Wendt v. Wendt
Decision Date | 05 September 2000 |
Docket Number | (AC 18388) |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | LORNA J. WENDT v. GARY C. WENDT |
Lavery, C. J., and Spear and Mihalakos, JS. Kathleen A. Hogan, with whom, on the brief, were Arnold H. Rutkin and Sarah S. Oldham, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Kurt W. Hansson, with whom were Louis K. Fisher and, on the brief, John S. McGeeney and James R. Bliss, for the appellee (defendant).
The plaintiff in this action for the dissolution of a marriage appeals from the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) utilized dates prior to the date of the dissolution of the marriage in making various calculations and divisions regarding contingent and deferred assets of the marriage, (2) divided the defendant's supplementary pension plan, (3) excluded from division the passive appreciation of various assets that occurred while the action was proceeding, (4) concluded that General Statutes § 46b-81 was interpreted consistently with article first, § 20, of the constitution of Connecticut, (5) considered sources outside the record in reaching its decision, (6) excluded evidence and testimony regarding the values of termination and severance packages, and (7) demonstrated gender bias in favor of the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are relevant to the resolution of this appeal.1 As of the date of the articulated memorandum of decision, the defendant, Gary C. Wendt, was the chairman, president and chief executive officer of GE Capital Services, Inc. (GECS), with principal offices in Stamford. GECS is the largest division of General Electric Corporation (GE), which is believed to be one of the largest corporations in the world. The plaintiff, Lorna J. Wendt, has been throughout most of the parties' marriage a mother, homemaker and corporate wife who entertained GE customers and other business associates in various social and business settings. The plaintiff was neither employed nor paid by GE or GECS.
The plaintiff and the defendant were married in 1965. Thereafter, the plaintiff worked as a music teacher in Massachusetts while the defendant studied for his master's degree in business administration at Harvard University. The plaintiff stopped working as a music teacher after the first of the parties' two daughters was born in December, 1968.
After working in various positions, the defendant joined GECS in July, 1975, as the vice president of the real estate department. The defendant's employment with a major international corporation triggered an increased workload and extensive social duties. Entertainment grew more formal and on a larger scale, and the plaintiff commonly hosted events.
The defendant met with continuous success at GECS, successfully rescuing various financially troubled divisions within GECS, which gave him increased prominence within GE and culminated in his promotion to chief executive officer of GECS. The plaintiffs entertainment duties increased with the expansion of the defendant's corporate responsibilities. She traveled extensively with the defendant to numerous countries. During these years, she raised the children, cleaned house, paid bills, attended various functions and participated in their local church. Both parties acknowledged that the other party substantially contributed to instilling in their children high moral and family values.
As chief executive officer, the defendant proved to be highly effective and was well deserving of his high level of compensation. The defendant's career as chief executive officer is marked with success after success. The defendant also participated in the parties' family life and in raising their two children. He drove the children to camp and college, helped with homework, attended school functions, cared for them when they were sick, and helped them plan for college and graduate school. The defendant was active in civic affairs and received awards for his accomplishments.
Eventually, the marriage eroded and the parties were separated on December 1, 1995. The plaintiff filed a dissolution complaint on December 19, 1995. During an eighteen day trial, virtually every aspect of the parties' financial relationship over the thirty-two and one-half year marriage was examined. There were more than 100 exhibits, and numerous witnesses and multiple expert witnesses. Briefs of counsel, and citations to foreign cases and law review articles added an additional 1500 pages of material for the court to review. On December 3, 1997, the court entered orders regarding property distribution, alimony and related financial matters. A subsequent memorandum of decision more than 500 pages long containing comprehensive factual findings and legal analysis was issued on March 31, 1998. The plaintiff appealed on May 8, 1998. Additional facts will be discussed where necessary to the issues on appeal.
The plaintiff claims that the court improperly valued various contingent and deferred assets of the marriage. We disagree.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilkes v. Wilkes, 55 Conn. App. 313, 317, 738 A.2d 758 (1999); Schult v. Schult, 40 Corm. App. 675, 682, 672 A.2d 959 (1996), aff'd, 241 Conn. 767, 699 A.2d 134 (1997).
The plaintiff claims that the court improperly valued and divided assets of the marriage as of the date of the parties' separation, December 1, 1995,2 instead of the date of dissolution, December 3, 1997, as it is required to do. We disagree.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zern v. Zern, 15 Conn. App. 292, 296, 544 A.2d 244 (1988); see also General Statutes § 46b-81.
The plaintiffs claim fails because the court did exactly what § 46b-81 and interpreting cases require: The court valued the marital property at the date of dissolution. As the court stated in its memorandum of decision: (Emphasis added.)
Our careful examination of the court's findings of fact reveals that the court's decision was not improper. First and foremost, the court explicitly stated that it valued the assets as of the date of the dissolution decree. This statement even serves as a heading for one of the subsections of the court's memorandum of decision. Indeed, with respect to GE stock, which constitutes the majority of the value of the assets in this case, the court expressly stated that it would divide the stock, along with cash and mutual funds, "as of their date of decree value."
A review of the court's reasoning reveals a careful and thoughtful discussion of the proper distribution of the assets and that valuation occurred at the date of the decree.3 It is black letter law that Connecticut is an equitable distribution property state; Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 792, 663 A.2d 365 (1995); and that this approach to property division "does not limit, either by timing or method of acquisition or by source of funds, the property subject to a trial court's broad allocative power." Id.; Tyc v. Tyc, 40 Conn. App. 562, 565-66, 672 A.2d 526, cert. denied, 237 Conn. 916, 676 A.2d 398 (1996); annot., Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrine, 41 A.L.R.4th 481 (1985).4
The plaintiff makes much of the fact that the court looked to the date of separation when considering the ultimate distribution of the assets. This consideration by the court was not improper. The principle that requires the court to value assets as of the date of dissolution does not absolutely preclude the court from considering the significance of the date of separation. ...
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