Wendt v. Host Intern., Inc., 96-55243
Decision Date | 22 September 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96-55243,96-55243 |
Citation | 125 F.3d 806 |
Parties | , 47 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 964, 25 Media L. Rep. 2345, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7521, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,120 George WENDT, an individual; John Ratzenberger, an individual, Plaintiffs-Appellants. v. HOST INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware corporation; Defendant-Appellee, and Paramount Pictures Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Intervenor. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
David A. Pash, Kinsella, Boesch, Fujikawa & Towle, Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiffs-appellants.
William T. Rintala, Rintala, Smoot, Jaenicke & Rees, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants-appellees.
Robert S. Chapman, Greenberg, Glusker, Fields, Claman & Machtinger, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant-intervenor.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-93-142-R.
Before: FLETCHER and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and JENKINS, * District Judge.
Actors George Wendt and John Ratzenberger appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Host International, Inc. ("Host") and applicant in intervention Paramount Pictures Corporation ("Paramount"), dismissing their action for violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and California's statutory and common law right of publicity. We reverse.
Wendt and Ratzenberger argue that the district court erred in dismissing their action because they have raised issues of material fact as to whether Host violated their trademark and publicity rights by creating animatronic robotic figures (the "robots") based upon their likenesses without their permission and placing these robots in airport bars modeled upon the set from the television show Cheers. They also appeal the district court's orders excluding appellants' survey evidence, barring presentation of expert testimony, and awarding Host and Paramount attorney's fees. We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand for trial.
In Wendt v. Host, 1995 WL 115571 (9th Cir.1995) ("Wendt I "), we reversed the first grant of summary judgment in this action and remanded. We held that appellants' state law causes of action were not preempted by federal copyright law and that disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment because the district court's comparison of photographs of appellants Wendt and Ratzenberger with photographs of the animatronic figures was not sufficient to resolve their claims under Cal. Civ.Code § 3344:
The question here is whether the three dimensional animatronic figures are sufficiently similar to plaintiffs to constitute their likenesses. Based on the limited record before us, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the figures are so dissimilar from plaintiffs that no reasonable trier of fact could find them to be 'likenesses.' That question must be determined by a comparison of the actual, three-dimensional entities.
1995 WL 115571 at * 2. We concluded that this comparison must be decided without reference to the context in which the image appears. Id. (citing White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied., 508 U.S. 951, 113 S.Ct. 2443, 124 L.Ed.2d 660 (1993)). We found that there were disputed issues of material fact concerning the appellants' common law right of publicity claims because the similarity between appellants' physical characteristics and those of the robots is disputed. Id. at * 3. Finally, we held that the appellants' claims for unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), require the application of a "well settled eight factor test" to determine whether Host's conduct has created a likelihood of confusion as to whether appellants were endorsing Host's product. Id.
Upon remand, the district court granted summary judgment for a second time after an in-court inspection of the robots. It held that it could not "find, by viewing both the robotics and the live persons of Mr. Wendt and Mr. Ratzenberger, that there is any similarity at all ... except that one of the robots, like one of the plaintiffs, is heavier than the other ... The facial features are totally different." The district court then awarded attorney's fees to Host and Paramount pursuant to Cal. Civ.Code § 3344.
Appellants argue that despite the district court's comparison of the animatronic figures and the appellants, dismissal was inappropriate because material issues of fact remain as to the degree to which the animatronic figures appropriate the appellants' likenesses. Appellants claim that the district court erred in determining that the robots were not likenesses of the appellants because the "likeness" need not be identical or photographic. Further, they argue that the likeness determination is an issue for the jury to decide in this case. We agree.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Jesinger v. Nevada Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.1994). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Id. We are not to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. The district court's rulings excluding damage evidence and expert testimony are governed by an abuse of discretion standard, and should not be reversed absent some prejudice. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1996). Our review is governed by the 'law of the case' doctrine, which prevents courts from "reconsidering an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case." Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 74 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir.1996).
California Civil Code § 3344 provides in relevant part:
[a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, ... for purposes of advertising or selling, ... without such person's prior consent ... shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.
In White, 971 F.2d at 1397, we ruled that a robot with mechanical features was not a "likeness" under § 3344. However, we specifically held open the possibility that a manikin molded to Vanna White's precise features, or one that was a caricature or bore an impressionistic resemblance to White might become a likeness for statutory purposes. Id. The degree to which these robots resemble, caricature, or bear an impressionistic resemblance to appellants is therefore clearly material to a claim of violation of Cal. Civ.Code § 3344. Summary judgment would have been appropriate upon remand only if no genuine issues of material fact concerning that degree of resemblance were raised by appellants. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
Despite the district court's assertions that no reasonable jury could find that the robots are "similar in any manner whatsoever to Plaintiffs," we respectfully disagree. Without making any judgment about the ultimate similarity of the figures to the appellants, we conclude from our own inspection of the robots that material facts exist that might cause a reasonable jury to find them sufficiently "like" the appellants to violate Cal. Civ.Code § 3344.
