Wentworth v. Crawford and Co.

• Decision Date: 24 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-089.,01-089.
• Citation: 807 A.2d 351
• Parties: Joan WENTWORTH v. CRAWFORD AND COMPANY.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

807 A.2d 351

Joan WENTWORTH v. CRAWFORD AND COMPANY.

No. 01-089.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

May 24, 2002.

Motion for Reargument Denied July 26, 2002.

Thomas C. Nuovo of Bauer, Anderson & Gravel, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

James E. Preston of Pierson, Wadhams, Quinn & Yates, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.

Present: AMESTOY, C.J., DOOLEY, MORSE, JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ.

AMESTOY, C.J.

Plaintiff Joan Wentworth appeals the trial court's dismissal of her negligence complaint against defendant Crawford & Company, a firm Wentworth's employer hired to provide her with vocational rehabilitation benefits after a workplace injury. The trial court dismissed Wentworth's complaint pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) because it determined that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for harm flowing from her workplace injury. We affirm, although on different grounds. See Sorge v. State, 171 Vt. 171, 174 n. *, 762 A.2d 816, 818 n. * (2000) (Supreme Court may affirm correct result below for different reasons on appeal).

Motions to dismiss for lack of a cognizable legal claim are not favored and are rarely granted. Ass'n of Haystack Prop. Owners, Inc. v. Sprague, 145 Vt. 443, 446-47, 494 A.2d 122, 124 (1985). Dismissal is inappropriate unless there is no doubt that the plaintiff could prove no facts or circumstances entitling her to relief. Id. The motion tests whether the complaint adequately states a claim; thus, the court must restrict its inquiry to the facts alleged in the complaint. See Bennett Estate v. Travelers Ins. Co., 138 Vt. 189, 190-91, 413 A.2d 1208, 1209 (1980); see also Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (when deciding a motion under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the court must limit its consideration to facts stated in the complaint, attachments thereto, or to matters the court may judicially notice); 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1356, at 298 (1990) (a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests only whether the plaintiff has adequately stated a claim and court's inquiry must be limited to complaint's contents). We regard as true the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations when reviewing an order on a motion under V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Sprague, 145 Vt. at 444,494 A.2d at 123.

In this case, Wentworth's complaint alleged that she was employed by Fanny Allen Hospital as a licensed practical nurse for over twenty years.¹ In October 1992, she injured her back. She returned to work in the fall of 1993, but reinjured her back that November while attempting to move a deceased patient. The following month, defendant Crawford & Company, who was hired to provide Wentworth with vocational rehabilitation benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act, see 21 V.S.A. § 641(a) (Cum.Supp.2001), made an initial evaluation of Wentworth, including her physical limitations. Crawford determined that Wentworth's limitations prevented her from returning to her former position at Fanny Allen. She was directed to stay in touch with the hospital to determine what other jobs might be available to her.

Although Crawford completed its initial evaluation of Wentworth, it did not prepare a written report detailing an appropriate vocational rehabilitation plan for her. From December 1993 to January 1999, Crawford contacted Fanny Allen on one occasion only to ascertain the availability of suitable alternative employment for Wentworth, and did not inform Wentworth of her rights to reinstatement at Fanny Allen under 21 V.S.A. § 643b. Fanny Allen had a unit secretary position available which Wentworth could have performed after minimal training. Wentworth sought employment elsewhere, however, and further injured her back.

In December 1999, Wentworth filed her complaint against Crawford in Chittenden Superior Court. She alleged that the workers' compensation rules required Crawford to prepare an individual written rehabilitation plan, but it failed to do so. She claimed Crawford also failed to inform her of her rights to reinstatement with Fanny Allen. The complaint alleged that Crawford owed Wentworth a duty to "uphold the law and provide competent rehabilitation services to her," and it breached that duty by failing to assist her in obtaining employment and by violating the workers' compensation rules promulgated by the Vermont Department of Labor and Industry. Consequently, Wentworth alleged, she suffered economic harm in the form of lost wages and benefits. The complaint did not allege that Crawford's conduct caused Wentworth any physical injury.

