Welsh v. State

• Decision Date: 27 July 1892
• Citation: 96 Ala. 92,11 So. 450
• Parties: WELSH v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

11 So. 450

96 Ala. 92

WELSH v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

July 27, 1892

Appeal from city of Gadsden; JOHN H. DISQUE, Judge.

Tally Welsh was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed.

The first assignment of error goes to the alleged irregular formation of the grand jury, as based upon the fact that when it was ascertained that the proper number of said jurors who appeared and were competent to serve as jurors were reduced below the number of 15, the sheriff of Etowah county summoned from the qualified citizens of said county two persons, and that the minute entry does not show that the court ordered the sheriff to summon the persons named to complete the grand jury. It is also assigned as error that the record does not show that the grand jury was organized under the act creating the city court of Gadsden, and that the indictment did not properly state the names of the defendant and the deceased. The court, in its general charge among other things, instructed the jury as follows: (1) "The court charges the jury, to wit, the term 'reasonable doubt' means a doubt which has some good reason for it arising out of the evidence in the case,-such doubt as you are able to find in the evidence a reason for. It means such a doubt as would cause a prudent man to pause and hesitate before accepting as true and acting upon any matters alleged or charged in the graver or more important affairs of life. As applied to evidence in criminal cases, it means an actual and substantial doubt, growing out of the unsatisfactory nature of evidence in the case. It does not mean a doubt which arises from some mere whim or vagary, or from any groundless surmise or guess; and, while the law requires you to be satisfied from the evidence of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it, at the same time, prohibits you from going outside of the evidence to hunt up doubts upon which to acquit defendant. In arriving at your verdict, it is your duty to carefully and candidly consider the entire evidence in the case, and in so doing you should entertain such doubts only as arise from the evidence and are 'reasonable,' as already defined; and unless the doubt is a reasonable one, and does so arise, it will not be sufficient in law to authorize a verdict of not guilty. Then, gentlemen, if, upon a careful and candid review of all the evidence, you ask your inward conscience, 'Is he the guilty one?' and the answer is, 'I doubt if he is,' you should acquit; but if the answer is, 'I have no doubt of it,' you should convict. So then, gentlemen by a 'reasonable doubt' is not meant absolute certainty. There is no such thing as absolute certainty in human affairs; for justice is, after all, but an approximate science, and its ends are not to be defeated by a failure of strict and mathematical proof." (2) "Confessions of guilt, gentlemen, when deliberately made, are among the most effectual and satisfactory proofs that can be received in courts of justice. Their value depends on the supposition that they are deliberately made and precisely identified, and on the presumption that a rational being will not make admissions prejudicial to his interest and safety, unless when urged by the promptings of truth and conscience." (3) "The court charges the jury there is no rule of law requiring you, gentlemen of the jury, to give equal credence to every part of the confessions made by the defendant and introduced in evidence before you, unless it is clearly weighed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, the motives which may have induced it, and its consistency with the other evidence; and you, gentlemen, without capriciously accepting or rejecting any portion, should credit such parts as you find reason for believing, and reject that part which you find reason for disbelieving." (4) "The court charges the jury you are instructed that, in considering what the defendant said after the fatal act, you must consider it altogether. He is entitled to the benefit of what he said for himself if true, as is the state to the benefit of what he said against himself, in any conversation proved by the state. What he said against himself the law presumes to be true, because against himself; but what he said for himself the jury are not bound to believe, because said in a conversation proved by the state. You may believe it or disbelieve it, as it may be shown to be true or false by the evidence in the case."

W H. Standifer, for appellant.

Wm. L. Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

MCCLELLAN J.

The act establishing the Gadsden city court provides that grand and petit jurors shall be drawn, summoned, and impaneled therein in the manner provided by law for the drawing, summoning, and impaneling of such jurors for the circuit court of Etowah county. Acts 1890-91, pp. 1092, 1103....