Wesley v. Collins
Decision Date | 28 February 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 3-84-0795.,3-84-0795. |
Citation | 605 F. Supp. 802 |
Parties | Charles WESLEY, et al. v. David COLLINS, et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Albert Bates, Summertown, Tenn., for C. Wesley, et al.
William B. Hubbard, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., William P. Sizer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., for D. Collins, et al.
In light of the significantly higher number of blacks convicted of felonies over that of whites, does a Tennessee law disenfranchising felons result in the unlawful dilution of the black vote in violation of the United States Constitution or the federal Voting Rights Act? The Court concludes that Tennessee may disqualify convicted felons from the voting public without unlawfully interfering with the equal opportunity of blacks to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The Court therefore dismisses the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Two plaintiffs bring suit in this Court alleging that the Tennessee Voting Rights Act of 1981, T.C.A. § 2-19-143 (1983 Supp.), denies them rights secured under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and under the federal Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) & (b) (1984 Supp.). The basic theories underlying plaintiffs' claims are, first, that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires Tennessee to demonstrate a compelling state interst justifying the disenfranchisement of felons since the classification impacts on the fundamental right to vote and, second, that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act proscribe disenfranchisement of felons because such state action results in the unlawful dilution of the black community's voting strength since so many more blacks are convicted of felonies than are whites.
Plaintiff Charles Wesley is an adult black citizen of Tennessee residing in Nashville, Tennessee. In February of 1984, Mr. Wesley entered a plea of guilty before Lewis County Circuit Court to a charge of accessory after the fact to the crime of larceny. The offense is defined as a felony in Tennessee; accordingly, Mr. Wesley's conviction resulted in his disenfranchisement.
On August 20, 1984, Mr. Wesley, along with the Natural Rights Center, a public interest law project active in the civil rights area, filed suit in this Court asserting claims under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 and under the federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief together with nominal and punitive damages. Plaintiffs name as defendants David Collins, the Tennessee Coordinator of Elections and W.J. Michael Cody, Attorney General and Reporter for the State of Tennessee.
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that a provision of the Tennessee Voting Rights Act requiring the disenfranchisement of felons, although facially neutral, is aimed at an attempt "to further secure the racial purity of the State legislature." Complaint ¶ 17. To bolster their claim, plaintiffs point to historical evidence of the repression of blacks in Tennessee—dating from the period of slavery during the 18th and 19th Centuries and continuing from emancipation to the present—marked by limited access to and segregation in the provision of health care, housing and education, and by sustained efforts to prevent blacks from registering to vote. The plaintiffs assert that disenfranchisement of felons is yet another example of official discrimination against blacks. They argue that under the Tennessee Voting Rights Act disenfranchisement of felons will, with time, progressively dilute the black vote thereby impeding the equal opportunity of blacks to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. As further support, plaintiffs cite an alleged statistic purporting to demonstrate the ratio of white felons to the general population of Tennessee whites to be approximately 1 to 1000, while the corresponding black ratio to be 1 to 100. Plaintiffs argue that the State of Tennessee lacks a compelling reason to justify disenfranchisement of felons and that the true reason for such state action is to impose a disproportionate disadvantage on blacks.
The Tennessee Voting Rights Act disenfranchises all persons convicted of "infamous crimes," as defined by the laws of Tennessee. T.C.A. § 2-19-143 (Supp.1984) provides:
"Infamous crimes" are defined under the Tennessee Code as felony convictions.
Upon conviction for any felony, it shall be the judgment of the court that the defendant be infamous and be immediately disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage.
T.C.A. § 40-20-112 (1982). Accordingly, all persons who have been convicted of crimes which at the time of conviction were defined as infamous are disenfranchised and no longer have the right to vote in Tennessee.1
The challenged Tennessee provision is authorized both by the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers states to disenfranchise persons convicted for "participation in rebellion, or other crimes."2 U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 2. Under the Tennessee Constitution, Article I, Section 5 provides:
The election shall be free and equal, and the right of suffrage, as hereinafter declared, shall never be denied to any person entitled thereto, except upon conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction.
Tenn. Const. Art. I, § 5. Constitutional authorization to disenfranchise criminals is addressed further in Article IV, Section 1, which provides:
Tenn. Const. art. IV, § 1. However, Section 2 provides: "Laws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage persons who may be convicted of infamous crimes." Tenn. Const., art. IV, § 2. The extension of suffrage to Tennessee citizens is a self-executing constitutional right, whereas exception to the universal grant depends on legislative curtailment of the right. Crutchfield v. Collins, 607 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tenn.App.), cert. denied (Tenn.1980). Thus, the Tennessee Legislature is empowered—and has exercised its authority—to disenfranchise those persons convicted of infamous crimes.
Plaintiffs argue that because the right to vote is fundamental the State of Tennessee must demonstrate a compelling state interest warranting disenfranchisement of felons so as to satisfy strict judicial scrutiny of the challenged statutory provision. The Court disagrees. While the right to vote ordinarily is deemed a fundamental interest, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886), federal courts consistently have recognized the right of states pursuant to section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to disenfranchise persons convicted of "participation in rebellion, or other crimes."3 In Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld a California statute disenfranchising convicted felons, ruling that even in light of the equal protection language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment ( ), the "affirmative sanction" contained in Section 2 expressly empowered ...
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