Wesley-Dickson v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 24 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10 Civ. 2428(JGK).,10 Civ. 2428(JGK).
• Parties: Lynnea WESLEY–DICKSON, Plaintiff, v. WARWICK VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

973 F.Supp.2d 386

Lynnea WESLEY–DICKSON, Plaintiff,

v.WARWICK VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. 10 Civ. 2428(JGK).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Sept. 24, 2013.

Frederick Kevin Brewington, Valerie Cartright, Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington, Hempstead, NY, for Plaintiff.

Patrick Joseph Fitzgerald, Scott Patrick Quesnel, Girvin & Ferlazzo, P.C., Albany, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:

The plaintiff, Lynnea Wesley–Dickson, brings this action against Warwick Valley Central School District (the “School District”), Christine Fox, Marijane Reinhard, and Kathy Carmody (collectively, the “defendants”). Defendants Fox, Reinhard, and Carmody are allegedly sued in their individual and official capacities. The plaintiff, an African–American woman diagnosed with cancer, was an employee of the School District, and alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race and disability.

The plaintiff brings claims against the defendants, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq. The defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing all of these claims, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I.

The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994). “[T]he trial court's task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue—finding; it does not extend to issue—resolution.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the matter that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts that are material and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir.1994). If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must produce evidence in the record and “may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible....” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir.1993).

II.

The following facts are undisputed for the purposes of this motion, unless otherwise indicated.

The School District is a public K–12 school district. (56.1 Stmts.¹ ¶ 1.) The plaintiff was hired by the School District in the summer of 2005 to fill a three-year probationary position as Supervisor of Special Education. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 2.) As Supervisor of Special Education, the plaintiff was responsible for overseeing the provision of services to the School District's special education students. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 3.)

The plaintiff's supervisor during her first year of probationary employment was Tammy Cosgrove, Director of Pupil Personnel Services (the “Director”) for the School District. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 6.) The Director is required, among other things, to review annually the performance of the Supervisor of Special Education. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 7.) For probationary employees, the Director's evaluation is used by the Superintendent of Schools in determining whether to recommend to the School District's Board of Education (the “Board”) that the employee be awarded tenure at the end of the probationary term. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 8.)

During the plaintiff's first year of probationary employment with the School District, Ms. Cosgrove counseled the plaintiff, both orally and in writing, about aspects of the plaintiff's performance that needed improvement. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 9.) On March 1, 2006, Ms. Cosgrove issued the plaintiff a written letter, in which Ms. Cosgrove identified “ongoing proofing and editing concerns” associated with the plaintiff's work product. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 10.)

At the end of the 2005–2006 school year, Ms. Cosgrove completed a performance evaluation for the plaintiff. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 11.) The evaluation was generally positive, commending the plaintiff for her strong interpersonal skills and personal qualities, and stating that the plaintiff had “excellent potential to be successful” in her position. (Bryant Aff. Ex. D.) However, the evaluation also highlighted some serious reservations that Ms. Cosgrove had. (Bryant Aff. Ex. D.)

Ms. Cosgrove noted that the plaintiff needed to improve in scheduling and holding meetings within mandated timelines. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 12.) According to Ms. Cosgrove, “[d]espite reminders and prompts from [Ms. Cosgrove], ... secretaries as well as the teachers themselves, Ms. Wesley–Dickson was, in almost every case, unable to return observations within the 10–day time frame specified in the teachers' contract. Teacher reactions to this situation ranged from sympathetic understanding to anxious discomfort to outright annoyance.” (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 13.)

Ms. Cosgrove also noted that the plaintiff's support staff was “stepping in” to complete tasks that fell under the plaintiff's job description “in order to prevent parent outrage and service provider ire.” (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 14.) Ms. Cosgrove went on to note that:

By far the area in which the most concern exists for Ms. Wesley–Dickson's future success as an administrator lies in her writing skills. The Supervisor of Special Education position demands significant written output in many areas.... Basic writing skills such as organization, grammar and punctuation are lacking in Ms. Wesley–Dickson's final products. Proofing and editing skills appear limited, as does the ability to incorporate specific suggestions for addressing problem areas in writing samples.... All of these factors combine to cause grave concern with Ms. Wesley–Dickson's ability to adequately perform a major component of her job.

(Bryant Aff. Ex. D; 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 15.)

According to Ms. Cosgrove, “[t]he concerns with Ms. Wesley–Dickson's timeliness and writing skills are significant as they pose a real impediment to producing ‘legally defensible documents'—the gold standard in the field of special education.” (Bryant Aff. Ex. D; 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 16.) Ms. Cosgrove cautioned, “[s]hould gains in [the areas of timeliness and quality of written products] not be demonstrated, serious consideration should be given to the appropriateness of continuing on in such a writing-intensive position.” (Bryant Aff. Ex. D; 56.1 Stmts. ¶ 17.)

In June 2006, Ms. Cosgrove left the Director position, and Kathleen Carmody was asked to serve as the Director on an interim basis. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 25.) Ms. Carmody served as the Director until approximately September 2006, when the School District permanently appointed Elizabeth Kirnie as the Director. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 27.) After Ms. Kirnie resigned in December 2006, Ms. Carmody became the acting Director for the rest of the 2006–2007 school year. (56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 28–30.)

The plaintiff alleges that, in around December 2006, when she told Ms. Carmody that she needed to take absences for chemotherapy, Ms. Carmody stated that she had a colleague on chemotherapy who came to work very unkempt at times and was unable to remember anything. (Wesley–Dickson Dep. at 86–90.) Ms. Carmody denies making any such statement to the plaintiff. (Carmody Aff. ¶ 8.)

On or about May 10, 2007, the plaintiff attended a meeting with the Superintendent of Schools at that time, Dr. Frank Greenhall. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 32.) Superintendent Greenhall informed the plaintiff about the possibility that he would not recommend her for tenure. (56.1 Stmts. ¶ 33.)

At some point in 2007, the plaintiff contacted her union representative, Ms. Mary Jane Hamburger, after receiving some negative memoranda about her work. (Hamburger Dep. at 15.) The plaintiff alleges that Ms. Hamburger advised Superintendent Greenhall that the School District failed to follow its own policies with respect to the plaintiff, because the plaintiff had not received enough evaluations as guaranteed by her contract. (Hamburger Dep. at 16.) The plaintiff alleges that Superintendent Greenhall told Ms. Hamburger in response that he was “not afraid to fire black people” and that he had already fired the School District's first black math teacher. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 100.) However, the plaintiff admits that she did not personally hear Superintendent Greenhall make these comments, and there is no admissible evidence of these comments. (56.1 Stmts. ¶¶ 81–82.) Ms. Hamburger has no recollection of these comments, (Hamburger Dep. at...