Welzel v. Bernstein

Citation436 F.Supp.2d 110
Decision Date06 July 2006
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 03-1887 (ESH).
PartiesKaren M. WELZEL, Plaintiff, v. Richard BERNSTEIN, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

C. Michael Tarone, McDonald & Karl, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Emily Kate Hargrove, Jonathan Wolfe Greenbaum, Nixon Peabody LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HUVELLE, District Judge.

Plaintiff Karen M. Welzel has sued RB Associates ("RB"), her former employer; Richard Bernstein, the President and sole owner of RB; James Martens, the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of RB; and Crawford Sherman, the Vice President of Hotel Operations for RB. Plaintiff, who is white, alleges that she was subjected to a series of retaliatory acts following an incident when she responded critically to what she perceived as racial animus by her superior (James Martens), in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I), and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C.Code § 2-1401 et seq. ("DCHRA") (Count IV). Plaintiff also asserts retaliation claims against RB under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") (Count 11)1 The matter comes before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons explained herein, the Court will grant defendants' motion, deny plaintiff's motion, and dismiss this case with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

RB is a real estate management and development company that manages commercial real estate, hotels, and a restaurant in Washington, D.C. and employees over 650 employees. (Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ["Defs.' Stmt."] ¶ 1.) Richard Bernstein, whose primary residence is in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, is the President and sole owner of RB. (Id. ¶ 7; Bernstein Dep. at 11; 120-21.) James Martens is the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of RB and is in charge of the day-to-day operations of the company. (Defs.' Stmt. ¶¶ 10, 11; Deposition of James Martens, June 8, 2005 ["Martens Dep. at 54; Bernstein Dep. at 64-65, 87.) Crawford Sherman has served as RB's Vice President of Hotel and Restaurant Operations since mid-2002. Prior to that time he was the General Manager of the Washington Plaza Hotel, which is one of the five hotels operated by RB. (Defs.' Stmt. ¶¶ 12, 13; Sherman Dep., Ex. 1.)

Plaintiff was hired as RB's Director of Human Resources in October 1999. (Defs.' Stmt. ¶ 14; Deposition of Karen M. Welzel, May 19, 2005 ["Welzel Dep. at 54; Welzel Dep., Ex. 5.) In that capacity, she was responsible for the human resource functions of the RB hotels, restaurants, and corporate staff. (Defs.' Stmt. ¶ 15; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute ["Pl.'s Stmt."] ¶ 8.) According to plaintiff, her job responsibilities included advising the management of RB regarding applicable employment laws and protecting the company from liability exposure. (See Welzel Dep., Ex. 28 (letter from Karen Welzel to James Martens, dated Sept. 28, 2001); Welzel Dep. I ¶¶ 194-95; Welzel Dep., Ex. 57 (affidavit of Karen M. Welzel, Mar. 7, 2003, attached to EEOC charge of discrimination).) From her first day of employment at RB on November 15, 1999 until December 2000, plaintiff reported directly to Wim Pastoor, the Vice President and Director of Hotel and Restaurant Operations at RB, and indirectly to Martens. (Defs.' Stmt. ¶ 16; Deposition of Karen M. Welzel, May 23, 2005 ["Welzel Dep. III"] at 15-17; Welzel Dep., Ex. 5.) After Pastoor was terminated by RB in December 2000, plaintiff reported directly to Martens. (Defs.' Stmt. ¶¶ 87, 88; Deposition of James Martens, July 28, 2005 ["Martens Dep. III"] at 364-65.) From June 2002 until her termination on March 10, 2003, plaintiff reported directly to Sherman, who had been elevated to Pastoor's position of Vice President and Director of Hotel and Restaurant Operations during a reorganization of RB's hotel management and operations. (Defs.' Stmt. ¶¶ 124, 125; Welzel Dep., Ex. 45.)

