Wesley Glasgow v. William Moyer

Decision Date07 June 1912
Docket NumberNo. 1123,1123
Citation225 U.S. 420,32 S.Ct. 753,56 L.Ed. 1147
PartiesJ. WESLEY GLASGOW, Appt., v. WILLIAM H. MOYER, Warden of the United States Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs John C. Fay and Charles Colden Miller for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 421-423 intentionally omitted] Solicitor General Lehmann for appellee.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal is prosecuted to review the order of the district court, denying petition of appellant to be discharged in proceedings for habeas corpus from the custody of the warden of the United States Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia.

The petition alleges the following: On the 21st of July 1911, while appellant was temporarily in Wilmington, Delaware, he was arrested and charged with peddling books without a license, and was convicted in the municipal court of the city and fined $5. The judgment was almost immediately remitted and he was re-arrested and charged with having deposited in the United States mails a copy of an obscene book, and by one William G. Mahaffy, a United States commissioner, committed to the custody of the warden of the Newcastle County Workhouse to await the action of the grand jury. Under the direction of the United States attorney his rooms were pillaged and all of his possessions, clothing, books, etc., were carried off and deposited in the United States courthouse. Before his conviction he was stripped of his clothing, dressed in prison garb, harsh prison rules were enforced against him, and he was fed on unwholesome food. He was so confined and treated until a grand jury, selected by the commissioner who had committed him, found an indictment against him charging him with having deposited an obscene book in the United States mails, and without seeing a copy of the indictment or knowing its contents, he was arraigned in his prison clothes, notwithstanding the indictment charged no offense against the laws of the United States and was couched in vague and uncertain language that did not apprise him of the offense (defects which he brought to the attention of the judge of the district court by pleas to the jurisdiction, demurrers, and motions to quash, all of which were overruled), and he was placed on trial before a jury selected by the commissioner who had committed him. Although the array was challenged for that cause and the number of peremptory challenges prescribed by law were not allowed him, he was forced to trial, and the jury, under instructions from the court, was constrained to find a verdict against him, papers material to his defense having been withheld by the United States attorney, with the acquiescence of the judge, and process for nonresident witnesses having been refused.

Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were filed and the hearing thereof fixed for January 6, 1912, before Edward G. Bradford, district judge, who, having the petition alleged, exhibited during the trial a deep-seated prejudice against appellant and a violent partiality in his rulings for the United States attorney, appellant in good faith, as in law he was entitled to do, filed an affidavit charging him, the district judge, with prejudice, and an application to have the same certified to the senior circuit judge, then present in the circuit court of appeals for the third circuit, together with the required certificato of counsel as required by law.

The petition further alleged that by the filing of the same and by operation of the act of March 3, 1911 [36 Stat. at L. 1087, chap. 231, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 128], which went into operation January 1, 1912, the district judge became and was disqualified to further proceed in said cause, and any further action taken by him was without jurisdiction and absolutely null and void; further alleged that the judge forbade the clerk to enter of record the affidavit, forbade the clerk to certify the same to the senior circuit judge, proceeded to overrule the motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, and, against the protest of appellant, sentenced him to confinement in the penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia, for a term of fifteen months from the 6th of January 1912, and to pay a fine of $500.

Appellant, the petition alleged, was placed in the hands of the United States marshal and by him imprisoned by force in his (the marshal's) office from about 1 P. M., January 6, 1912, without being permitted to return to the court house to get his personal property there, and at midnight was spirited away by a circuitous route to Norfolk, Virginia, where he was imprisoned all night and all of the next day (Sunday). Thence he was taken, manacled, without being supplied with food or being allowed to purchase any, and delivered under the unlawful order of the district court to the custody of the appellee, by whom he has ever since been confined in the penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia.

Appellant, the petition alleged, is, by the action recited, not only unlawfully imprisoned, but by the refusal to certify his application, affidavit, and certificate of counsel to the senior circuit judge, 'there is now no judge of the United States district court of Delaware, and no one there authorized to pass upon his motions in arrest of judgment or motion for a new trial, or competent to sit and certify to the exceptions reserved by him to the many errors committed by said Judge Bradford during his trial, or to permit him to have the same reviewed and set aside by an appellate tribunal.'

A writ of habeas corpus was prayed, to the end that appellant be discharged or cause to the contrary be shown.

The writ was issued, but upon its return and hearing appellant was remanded to custody.

The court, as grounds for its decision, said: 'The real question in this case is whether or not, under § 21 of the new Judicial Code, an affidavit such as provided for therein can be filed after a case has been tried' and verdict rendered, and the attempt is to disqualify a judge from pronouncing sentence. The court pointed out that in the case at bar there was also the circumstance that the case had been tried and the verdict rendered before the Code went into effect, and the court thought that it could not be conceived that...

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