Crawford moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion on the grounds that Wentworth's complaint did not allege a cognizable claim outside the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. See 21 V.S.A. § 622. It reasoned that Crawford was hired by her employer after her compensable back injury, and therefore Wentworth's remedies lie exclusively under the Act pursuant to 21 V.S.A. § 622. Unless Wentworth could show that Crawford undertook a duty outside and independent of the Act, and that she suffered additional physical injuries flowing from Crawford's breach of that duty, her claim fell within § 622 and dismissal was required. Although we analyze Wentworth's claim differently than did the trial court, we agree that dismissal of her complaint was proper.

Wentworth's brief, like her complaint, demonstrates that her primary grievance was Crawford's alleged failure to abide by the Department's vocational rehabilitation rules. She argues that the rules required Crawford to prepare and have her sign a written rehabilitation plan so that she could obtain suitable employment with Fanny Allen. She also claims that Crawford was required to provide training and to pursue alternative employment for her at the hospital, as well as preserve her reinstatement rights. Crawford disputes those allegations, and argues that she should have pursued and exhausted available administrative remedies with the Department of Labor and Industry to address her dissatisfaction with Crawford's services. Under the exhaustion doctrine one must generally pursue available administrative remedies prior to filing a civil complaint. See In re D.A. Assocs., 150 Vt. 18, 20, 547 A.2d 1325, 1326 (1988) ("[W]hen an administrative remedy is established by statute or regulation, relief must not only be sought in accordance therewith, but must first be exhausted before recourse to the courts is available."). A review of the statutory and regulatory scheme persuades us that Crawford's exhaustion-of-remedies argument has merit.

Vocational rehabilitation benefits are available when a workplace injury prevents the employee from performing work for which she had previous training or experience. 21 V.S.A. § 641(a). The benefits include retraining and job placement, and their purpose is "to restore the employee to suitable employment." Id. The statute does not "impose a duty on the employer or its insurer to develop a rehabilitation plan for [an injured employee]," but, rather, it "contemplates that the parties will cooperate in the development and implementation of a plan." Wroten v. Lamphere, 147 Vt. 606, 612, 523 A.2d 1236, 1239 (1987). The rules the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry promulgated in 1994² required the vocational rehabilitation service provider to file an "Individual Written Rehabilitation Plan" (IWRP), "[w]here appropriate," after assessing the injured worker's eligibility for vocational rehabilitation services. Vt. Workers' Compensation & Occupational Disease Act Rule 29 (eff. Feb. 7, 1994). The rules defined an IWRP as a "written document completed by a rehabilitation service provider and an injured worker which describes the manner and means by which the injured worker will be returned to suitable employment through the use of rehabilitation services." Rule 26(b). The IWRP's purpose was "to document not only the vocational goal(s) agreed upon but also each party's responsibilities in achieving the goal(s)." Id.

The Department's rules also required the injured worker, the employer or its insurance carrier, and the rehabilitation service provider to sign the IWRP. Rule 29(d). The Commissioner would approve the IWRP if the Commissioner determined that the vocational goal, and the plan established to meet that goal, were appropriate. Rule 29(e). If any party to the plan did not sign the IWRP, or if the Commissioner had "reason to doubt" the plan's appropriateness, the rules authorized the Department to convene an informal conference or a formal hearing to resolve the matter. Rule 29(e). Most importantly, Rule 32 authorized the Commissioner to order a change in rehabilitation service provider "upon a showing that the current provider is not complying with the spirit and/or letter of [the] rules," is not qualified under standards set forth in rules, and/or is not able to engage in an effective working relationship with the injured employee as a result of irreconcilable differences between the two parties. Rule 32. The rule's obvious purpose was to ensure that a claimant entitled to vocational rehabilitation benefits obtained effective and competent service from the provider. Rule 32 also furthered the Legislature's directive that the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry be the primary authority for determining questions arising under the Workers' Compensation Act. See 21 V.S.A. § 606; DeGray v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 106 Vt. 259, 268, 173 A. 556, 559 (1934). Wentworth should have sought to remedy Crawford's alleged failures through the relief available under Rule 32.

Wentworth argues that exhaustion was not required for two reasons. She first claims that the Department's rules did not allow her to request a change in service provider until sometime in 2000. That claim is without support because,...