555, R.S. 1929; Williams v. Express Co., 195 Mo. App. 362, 191 S.W. 1087; Newton County Farmers & Fruit Growers Exchange v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 2 S.W. (2d) 125. A joint stock association has powers and privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships. Williams v. Express Co., 195 Mo. App. 362, 191 S.W. 1087; Newton Co. Farmers & Fruit Growers Exchange v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 2 S.W. (2d) 125; State ex rel. Pearson v. Louisiana & Mo. River Ry. Co., 196 Mo. 536, 94 S.W. 282. The statute and the cases distinguish joint stock association from other voluntary associations. Sec. 4526, R.S. 1929; Williams v. Express Co., 195 Mo. App. 362, 191 S.W. 1087; Newton County Farmers & Fruit Growers Exchange v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 2 S.W. (2d) 125. (2) Equity will enjoin the prosecution of crime; but the petition must state facts showing that irreparable injury to property or property rights will result, save for the intervention of a court of equity by injunction. Russo v. Miller, 3 S.W. (2d) 266; Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo. App. 406; State ex rel. v. Wood, 56 S.W. 474. A court of equity has jurisdiction to inquire into the legality of any threatened invasion of property or rights of property, by public officers charged with the enforcement of the criminal laws, where the facts alleged in the petition show that irreparable injury will result to plaintiff's property, if such invasion is held unlawful. Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 111 S.W. 651; State v. Hall, 250 S.W. 64; State ex rel. v. Wood, 56 S.W. 474. The allegations of the petition as to irreparable injury must be taken as true on demurrer. Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 111 S.W. 651. The facts stated in the petition clearly show that irreparable injury will result to plaintiff, if the threatened prosecutions and arrests are held wrongful. Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 111 S.W. 651; State v. Hall, 250 S.W. 64; State ex rel. v. Wood, 56 S.W. 474. (3) The system of purse making and distributing described in the petition is not in violation of the Book-making and Pool-Selling Act or any other law or statute of this State. If, to make up and...