Wentworth v. Meyer, D-2662

Citation839 S.W.2d 766
Decision Date16 September 1992
Docket NumberNo. D-2662,D-2662
PartiesJeff WENTWORTH, Relator, v. Fred MEYER, Chairman, State Republican Executive Committee, Respondent.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Robert J. Meyers, San Antonio, Randall Buck Wood, Austin, John E. Clark, San Antonio, for relator.

Harold D. Hammett, Fort Worth, Robert D. Daniel, Houston, Kenneth W. Anderson, Jr., Dallas, Javier P. Guajardo, Austin, Michael E. Grimes, Round Rock, J. Patrick Wiseman, Austin, for respondent.

OPINION

COOK, Justice.

In this original proceeding, we must determine whether the Texas Constitution prevents Relator Jeff Wentworth from serving as a state senator in the Texas legislature. The legislative term would overlap, by twenty-one days, Wentworth's previous term of appointment to the Board of Regents of the Texas State University System. The question is whether article III, section 19 of the Texas Constitution renders Wentworth ineligible because of this overlap. Wentworth denies his candidacy violates the constitution because he resigned his position on the Board long ago, and seeks mandamus relief to ensure his place on the ballot as the Republican nominee. Because we determine that Wentworth's resignation prior to running for office places him outside the prohibitions

of the constitution, we conditionally grant the writ. 1
I.

On March 24, 1987, the Governor appointed Wentworth to the Board of Regents for a six year term that would expire on February 1, 1993. On May 10, 1988, Wentworth resigned as regent, before assuming office as a state representative on May 11, 1988, after a special election. Wentworth was re-elected to the House of Representatives in November 1988 and November 1990, and his current term as a representative would not expire until the legislature convenes on January 12, 1993, when his prospective term as state senator, should he prevail, would begin.

Wentworth won the Republican nomination for State Senator from District 26 in a runoff election on April 14, 1992. On April 24, Fred Meyer, State Chairman of the Republican Party of Texas, certified to the Secretary of State that Wentworth was the Republican Party's nominee for the office. Three weeks later, Meyer notified the Secretary of State by letter that he had determined and declared Wentworth ineligible as the Republican nominee. Meyer further informed the Secretary that the district executive committee, or the State Republican Executive Committee, would be selecting a replacement nominee for the general election. Meyer based his decision on article III, section 19 of the constitution:

No judge of any court, Secretary of State, Attorney General, clerk of any court of record, or any person holding a lucrative office under the United States, or this State, or any foreign government shall during the term for which he is elected or appointed, be eligible to the Legislature.

TEX. CONST. art. III, § 19.

II.

We consider the question whether Wentworth's resignation from the Board, four years before his victory in the recent runoff election, saves his candidacy from the prohibition of section 19. Resolution of the issue requires interpretation of the words "during the term for which he is elected or appointed." The words support two interpretations. If the "term" which cannot overlap is the entire six-year Board term, then Wentworth cannot become a state senator. If Wentworth's "term" ended when he resigned, then he is free to run for legislative office.

In interpreting any constitutional provision, we begin with the text of the constitution. When there is doubt as to the meaning of the literal text, we must then consider the intent of the people who adopted the constitution, although the history of that intent is often difficult to discern. See Edgewood v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.1989) (citation omitted). We remain aware that the constitution was ratified to function as an organic document to govern society and institutions as they evolve through time. Id. These general principles are buttressed by another, more specific, rule of interpretation in disputes involving elections: Any constitutional or statutory provision which restricts the right to hold office must be strictly construed against ineligibility. Brown v. Meyer, 787 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.1990). This rule is particularly important where, as here, the language is susceptible of varied interpretations.

In Dawkins v. Meyer, 825 S.W.2d 444 (1992), we discussed the purpose of section 19. The provision bolsters the separation of powers within our state government. Specifically, the section protects the legislature from undue influence by certain officeholders. Id. at 448; see also TEX. CONST. art. III, § 8, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955) (commentary authored by A.J. Thomas, Jr. and Ann Van Wymen Thomas).

