Welton v. Berryhill

Decision Date25 April 2018
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 17-cv-01193-STV
PartiesMICHELLE WELTON, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Colorado
ORDER

Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Michelle Welton's Complaint seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security's decision denying Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act ("SSA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and 1381-83c, respectively. The parties have both consented to proceed before this Court for all proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.2. [#13] The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). This Court has carefully considered the Complaint [#1], the Social Security Administrative Record [#11], the parties' briefing [##16-17, 20], and the applicable case law, and has determined that oral argument would not materially assist in the disposition of this appeal. For the following reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision.

I. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Five-Step Process for Determining Disability

The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."1 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). "This twelve-month duration requirement applies to the claimant's inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity, and not just his underlying impairment." Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084. "In determining whether an individual's physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that such impairment or impairments could be the basis of eligibility . . ., the Commissioner [ ] shall consider the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(B), 1382c(a)(3)(G).

"The Commissioner is required to follow a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled." Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir. 2005). The five-step inquiry is as follows:

1. The Commissioner first determines whether the claimant's work activity, if any, constitutes substantial gainful activity;2. If not, the Commissioner then considers the medical severity of the claimant's mental and physical impairments to determine whether any impairment or combination of impairments is "severe;"2
3. If so, the Commissioner then must consider whether any of the severe impairment(s) meet or exceed a listed impairment in the appendix of the regulations;
4. If not, the Commissioner next must determine whether the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC")i.e., the functional capacity the claimant retains despite his impairments—is sufficient to allow the claimant to perform his past relevant work, if any;
5. If not, the Commissioner finally must determine whether the claimant's RFC, age, education and work experience are sufficient to permit the claimant to perform other work in the national economy.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005); Bailey v. Berryhill, 250 F. Supp. 3d 782, 784 (D. Colo. 2017). The claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability at steps one through four, after which the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that claimant retains the ability to perform work in the national economy. Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1064 n.1 (10th Cir. 2013); Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084. "A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis." Ryan v. Colvin, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1015, 1018 (D. Colo. 2016) (citing Casias v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991)).

B. Standard of Review

In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Court's review is limited to a determination of "whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards andwhether her factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Vallejo v. Berryhill, 849 F.3d 951, 954 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Nguyen v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1400, 1402 (10th Cir. 1994)). "With regard to the law, reversal may be appropriate when [the Commissioner] either applies an incorrect legal standard or fails to demonstrate reliance on the correct legal standards." Bailey, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 784 (citing Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir.1996)).

"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084). "Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or constitutes mere conclusion." Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1261-62 (quoting Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992)). The Court must "meticulously examine the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the [Commissioner's] findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.'" Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). The Court, however, "will not reweigh the evidence or substitute [its] judgment for the Commissioner's." Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1172.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in 1964. [AR 71, 157]3 Plaintiff completed high school and two years of college education. [AR 78, 201] Plaintiff is able to communicate in English. [AR 199] On or about April 15, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for DIB and a Title XVI application for SSI. [AR 71, 157-65] Plaintiff originally claimed a disabilityonset date of August 30, 1991 [AR 71, 228], but amended that date to November 1, 2003, at the hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Thomas Inman [AR 11, 31]. Thus Plaintiff was 39 years old at the time of the alleged onset. [AR 18] Plaintiff claims disability based upon the following physical impairments: pelvic pain, bowel problems, digestive issues, and vomiting. [AR 200] Plaintiff worked in a variety of positions for several airlines prior to the alleged disability onset date, including as a customer service agent for Continental Airlines and a customer service supervisor for G.P. Express Airlines. [AR 209, 214] Plaintiff's most recent prior work experience was as a flight attendant for Frontier Airlines from July 1995 through September 2003. [AR 182, 190, 209] Plaintiff attempted to return to work as a gate agent for Skywest in February 2008, but had to quit during training after one to two months, due to her disability. [AR 182]

A. Medical Background

Plaintiff experienced an ectopic pregnancy in 1991 and a miscarriage in 1996. [AR 265, 498-99] In approximately 1999, Plaintiff began treatment for chronic pelvic pain. [AR 265] Plaintiff presented to Dr. William Schoolcraft, who assessed Plaintiff for chronic pelvic pain, and noted possible pelvic adhesions and/or endometriosis. [Id.] On October 20, 1999, Dr. Schoolcraft performed a laparoscopy and lysis of adhesions, diagnosing Plaintiff with pelvic pain, pelvic adhesions, and a right tubal obstruction. [AR 267] Dr. Schoolcraft did not observe endometriosis. [AR 268] Plaintiff reported feeling "dramatically better" within a week after the operation, but complained of increasing pelvic pain in the lower right quadrant in November 1999. [AR 262-63] Dr. Schoolcraft noted the "[u]nclear etiology for pain," and recommended a gastrointestinal ("GI")consultation. [AR 262] Afterward, Plaintiff apparently did not present for any further medical appointments until 2002. [AR 260]

Plaintiff began to see Dr. Arthur Sands in March 2002. [AR 477] Dr. Sands reported that while Plaintiff had "marked" lower right quadrant chronic pain, it was "well controlled" with the medication Fiorinal. [Id.] The following month, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Sands that she had generally "been doing okay." [AR 476] Plaintiff was resistant to surgery despite some continued pain, but Dr. Sands encouraged her to give "strong consideration" to surgical options. [Id.] Plaintiff reported continued lower abdominal pain in May 2002, but her current medications were controlling the pain. [AR 475] Plaintiff was scheduled for an oophorectomy to remove the ovaries on the right side, but declined to go through with the procedure. [Id.] Throughout the remainder of 2002, Plaintiff reported that she was doing well and that the pain was much better, and Dr. Sands observed that Plaintiff's multiple problems were stable. [AR 318-19, 472]

In early 2003, Plaintiff presented to the emergency room for chronic abdominal pain. [AR 315] She also requested paperwork for a leave of absence due to the pain from her position at Frontier Airlines, from her provider, Physician Assistant ("PA") Cathy Robinson. [Id.] Plaintiff met with Dr. Rand Compton for a gastroenterology consultation in April 2003. [AR 281-82] Plaintiff reported to Dr. Compton that she "had severe problems with recurrent nausea and vomiting and periumbilical pain" over the last two years, though her abdominal pain was controlled with Fiorinal and codeine. [AR 281] At that time, Plaintiff was on partial medical leave from her work as a flight attendant because of her pain and was "under significant stress because of her job and illness." [Id.] Dr. Compton performed an upper GI endoscopy on April 22, 2003, findingmild inflammation in the...

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