Werner v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1942
• Docket Number: No. 26293.,26293.
• Citation: 42 N.E.2d 82,379 Ill. 559
• Parties: WERNER v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

379 Ill. 559

42 N.E.2d 82

WERNER

v.ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

No. 26293.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 16, 1942.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing June 9, 1942.

Action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act by Paul W. Werner against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Appellate Court, 309 Ill.App. 292, 33 N.E.2d 121, and defendant appeals.

Reversed.Appeal from Appellate Court, Fourth District, on Appeal from City Court of East St. Louis; William F. Borders, Judge.

Kramer, Campbell, Costello & Wiechert and Norman J. Gundlach, all of East St. Louis (E. C. Craig, V. W. Foster, and Charles A. Helsell, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Mark D. Eagleton, Edward L. Eyerman, and Roberts P. Elam, all of St. Louis, Mo. (McGlynn & McGlynn, of East St. Louis, and John S. Marsalek, of St. Louis, Mo., of counsel), for appellee.

MURPHY, Chief Justice.

The Appellate Court affirmed a judgment of the city court of East St. Louis (309 Ill.App. 292, 33 N.E.2d 121) and leave to appeal was granted by this court. After the appeal was granted the appellant obtained leave of court to file a motion which for the first time raised a question of the jurisdiction of the city court. The motion was taken with the case and each of the parties filed supplemental briefs on the jurisdictional issues.

The facts necessary to a consideration of the motion are, that in 1936 plaintiff Paul W. Werner resided in De Witt county and was in the employ of the defendant Illinois Central Railroad Company as a brakeman. While so engaged in defendant's railroad yards in Pana, Christian county, he received injuries. He instituted this suit in the city court of East St. Louis against the defendant, claiming there was liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. Defendant maintained an office in East St. Louis and service was had upon it within the territorial limits of the city.

Defendant's motion to dismiss raises a question as to the territorial jurisdiction of the city court. It is contended that under the constitution and statute, city courts have no jurisdiction over a case where the cause of action declared upon arose without the territorial limits of the city.

The constitution of 1818, section 1 of article 4, created the Supreme Court. Power to create inferior courts was vested in the General Assembly. The constitution of 1848, section 1 of article 5 provided ‘The judicial power of this state shall be and is hereby vested in one supreme court, in circuit courts, in county courts, and in justices of the peace: Provided, that inferior local courts, of civil and criminal jurisdiction, may be established by the general assembly in the cities of this state, but such courts shall have a uniform organization and jurisdiction in such cities.’ The provision of the 1948 constitution came before this court in People ex rel. Beebe v. Evans, 18 Ill. 361. The General Assembly had adopted an act which was entitled: ‘To establish a recorder's court for the cities of La Salle and Peru.’ Public Laws 1857, p. 168. It declared that the jurisdiction was concurrent with the ‘circuit court of La Salle county, in the towns of La Salle and Salisbury, in said county,’ etc. An original action of mandamus was started in this court to command the clerk of the recorder's court to file certain papers. The defense was that the act creating the court was unconstitutional. The act was construed as an attempt to create a city court to be held within the confines of the city with the territorial jurisdiction extending to the towns of La Salle and Salisbury, beyond the boundary lines of the city. After quoting the constitutional provision, it was said: ‘In our opinion, this limits the territorial jurisdiction of the courts, to be established under this proviso, to the cities, for which and within which they are established. * * * They were intended to be for the benefit of the cities, and to meet their wants, and not of the adjacent country. They were designed to dispose of the litigation arising in the cities.'

In People ex rel. Montgomery v. Barr, 22 Ill. 241, the plaintiff had obtained a judgment in the court of common pleas in the city of Aurora. He applied for mandamus to command the clerk of that court to issue an execution to a foreign county on such judgment. A peremptory writ was awarded by this court but in doing so the distinction between jurisdiction of a court to issue an original process and the authority of a court to issue writs to give effect to its judgment was clearly pointed out. In making the distinction between the question of jurisdiction and the question of power, it was noted that the city courts were designed ‘to settle and dispose of the litigation arising in the cities' and that ‘we do not wish to be understood as saying that this court [city court] has jurisdiction to issue orginal process to be executed without the limits of the city.'

In Covill v. Phy, 26 Ill. 432, it was held that by reason of the constitutional provision the legislature could not give a city court jurisdiction to send its original processes beyond the city limits. It was said the legislature did not have the constitutional power to extend the jurisdiction of the city court beyond the city limits. A similar question was raised as to the city court of Sparta in Holmes v. Fihlenburg, 54 Ill. 203, and the same rule applied. In Gardner v. Witbord, 59 Ill. 145, jurisdiction of the Sparta court was again considered.It was said the territorial jurisdiction of the city court was limited by the constitution to the city of Sparta, citing the Evans and Holmes cases, supra. These cases established the law to be that the court provision in the constitution of 1848 did not leave the legislature with unrestricted power as to the territorial jurisdiction of a city court, but limited it to the territory within the city in which the court was created.

Section 1 of article 6 of the constitution of 1870, Smith-Hurd Stats., provides that ‘The judicial powers, except as in this article is otherwise provided, shall be vested in one supreme court, circuit courts, county courts, justices of the peace, police magistrates, and such courts as may be created by law in and for cities and incorporated towns.'

The first statute in reference to the creation of city courts, enacted after the adoption of the constitution of 1870, was an act approved March 26, 1874. Ill.Rev.Stat.1874, p. 345. It provided that city courts should ‘have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuits courts within the city in which the same may be, in all civil cases, and in all criminal cases except treason and murder.’ This section was amended in 1901, Laws of Illinois, 1901, p. 136, and as amended provided that city courts should ‘have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts within the city in which the same may be in all civil cases and in all criminal cases arising in said city,’ etc. The next amendment was in 1915. Laws of Illinois, 1915, p. 350, Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, c. 37, § 333. It declared that the city courts ‘shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court within the city in which the same may be in all civil cases both law and chancery and in all criminal cases arising in said city.’ It was amended in 1931 but the provision material here was not changed.

One of the first cases to reach this court after the adoption of the constitution of 1870, where the jurisdiction of a city court was in question, was Joslyn v. Dickerson, 71 Ill. 25. It was a chancery suit filed in the city court of Elgin in Kane county to enjoin the collection of a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace in McHenry county. While the question discussed is not the same as the one in the instant case, the court used the following language: ‘The court below [city court] had no jurisdiction beyond the limits of the city of Elgin’ and cites People v. Evans, supra, and Holmes v. Fihlenburg, supra. In Hercules Iron Works v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co., 141 Ill. 491, 30 N.E. 1050, 1051, the question was whether the city court of Aurora had jurisdiction in a condemnation proceeding under the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act. In determining what was meant by the words concurrent jurisdiction, it was said: ‘Concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court, as here used, means equal power and authority with the circuit court to hear and determine all civil and criminal causes, treason and murder excepted, the subject-matter of which arises within the prescribed territorial...