It is consistent with this purpose to interpret section 19 as prohibiting those officeholders from sitting in the legislature during the time they hold their offices. On the other hand, the purpose of section 19 is not advanced by denying legislative office to someone who abandons his office four

years before seeking a legislative seat. That this is so is illustrated by the case before us today. Wentworth can exert no influence over the legislature by virtue of his former position as a regent, for he resigned that position four years ago. It was filled and is now occupied by someone else. Moreover, Wentworth has already served two terms in the legislature as a member of the House of Representatives. The purpose of section 19 cannot be fostered by an interpretation that denies this former regent the opportunity to run for the state senate
III.

We are aware that the views we express today conflict with previous opinions of this court. In Lee v. Daniels, 377 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.1964), a case remarkably like the one we consider today, we construed section 19 in favor of ineligibility. In Lee, a county commissioner resigned office to run for the house of representatives. His term as commissioner overlapped the house term by nearly two months. A petition for writ of mandamus was filed to remove his name from the ballot. We conditionally granted the writ. Id. at 620. It made no difference that the office seeker in Lee resigned prior to seeking office. We stated that it is the term which controls, and it makes no difference when the office-holder resigns, even if he resigns only a day after he begins holding office. Id. at 619; see also Kirk v. Gordon, 376 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.1964) (district attorney who proffered letter of resignation could not run for state representative).

This interpretation of section 19 is at odds with the rule that requires us to strictly construe election law restrictions against ineligibility. The interpretation narrows, rather than expands, the potential for eligibility. Because we are bound to decide in favor of eligibility whenever possible, we must reevaluate our opinion in Lee.

We initially review our contention that, by adopting the disputed language of section 19, the framers intended to insure that "term of office" meant an entire term, not just the officeholder's tenure in the term. Without this meaning, we said, the language is mere surplusage. Lee, 618 S.W.2d at 620. The interpretation is plausible, but it is only one possible suggestion for adoption of the phrase. Addition of the critical language could carry other meanings. The phrase could mean that officeholders are disqualified only during their tenure in office, and not perpetually. Given the two interpretations, and absent an adequate history of the constitutional convention to guide us, we must advance the purpose of section 19 and adhere to the rule requiring us to decide in favor of eligibility. We can no longer view the language at issue as preventing eligibility where an officeholder has resigned before running for the legislature.

We also review the authority cited in Lee. We relied upon the constitutions of other states and three out-of-state cases to support our holding. Our current research, however, reveals no out-of-state constitutional provisions which prevent a officeholder from running for the legislature once resigning office. As for the three cited cases, none involve either provisions or situations which mirror those we consider today. See generally Rowe v. Tuck, 149 Ga. 88, 99 S.E. 303 (1919) (statute prohibiting simultaneous service in municipal offices); State ex rel. Childs v. Sutton, 63 Minn. 147, 65 N.W. 262 (1895) (constitutional provision prohibiting legislators from holding other offices); Baskin v. State of Oklahoma, 107 Okla. 272, 232 P. 388 (1925) (constitutional prohibition against legislators receiving gubernatorial appointments).

Lee v. Daniels and Kirk v. Gordon adopt an interpretation of section 19 which restricts eligibility without adequate support in the language of the section or its purpose. For this reason, and to the extent they conflict with our decision today, these cases are overruled.

We do not, however, overrule or disturb in any way our holding and opinion in Dawkins v. Meyer, 825 S.W.2d at 448. The facts and issue in that case were entirely different than those presented here. Dawkins

was argued and decided on the issue whether the office which prevented Dawkins' candidacy was lucrative within the meaning of section 19. Unlike Wentworth, when Dawkins moved for leave to file the petition for writ of mandamus, she had not resigned the office and had expressed no intent to resign
IV.

Wentworth resigned his position as a member of the Board of Regents of the Texas State University System years before he ran for the Senate. During part of the intervening years, he served as a state representative. His position as regent was filled by someone else. To allow Wentworth to take his seat as a senator does not violate either the express language or the purpose of article III, section 19 of the Texas Constitution. The language does not prevent those who have resigned from...

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