We reject appellees' assertion that Fleet v. CBS, 50 Cal.App.4th 1911, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 645 (1996) is new controlling authority that requires us to revisit the determination on first appeal that appellants' § 3344 claims are not preempted by federal copyright law. Wendt I, 1995 WL 115571, at * 1. Fleet is not controlling new authority on the preemption issue. It holds that an actor may not bring an action for misappropriation under Cal. Civ.Code § 3344 when the only claimed exploitation occurred through the distribution of the actor's performance in a copyrighted movie. Id. at 651 () (internal quotations omitted).
Appellants here are not seeking to prevent Paramount from exhibiting its copyrighted work in the Cheers series. As we stated in Wendt I, their "claims are not preempted by the federal copyright statute so long as they 'contain elements, such as the invasion of personal rights ... that are different in kind from copyright infringement.' " Wendt I, 1995 WL 115571 at * 1 (quoting Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.1992)) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976)). The Fleet court acknowledged that it simply found a fact-specific exception to the general rule that "as a general proposition section 3344 is intended to protect rights which cannot be copyrighted." Fleet, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d at 649.
Appellants' claims are not preempted by federal copyright law. Issues of material fact exist concerning the degree to which the robots are like the appellants. We reverse the grant of summary judgment on the claim under Cal. Civ.Code § 3344.
California recognizes a common law right of privacy that includes protection against appropriation for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name or likeness. Eastwood v. Super. Ct. for Los Angeles County, 149 Cal.App.3d 409, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal.Ct.App.1983). The right to be protected against such appropriations is also referred to as the "right of publicity." Id. A common law cause of action for appropriation of name or likeness may be pleaded by alleging 1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Upper Deck Co. v. Panini Am., Inc., Case No.: 20cv185-GPC(KSC)
...has also noted that the "Lanham Act's likelihood of confusion standard is predominantly factual in nature." Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc. 125 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1997) ; see also Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc. , 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[b]e......
-
Bluetooth Sig, Inc. v. FCA US LLC
...Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc. , 618 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc. , 125 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1997) ). "Challenges to survey methodology go to the weight given [to] the survey, not its admissibility." Wendt , 125 F.3d at 814......
-
Golden Eye Media USA, Inc. v. Trolley Bags UK Ltd.
...has indicated that the "Lanham Act's likelihood of confusion standard is [also] predominantly factual in nature." Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc. , 125 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1997).IV. DISCUSSION Because this case implicates complex issues of design patent law—including international patent issu......
-
Fraley v. Facebook, Inc
...likeness ... endows the name and likeness of the person involved with commercially exploitable opportunities.’ ” Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d 813, 824, 160 Cal.Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425 (1979)). Thus, Plaintiffs h......
-
A New Fantasy Sport: Defining the Right Of Publicity After C.B.C. Distribution v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media
...erved well in New York, but is now uncertain?15 Is it the Predominate Use test enunciated by the Missouri Supreme Court?16 Or will we never get beyond "I know it when I see it," which is all the Supreme Court has offered up so far?17 Footnotes 1.505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. deni......
-
Lawyer's Fantasy: The Quest For Clear Right Of Publicity Rules
...erved well in New York, but is now uncertain?15 Is it the Predominate Use test enunciated by the Missouri Supreme Court?16 Or will we never get beyond "I know it when I see it," which is all the Supreme Court has offered up so far?17 Footnotes 1.505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. deni......
-
Defamation and privacy
...a fictional character does not thereby lose the right to control the commercial exploitation of his likeness. Wendt v. Host Int’l 9th Cir. 125 F.3d 806, 811 (1997). Lack of consent is an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. 34 Cal. App. 4th......
-
Freedom of speech and information privacy: the troubling implications of a right to stop people from speaking about you.
...Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); Wendt v. Host Int'l, 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997); Madow, infra note 111; Zimmerman, infra note (117.) See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 114, at 1710-12 ("The expansive power th......
-
Avoid On-Sale Bar by Filing Early Both in the United States and China Post-Helsinn
...Avatars , 39 Akron L. Rev. 649, 675 (2006). 31. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 32. Id. at 1396. 33. Id. at 1399. 34. Id. at 1397. 35. 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997). 36. Id. at 809. 37. Id. 38. Id. at 811. 39. White , 971 F.2d at 1399. 40. Id. 41. See 17 U.S.C. § 102; Pamela Samuelson, Alloca......
-
Virtual Influencers: Stretching the Boundaries of Intellectual Property Governing Digital Creations
...Avatars , 39 Akron L. Rev. 649, 675 (2006). 31. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 32. Id. at 1396. 33. Id. at 1399. 34. Id. at 1397. 35. 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997). 36. Id. at 809. 37. Id. 38. Id. at 811. 39. White , 971 F.2d at 1399. 40. Id. 41. See 17 U.S.C. § 102; Pamela Samuelson, Alloca......