Werner v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 4-91-994. |
| Citation | 824 F. Supp. 890 |
| Parties | Mr. Richard WERNER & Dick Werner Sales, Plaintiffs, v. NEW BALANCE ATHLETIC SHOE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Thomas Corey Athens, Athens Law Office, Fergus Falls, MN, Victor H. Sparrow, III, Sparrow Law Office, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.
Holly A.R. Hart, Buster Clarence Hart, Fabyanske Svoboda Westra & Davis, St. Paul, MN, for defendant.
This matter is before the court on defendant New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.'s ("New Balance") motion for summary judgment. Based on a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, the court grants New Balance's motion.
In 1973, New Balance hired plaintiff Richard Werner to market its shoes to authorized retailers in the midwest region. Sometime during the 1980s, New Balance informed Werner that it was dissatisfied with his performance. New Balance claimed that Werner spent too much time marketing other brands of shoes at the expense of its product.
According to New Balance, Werner's performance did not improve. Therefore, on August 29, 1990, New Balance informed Werner that it would terminate him on December 31, 1990, unless he devoted more time to marketing New Balance shoes and increased sales in his territory. It is undisputed that Werner did not meet New Balance's requirements and on December 31, 1990, New Balance informed Werner that his services were no longer needed.
Werner now asserts five claims against New Balance:1
1. Price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (Count 1);
2. Violation of Minn.Stat. § 325E.37, subd. 5(a) (Count 2);
3. Breach of contract under the laws of both Minnesota and Massachusetts (Count 3);
4. Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the laws of both Minnesota and Massachusetts (Count 4); and
5. Failure to pay approximately $4,300 in commissions (Count 5).
New Balance now moves for summary judgment on counts 1 through 4 of the amended complaint. New Balance contends that summary judgment on Werner's price-fixing claim is appropriate because he agreed to dismiss that claim with prejudice on the condition that he be permitted to pursue a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. New Balance does not object to that condition and contends that the court should dismiss the price-fixing claim and consider the wrongful termination claim. New Balance notes, however, that even if the court considers the merits of the price-fixing claim, it should dismiss that claim because Werner proffers insufficient facts to support such a claim. New Balance contends that summary judgement on the termination claim is appropriate because no such claim is recognized under Minnesota law. New Balance contends that summary judgment on Werner's claim under Minn.Stat. § 325E.37 is warranted because that claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Finally, New Balance contends that summary judgment is appropriate on Werner's breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims because no facts exist supporting those claims. New Balance, however, does not discuss whether the court should apply Minnesota law, Massachusetts law, or both in resolving Werner's contract-based claims.
Werner apparently agrees that the court should dismiss his price-fixing claim, as set forth in count 1 of the amended complaint, and consider his allegation of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Werner contends that summary judgment is not appropriate on his wrongful termination claim because Minnesota recognizes such a claim and a material fact dispute precludes summary judgment on that claim. Werner contends that summary judgment on his claim under Minn.Stat. § 325E.37 is not appropriate because he filed his claim before the applicable statute of limitations expired. Finally, Werner contends that summary judgment on his contract claims is not appropriate because the parties entered into a valid and enforceable contract under which New Balance could only terminate him in good faith and for good cause. Like New Balance, Werner fails to discuss whether the court should apply Minnesota law, Massachusetts law or both to resolve his contract-based claims.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." This standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which requires the trial judge to direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Stated in the negative, summary judgment will not lie if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In order for the moving party to prevail, it must demonstrate to the court that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. On a motion for summary judgment, all evidence and inferences are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12. The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Moreover, if a plaintiff cannot support each essential element of its claim, summary judgment must be granted because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. With this standard at hand, the court will consider New Balance's motion for summary judgment.
During oral arguments on New Balance's motion for summary judgment, Werner's attorney stated that Werner has no standing to pursue his price-fixing claim as set forth in count 1 of the amended complaint. The court thus dismisses with prejudice Werner's price-fixing claim.2 However, in keeping with the parties' agreement, the court will consider the merits of Werner's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
Werner contends that New Balance discharged him in violation of the law because it terminated him after he refused to participate in its price-fixing scheme. Minnesota's whistleblower statute provides:
Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(c). Minn.Stat. § 181.931, subd. 2, however, provides that "employee as used in § 181.932, subd. 1 does not include an independent contractor." During oral arguments, Werner's counsel admitted that Werner was an independent contractor, not an employee. Thus, by its express terms, Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(c) does not apply in this case.
Werner contends that his discharge claim is based on common law. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered and rejected a similar argument in Piekarski v. Home Owners Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 956 F.2d 1484 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 206, 121 L.Ed.2d 147 (1992).
We reject Piekarski's common law claim for ... retaliatory discharge.... Minnesota courts have not recognized a common law action for discharge based on refusal to violate the law that exists independently of the action under Minnesota Statute § 181.932(1)(c).
Id. at 1493 (citations omitted); see also Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins., Co., 728 F.Supp. 1389, 1394 (D.Minn.1989) ().
Werner contends that Piekarski is distinguishable from the case at hand because Piekarski was an employee, not an independent contractor. Werner thus contends that the court can apply a common law doctrine that prohibits the discharge of an independent contract for refusing to violate a state or federal law. Werner, however, cites no law that supports his theory. Moreover, Werner proffers no reason why the court should fashion a common law doctrine for independent contractors in light of the fact that Minnesota courts hold that employees have no such claim available to them. The court thus determines that Werner has no statutory or common law claim for discharge in violation of public policy and, therefore, summary judgment on his wrongful termination claim is warranted.
Werner alleges that New Balance's discharge of him constitutes a violation of Minn. Stat. § 325E.37. "That statute, however, applies only to sale representative agreements that were either entered into or renewed after July 31, 1990." Sports and Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Chicago Cutlery Co., 811 F.Supp. 1372, 1378 n. 9 (D.Minn.1993). Werner states that he entered into an oral agreement...
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McClure v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.
...(McClure contract). The protections provided by § 181.932 are therefore not available to plaintiffs. See Werner v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 824 F.Supp. 890, 893 (D.Minn.1993) (holding that Minn.Stat. § 181.932 is inapplicable where plaintiff was an independent contractor). Even if p......