In late 1999 or early 2000, Pastoor proposed. that RB create a central reservation office ("CRO") in the basement of the Washington Plaza Hotel. (Declaration of Wim Pastoor, July 15, 2005 ["Pastoor Decl. I"] ¶¶ 22, 23.) Plaintiff participated in the creation and implementation of the CRO. (Deposition of Karen M. Welzel, May 20, 2005 ["Welzel Dep. II"] at 32.) The CRO, which was staffed primarily with reservation agents who previously had been working as reservation agents at the five RB hotels, consisted primarily of African— American employees. (Defs.' Stmt. ¶¶ 21, 24.) Some time during the fall of 2000, during a training session for CRO employees, Martens visited the basement area of the Washington Plaza Hotel to observe the CRO space. (Id. ¶ 25.) He discovered that the basement had no windows, no ventilation, and no air conditioning. (Id. ¶ 26.) Shortly thereafter, on November 22, 2000, plaintiff attended a meeting with Martens and Pastoor. While plaintiff and defendants dispute whether Martens' subsequent comment was motivated by his observations of the uncomfortable working conditions at the CRO, he did report that when he visited the area, he "saw two rows of black faces" looking at him. (Defs.' Stmt. ¶¶ 45; 51; Welzel Dep. I at 202, 203.) To this, plaintiff responded: "Jim, be careful how you say that." (Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 54.)

Although the parties dispute what transpired next, plaintiff contends that immediately after she "challenged his opinion" (Welzel Dep., Ex. 57), Martens stood up, closed the door to the conference room, and began to yell at her for approximately twenty minutes. (See Welzel Dep. III at 102-12.) According to plaintiff, Martens told her that he "should be able to have these conversations behind closed doors at the corporate office." (Id. at 108.) She asserts that Martens said that if RB paid more money for the position of reservation agent, RB would be able to get "a better class of people" and "employees from the state of Virginia" to fill that position. (Id. at 103, 105, 106.). Plaintiff further contends that Martens openly questioned whether RB had "the right person in the HR position" and threateningly told her that "he was not going anywhere." (Id. at 108, 109.) During Martens'"tirade," plaintiff remained basically silent. (See id. at 112 ("I just let him go on for the twenty minutes that he was ranting.").) She did, however, testify that "when I was able to get in a comment in all of his yelling at me, I did point out to him that we don't take the color of a person's skin into consideration when we're making hiring decisions." (Id. at 107)2 Later that day, after the meeting had ended, plaintiff informed Martens that "I wasn't calling you a racist. I was merely trying to tell you that the statements you were making were dangerous. And I was just trying to caution you." (Welzel Dep. III at 122.)

According to plaintiff, this November 22, 2000 meeting is "at the center of this case," and it is the "mainspring" that has "spawned a stream of additional retaliatory incidents that culminated with her firing" over two years later on March 10, 2003. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 1, 5.) Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to numerous adverse employment actions in retaliation for her opposition to Martens' comments on November 22, 2000 and for several other protected activities that she allegedly engaged in during her tenure at RB. (See Pl.'s Opp'n at 24-27 (listing alleged protected activities); id. at 28-30 (listing alleged adverse employment actions).) She contends that the series of adverse employment actions began during the November 22, 2000 incident and culminated in her termination on March 10, 2003, which occurred three days after she filed an EEOC charge of discrimination on the basis of sex and retaliation. (First Amended Compl., Ex. 6.)

Following her filing of an EEO complaint on March 7, 2003, and receipt of a right to sue letter on June 11, 2003, plaintiff initiated this suit.3 As the parties appear to agree, claims that arose after June 4, 2002 can be brought under Title VII and the DCHRA, but those that predate June 4 are barred by the statute of limitations and may only be brought under § 1981, which has a four-year statute of limitations as applied to plaintiff's claims. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382-83, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004) (four-year statute of limitations for § 1981 claims created by 1991 Act). (See Pl.'s Opp'n at 35 and Defs.' Reply to Pl.'s Opposition to Defs.' Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ["Defs.' Reply"] at 11 n. 12.) Thus, according to the parties, retaliatory actions that occurred prior to May 2002 must be analyzed under § 1981, whereas those that arose after May 2002 should be analyzed under Title VII.4 (Id.) Accordingly, before one can address the merits of the parties' positions, it is necessary to set out the legal standards that will govern the Court's analysis, as well as the controlling law under Title VII and § 1981.5

ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute as to a material fact—one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law"—is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A moving party is therefore entitled to summary judgment against "a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the...

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