Wentworth v. S.A. Woods MaCh. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1895
• Citation: Wentworth v. S.A. Woods MaCh. Co., 163 Mass. 28, 39 N.E. 414 (Mass. 1895)
• Parties: WENTWORTH et al. v. S.A. WOODS MACH. CO. et al.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

163 Mass. 28

39 N.E. 414

WENTWORTH et al. v. S.A. WOODS MACH. CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 8, 1895

COUNSEL

Jesse C. Ivy, for appellants.

Josiah S. Dean, for appellees.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

This is an appeal from a decree of a justice of the superior court sitting in equity. The evidence is reported, and the report contains no statement of rulings made or facts found. If the evidence warranted a finding of facts on which the decree could properly be made, the decree must be affirmed. So far as the decision depends on findings of fact, it will be sustained, unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Biggerstaff v. Marston, 161 Mass. 101, 36 N.E. 785; Sheffield v. Parker, 158 Mass. 331, 33 N.E. 501; Francis v. Daley, 150 Mass. 381, 23 N.E. 218; Debinson v. Emmons, 158 Mass. 592, 33 N.E. 706.

The contracts under which the machines were delivered pass no title until the condition is performed, and the vendor, if guilty of no laches, may reclaim the property, even from one who has purchased from the vendee in good faith, and without notice. Coggill v. Railroad Co., 3 Gray, 545; Hirschorn v. Canney, 98 Mass. 149. The evidence well warranted the finding that the respondent the Woods Machine Company did not waive the condition, and that the condition was not peformed.

If the machines were of such a character, and if, with the knowledge and consent of the Woods Machine Company, they were affixed to the freehold in such a manner and under such circumstances as would make them a part of the real estate according to the rules applied between grantor and grantee and if the plaintiffs acquired a title to the real estate without notice of the title of the machine company, they would belong to the plaintiffs, under their deeds. Stove Co. v. Way, 141 Mass. 557, 6 N.E. 714; Southbridge Sav. Bank v. Exeter Mach. Works, 127 Mass. 542. This proposition presents for consideration questions of fact which must have been decided against the plaintiff at the hearing. The evidence well warranted this decision. Fitzpatrick, when he ordered the machines, and for a long time afterwards, was only a tenant of the building in which they were placed. He got them insured as personal property, and the insurance was made payable to the S.A. Woods Machine Company, as its interests might appear. In his insolvency proceedings, the Woods Manufacturing Company was included in his list of creditors, and its debt was alleged to be secured by instruments described as "leases." When the real estate was conveyed to him, he gave the plaintiff Marcy his note for $10,000 in part payment of the price, and he gave a mortgage on these machines, as personal property, to secure the note. The machines rested on the floor, and were fastened merely by screws, through holes in the legs, for the purpose of steadying them. They were of a regular, stock pattern. They could be removed without injury to the building, and they were suitable for use in any other planing mill. All of these were facts proper to be considered by the judge, in determining the question whether the machines had become a part of the real estate. It was a question of mixed law and fact,...