Wensel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

Decision Date07 August 2002
Docket NumberNo. C01-3019-MWB.,C01-3019-MWB.
Citation218 F.Supp.2d 1047
PartiesKelli Rae WENSEL, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Michael Carroll, Coppola, Sandre, McConville & Carroll, PC, West Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

Scott Davies, Jason Hedican, Briggs Morgan, PA, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BENNETT, Chief Judge.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................1050
                   A. Procedural Background .............................................1050
                   B. Disputed And Undisputed Facts .....................................1050
                      1. The training program ...........................................1051
                      2. Wensel's employment and training ...............................1051
                II. DISCUSSION ..........................................................1052
                   A. Standards For Summary Judgment ....................................1052
                      1. Requirements of Rule 56 ........................................1053
                      2. The parties' burdens ...........................................1053
                      3. Summary judgment in employment discrimination cases ............1054
                   B. Common-Law Claims .................................................1055
                   C. Discrimination Claims .............................................1055
                      1. Price Waterhouse direct evidence framework .....................1057
                         a. The speaker .................................................1059
                         b. The content .................................................1059
                         c. Causation ...................................................1061
                      2. Circumstantial evidence and the McDonnell Douglas
                burden-shifting paradigm .......................................1062
                         a. Disparate treatment through constructive discharge ..........1062
                             i. Intolerableness of working conditions ...................1064
                            ii. Opportunity to respond ..................................1066
                         b. Pregnancy discrimination: Failure to receive independent
                agent contract ..............................................1068
                
                i. Did Wensel suffer an adverse employment action? .........1069
                            ii. Were other agents who received contracts similarly
                situated to Wensel? .....................................1070
                           iii. Legitimate business justification and proof of pretext ..1071
                III. CONCLUSION .........................................................1073
                

In this employment discrimination case, the plaintiff claims that, because of her pregnancy, she was treated unfairly and differently than her counterparts in the defendant's training program and, as a result, that she was constructively discharged. More specifically, the plaintiff participated in the defendant's Trainee Agent program with the hope of being awarded an independent agency contract and operating her own franchise insurance office in Sheldon, Iowa. However, after two extensions of her training period, the second of which occurred during the third trimester of her pregnancy, the plaintiff concluded that she would not be granted agency status and, consequently, resigned. On this motion for summary judgment, the court is called upon to decide whether the plaintiff has generated genuine issues of material fact on her claims of disparate treatment based on constructive discharge and failure to receive an independent agency contract.

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 2, 2001. In her complaint, she alleges eight causes of action, including two statutory claims of gender discrimination under both Title VII and chapter 216 of the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") and six state common-law claims of fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel. This court's exercise of jurisdiction over the plaintiff's federal claim is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (providing for original jurisdiction of Title VII claims in federal district courts). Jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state-law claims is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). In addition, this litigation is timely, because the plaintiff brought this suit within the prescribed 90 days after having received administrative releases from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, which were issued on December 19, 2000 and on January 3, 2001, respectively.

This action is scheduled for a jury trial to begin on September 23, 2002. Before the court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The court heard oral arguments on this motion on August 2, 2002. Counsel were thoroughly prepared, well-versed in relevant caselaw, and provided helpful input. The defendant was represented at these arguments by Scott Davies and Jason Hedican, of Briggs Morgan PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota. The plaintiff was represented by Michael Carroll, of Coppola, Sandre, McConville & Carroll, P.C., West Des Moines, Iowa.

B. Disputed And Undisputed Facts

The factual background of this case can be summarized in a fairly succinct manner because there are very few disputed facts. Instead, the parties' principle arguments on this motion for summary judgment center on the legal significance of the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's employment and her resignation.

1. The training program

The defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), provides insurance services through sales agents who operate as independent contractors. "Agency 2000" refers to the former training program through which State Farm employees transitioned into independent agents. Prior to entering this training program, the plaintiff, Kelli Rae Wensel ("Wensel"), worked as a claims specialist for approximately three years. In April of 1997, after some preliminary screening, State Farm selected Wensel to participate in the Agency 2000 process. State Farm ceased the Agency 2000 program midway through Wensel's training process in December of 1998 and implemented a three-phase process, which is similar to Agency 2000 but stresses different criteria. Wensel notes, however, that State Farm did not inform candidates of the new program nor of its new criteria until March of 1999.

State Farm's Agency 2000 training program consisted of an initial six-month training period, after which a selection committee identified those candidates who would continue with the process. If a candidate was approved, she left her current position with State Farm and began intern training, which entailed a six to eight month intensive course of study at State Farm's regional headquarters. In Wensel's case, she completed her intern training in Lincoln, Nebraska. If a candidate successfully completed intern training, as Wensel did, she was offered a trainee agent contract.

In both the Agency 2000 and three-phase programs, while a trainee agent, or "TA," the candidate receives a salary from State Farm, and State Farm rents an office and pays most office expenses. During this time, TAs are supervised and evaluated by a "management team." Wensel's management team consisted of Terry Barton (Agency Vice President for Iowa), Mark Hecox (Agency Field Executive), Marsha Carlson (Agency Field Consultant), and Becky Moore and Mark Maxon (Agency Field Specialists). Throughout the training process, members of the management team provide feedback in the form of written progress reports. A candidate continues as a TA for a minimum of twelve months before being considered for an independent contractor agreement.

The three-phase program is similar to the Agency 2000 program except that it is broken down into separate phases, with greater emphasis on staff management. A TA advances through the phases of this program based on his or her management team's assessment of the TA's skills. At the time of her resignation, Wensel was in the final phase of the three-phase training process.

2. Wensel's employment and training

Wensel acknowledges that State Farm held the trainee agent process out as lasting a minimum of twelve months. However, she contends that the pattern and practice of the company was to award independent contracts to TAs after twelve months. Wensel became a TA in Sheldon, Iowa on August 1, 1998. At a meeting in May of 1999, State Farm informed Wensel that she would not receive her agency contract in August as Wensel had originally anticipated. At the time she learned of State Farm's decision, she was pregnant, but it is undisputed that State Farm did not know of her pregnancy at the time it decided to extend her training period. Upset because she had planned her pregnancy around her expectation to be an independent contractor in August, she left this meeting crying. It was at this time that her management team learned of her pregnancy.

Wensel resigned from the training program on January 10, 2000, effective February 29, 2000, after her training period was extended for a second time in October of 1999. Thus, Wensel had been a TA for 14 months at the time her training period was extended for the second time and for 17 months at the time of her resignation. She claims that when her training period was extended in October of 1999, it was clear to her that she would not be awarded independent contractor status and was constructively discharged.

Wensel completed her intern training with five other candidates: Jay Gotta, Brenda Henning, Eric Kent, Jeff Huff, and Rick Hernandez. Like Wensel, all five classmates became TAs. Of these, Kent, Huff, and Hernandez, like Wensel, were...

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