Wessels v. Beeman
| Decision Date | 28 July 1891 |
| Citation | 49 N.W. 483,87 Mich. 481 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | WESSELS v. BEEMAN et al. |
Error to circuit court, Gratiot county; HENRY HART, Judge.
Action by William E. Wessels against Washington Beeman and Charles W. Tan, sheriff, for conversion. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff brings error. Reversed.
C.J. Willett, for appellant.
Sawyer & Knowlton, for appellees.
This is an action of trover, brought to recover damages for converting some tobacco and cigars. Plaintiff claims to have become the owner thereof by purchase from one Aaron Wessels who appears to have been a manufacturer, dealer, and general trader in the village of St. Louis, Gratiot county, Mich. Upon the trial, the plaintiff in the first instance contented himself by proving the ownership of the property in Aaron Wessels, a sale by Aaron Wessels to him, evidenced by a bill of sale dated November 17, 1883, and introducing testimony tending to show a delivery of the property, its value, and the conversion of the same by defendants. The defendant Beeman was a judgment creditor of Aaron Wessels and defendant Tan was sheriff, and the defense interposed is that the conveyance by Aaron Wessels to William E. Wessels, the plaintiff, was fraudulent and void as to the creditors of Aaron Wessels. A further defense relied upon with reference to the alleged sale from Aaron to William was based upon the fact that a large number of the cigars were unstamped, and were forfeited to the United States government under the Revised Statutes of the United States, �� 3405-3408. The case was before us at the April term, 1887, and is reported in 66 Mich. 343, 33 N.W. 510. Only one of the points then raised-but not decided-is before this court now; and, were it not for the reason that we feel it our duty to reverse the case and send it back for another trial for error in the rulings upon the admission of testimony and the charge of the court, it would not be necessary to decide that point now, which is, whether the sale of unstamped cigars passed any title to the plaintiff. The defendants contend that no title passed, and cite: Rev. St. U.S. �� 3397, 3398, 3400, 3404, 3405; Miller v. Post, 1 Allen, 434; Insurance Co. v. Harvey, 11 Wis. 394; Johnson v. Hudson, 11 East, 180; Brown v. Duncan, 10 Barn. & C. 93; Cope v. Rowlands, 2 Mees. & W. 149; Fergusson v. Norman, 5 Bing. N. C. 76; Benj. Sales, � 538; Anson, Cont. (4th Ed.) pp. 172, 173; Miller v. Morrill, 3 Cold. 587; Wayman v. Torreyson, 4 Nev. 124; and other cases. It appears from the testimony that the plaintiff at the time he received the bill of sale received also from his vendor, Aaron Wessels, the key of the room where the cigars were stored, and also the key of the barn where the tobacco was stored, and that he placed one Garbut in control thereof as his agent; that he went to the town-clerk's office, and filed his bill of sale among the chattel mortgage securities; that he was told by the deputy-clerk that if it was an absolute sale of the property, and he had actual possession of it, filing was not necessary. He replied that he had the key of the room where it was stored in his pocket, and insisted upon filing the mortgage, which was done on the 17th day of November, 1883. No affidavit of renewal was filed, and after more than a year had expired, defendant seized the property under his execution, and it was sold at sheriff's sale.
Defendants claim that, as plaintiff had filed the bill of sale, he was estopped from denying that it was intended for security, instead of an absolute transfer, and requested the court so to charge. The court declined to do so, but instructed the jury that they might consider the fact that plaintiff had filed the bill of sale as evidence bearing upon the claim made by him now, that the sale was absolute. The plaintiff excepted to the latter part of the charge. There was no error in this portion of the charge. It was proper for the jury to consider the fact in determining whether it was an absolute sale, as claimed by plaintiff, or as a security, as claimed by defendant. If the jury found that there was an absolute sale, then the question of delivery and actual and continued change of possession was important; for, if there was no actual delivery, followed by a continued change of possession, the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show that the sale was made in good faith, and without any intention to defraud the creditors; but if it was intended as a security, and the property not delivered, it was absolutely void as to creditors of Aaron Wessels then existing; or, if the affidavit was not filed as required by the statute, then it would be void as against such creditors as should acquire a lien after the expiration of a year and before the filing of the renewal affidavit; and in this case it is conceded no renewal affidavit was filed. The act of the party in filing a bill of sale had some significance upon the question as to whether it was an absolute transfer or only a security. If, as plaintiff contends, the bill of sale evidenced an absolute transfer of the property to him as purchaser, yet he is not estopped from so asserting, notwithstanding he filed the bill of sale in the clerk's office. The attorney of the defendant was informed, when the instrument was placed upon record, that the plaintiff claimed he had possession of the goods; that he had the key in his pocket of the room in which they were stored; so that, so far as the defendant was concerned, the filing was not such an unequivocal act as would estop him from asserting that the instrument was not a bill of sale absolute, and not intended for security; but further than this there is no estoppel pleaded, and the testimony was not admissible without being embraced in the pleadings or the facts constituting it set out in the notice. Johnson v. Stellwagen, 67 Mich. 14, 34 N.W. 252, and cases cited. It was also claimed by the defendant that the sale was made with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the creditors of Aaron Wessels. In the investigation of this question the defendant was permitted a wide and almost unbounded range of inquiry concerning transactions prior and subsequently to the sale to plaintiff, and concerning matters with which the plaintiff had no connection whatever. In the investigation of fraud it is usual to permit a wide range of investigation of matters that will throw light upon the questions at issue, but irrelevant testimony is no more admissible in trying questions of fraud than in any other investigation or trial or civil action at law. I think the court went far beyond what is allowable in the trial of such issues, and a great mass of testimony was admitted bearing upon the good faith and fair dealing of Aaron Wessels, plaintiff's vendor, entirely disconnected with the transaction between him and the plaintiff, which could have no other effect than to prejudice the minds of the jury, and call their attention away from the real issue which they were called upon to decide. The plaintiff's claim was that he was a creditor of Aaron Wessels; that he had loaned him money, for which he had received the promissory notes of defendant; and on the 17th of November, 1883, he settled with Aaron Wessels, and received the mortgages and goods included in the bill of sale in full discharge of such indebtedness. The defendant's claim was that plaintiff was not a creditor, or, if at all, not to the amount he claimed, and that the execution of the mortgages and the bill of sale were for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding defendant and other creditors from collecting their debts. There was testimony introduced tending strongly to prove that Aaron Wessels was engaged in an attempt to defraud his creditors. But such intent would not affect bona fide transactions between Aaron Wessels and any of his creditors who received from him money, property, or security for their debts, unless they participated with Wessels in an attempt to defraud the other creditors.
The...
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