Wendel v. New York
| Decision Date | 23 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-CV-4941 (JFB)(MLO).,06-CV-4941 (JFB)(MLO). |
| Citation | 574 F.Supp.2d 290 |
| Parties | Dorothy A. WENDEL, Individually and as a Class Representative for All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. State of NEW YORK, New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, and Nancy A. Naples, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Martin J. Coleman, Esq., Hauppauge, NY, for plaintiff.
Andrew M. Cuomo, Esq., Attorney General of the State of New York, by Susan M. Connolly, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Hauppauge, NY, for. defendants.
On September 12, 2006, plaintiff Dorothy A. Wendel, individually and as a class representative for all others similarly situated ("Wendel" or "plaintiff"), brought the instant action against defendants State of New York ("New York"), New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (the "DMV"), and Nancy A. Naples, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles (collectively, "defendants"). Specifically, pursuant to the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 and 12132 (the "ADA"), Wendel mounted a facial challenge to Section 404-a of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law ("Section 404-a")—a New York statute that establishes the procedure by which disabled individuals, such as plaintiff, may obtain special license plates. In particular, Wendel challenged the provision of Section 404-a that limits the disabled to a single set of such plates; plaintiff wished to own two cars and argued that the ADA entitled her, as a matter of law, to a set of disabled license plates for each car.
Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the action, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that Wendel failed to state a claim under the ADA. By Memorandum and Order dated May 4, 2007 (the "May 4 Order"), the Court granted defendants' motion and held that Section 404-a was facially valid as a matter of law. The Court primarily based this ruling on the following: (1) although Section 404-a limits disabled drivers to a single set of disabled license plates, the statute does not preclude disabled drivers from obtaining— in addition to the disabled license plates— the same number of regular license plates as non-disabled drivers; and (2) pursuant to Section 1203-a of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law ("Section 1203-a"), Wendel is entitled—in addition to a set of disabled license plates, and as many regular license plates as a non-disabled driver—to a disabled "hang-tag" that is transferable among all cars in which plaintiff rides. Further, after carefully reviewing Sections 404-a and 1203-a, the Court concluded that nothing on the face of these statutes suggested that hang-tags provide inferior benefits to disabled drivers in comparison to disabled license plates for purposes of parking. Thus, the Court held that Section 404-a did not facially violate the ADA as a matter of law.
Nevertheless, based upon certain factual representations Wendel made at oral argument, the Court afforded plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. In particular, the Court granted plaintiff leave to allege an ADA claim arising from defendants' application and/or implementation of New York's disabled license plate and hang-tag scheme. On July 3, 2007, plaintiff submitted her amended complaint. As the Court discusses in greater detail infra, Wendel primarily alleges in her amended complaint that New York's scheme violates the ADA because third parties—such as officers of the New York City Police Department (the "NYPD"), passing motorists, tow-truck operators, and gas station attendants—are less likely to recognize her disability and/or provide her assistance on the roads when her car merely bears a hang-tag (which cannot be used while the car is moving), and not disabled license plates.1 Defendants now move to dismiss the amended complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), on the grounds that Wendel has failed again to state a claim under the ADA.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with defendants and dismisses the amended complaint. The Court recognizes the serious difficulties that often confront disabled persons such as plaintiff in the performance of their daily activities, including driving, and Congress enacted the ADA to ensure that disabled persons are provided reasonable accommodations and protected from discrimination in the performance of such activities. Therefore, courts must carefully scrutinize any claim that a statute violates the ADA in any way. However, even if all of plaintiffs allegations are taken as true, New York's license plate and hang-tag scheme for disabled drivers does not, either on its face or as applied to plaintiff and her daily activities, violate the ADA. The current statutory and regulatory scheme in New York (including the use of hang-tags) provides plaintiff with full access to parking set aside for the disabled by law. Moreover, to the extent she alleges that the NYPD is improperly ticketing her vehicle even with a properly displayed hang-tag, her remedy is against the City of New York, not against New York State in an effort to strike down the license plate legislation. Similarly, to the extent she alleges that New York's license plate and hang-tag scheme deprives her of third-party benefits that are facilitated by the license plate as opposed to the hang-tag (including services of gas station attendants, tow truck operators, etc.), such alleged benefits are not within the purpose or province of the license plate/hang-tag framework and such framework need not be altered under the ADA in order to maximize these collateral third-party benefits allegedly obtained from the use of the disabled license plates. In fact, plaintiff has other practical and legal mechanisms available to her to ensure that these third parties are aware of her disability so that they can assist her while she is driving, whether such third party acts voluntarily or to comply with the ADA. Accordingly, as discussed below, plaintiff's ADA claim fails as a matter of law and cannot survive a motion to dismiss.
The following facts are taken from Wendel's amended complaint (the "complaint") and are not findings of fact by the Court. The Court assumes these facts to be true for the purpose of deciding this motion and construes them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party.
According to the complaint, Wendel resides in New York and has Spastic Diaplegic Cerebral Palsy, a "severe and permanent disability." (Compl. ¶ 1.) As a consequence of her disability, plaintiff uses either a wheelchair or elbow brace crutches. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 11.)
The complaint states that Wendel is an attorney whose practice requires her to travel frequently to New York City from her home in Patchogue. (Compl. ¶ 10.) However, because of her disability, plaintiff "cannot effectively use public transportation." (Compl. ¶ 10.) Thus, Wendel "must own and use automobiles to maintain her livelihood." (Compl. ¶ 11.)
According to the complaint, Wendel lives alone and "has no relatives or other persons she can rely on to provide her with emergency transportation." (Compl. ¶ 12.)
The complaint states that, in 1995, Wendel applied for and received a New York City disabled person parking permit (a "parking permit" or "hang-tag"). (Compl. ¶ 23.)
According to a "Message from the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles," which sets forth the procedural and substantive requirements both for disabled parking permits and disabled license plates (the "DMV Requirements"),2 the "proper use" of a hang-tag is to use parking spaces set aside for the disabled.
As the DMV Requirements explain, hang-tags "may be used in any vehicle in which [a disabled person] is riding" and, therefore, may be used in more than one vehicle.
According to plaintiff, (Compl. ¶ 17.)
The complaint states that, approximately in or about 2002, Wendel applied for and obtained a set of disabled license plates. (Compl. ¶ 31.)
According to the DMV Requirements, the "proper use" of the disabled license plate is—as with the hang-tag—to use parking spaces set aside for the disabled.
In contrast to the hang-tags—which, as stated supra, may be transferred to any vehicle in which a disabled person travels—disabled persons are permitted to obtain only one set of disabled license plates. )
Further, according to Wendel, disabled license plates are approximately six inches by twelve inches and are reflective. (Compl. ¶ 14.) In addition, disabled license plates "are easily seen in daylight or at night and provide essential identifying information about the vehicle and its owner(s) while the vehicles are moving or stationary." (Compl. ¶ 14.)
In the complaint, Wendel alleges certain "benefits from use of disabled person license plates that she was not able to receive from use of the" hang-tag. (Compl. ¶ 32.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges the following benefits, all of which are related to third parties: (1) The disabled license plate facilitates her ability to "obtain[ ] the assistance of gasoline station attendants to help the plaintiff fill up her gas tank at...
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