Wesson v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 30 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-60198,94-60198 |
| Citation | 48 F.3d 894 |
| Parties | -1540, 63 USLW 2620, 95-1 USTC P 50,186 Ray L. WESSON, Estate of Ray Wesson, Deceased, E. Hall, Administrator, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Frank J. Hammond, III, Watkins & Eager, Jackson, MS, Clyde H. Gunn, III, Corban & Gunn, Biloxi, MS, for appellant.
Edward T. Perelmuter, Gary R. Allen, Chief Appellate Section, Kenneth W. Rosenberg, Washington, DC, for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, DEMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
The sole issue before this Court is whether punitive damages awarded in a bad faith cause of action under Mississippi law are excludable under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 104(a)(2). 1 We are not the first circuit to address this issue. The Ninth, Federal, and Fourth Circuits have held that punitive damages do not fall within the purview of Sec. 104(a)(2). 2 The Sixth Circuit, departing from this majority position, held that punitive damages are excludable. 3 For the reasons discussed below, we join our brethren of the Ninth, Federal, and Fourth Circuits in holding that noncompensatory punitive damages are not excludable under Sec. 104(a)(2).
Dr. Ray Lamar Wesson and another doctor owned and operated a surgical clinic. The clinic purchased a life insurance policy on Dr. Wesson in the amount of $87,136.00. The Policy provided a feature called an "Automatic Premium Loan." This feature guarded against lapse of the Policy by borrowing against the value of the Policy to satisfy any unpaid premium. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (MONY) did not set up the Policy with the automatic premium loan feature because of a mistaken belief that another provision in the Policy negated this feature. MONY later became aware that the automatic loan feature should be operative notwithstanding any other provision, yet failed to activate it.
A premium on the Wesson Policy was not paid. Roughly one and one-half months later Dr. Wesson died in a plane crash and MONY refused to tender the face amount of the policy. The children, as beneficiaries under the Policy, brought suit against MONY in Mississippi state court to recover the face value of the Policy and punitive damages for bad faith. The jury returned a verdict of $87,136.00 in actual damages and 8 million in punitive damages. The punitive damage award was remitted to 1.5 million. 4
The decedent's estate received the proceeds of the punitive damage award and included them on its 1988 federal income tax return. In July 1990 the estate filed an amended return claiming a refund in the amount of $300,465.00 under the theory that the punitive damages were excludable under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 104(a)(2). The IRS rejected the refund claim in April 1992. In February 1993 the estate filed this complaint in district court. Motions for summary judgment were filed and the district court granted the government's motion. The district court issued a memorandum opinion, which relied on the Fourth Circuit rationale of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Miller for including punitive damages in taxable income. This appeal ensued.
We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Both the district court and the parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact, therefore summary judgment was appropriate. The sole issue is whether punitive damages received in a bad-faith action should be excludable from taxable gross income under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 104(a)(2) (1988).
To resolve this issue, we first look to the language of the statute. Section 104, entitled "Compensation for injuries or sickness," provides in relevant part that "gross income does not include ... the amount of any damages received ... on account of personal injuries or sickness." 5 Appellant contends that the punitive damages awarded by the jury were damages received on account of personal injuries. The government contends that punitive damages do not fall within the purview of section 104(a)(2) and are therefore taxable. As the Ninth, Federal, and Fourth Circuits have noted, section 104(a)(2) is ambiguous, 6 susceptible of at least two conflicting interpretations. 7 We agree. Section 104(a)(2) could mean that all damages recovered in a personal injury suit are excluded, or it could mean that only those damages that purport to compensate the plaintiff for the personal injury suffered are received on account of personal injury--"consensus on this issue within the federal judiciary is nonexistent." 8 The ambiguity is not limited to the term "on account of." Congress also failed to explain the meaning of "personal injury."
The Supreme Court shed some light on the meaning of the latter term. In United States v. Burke 9 the Court defined the meaning of "personal injury" as used in section 104(a)(2). The plaintiff filed a Title VII action in district court alleging that the defendant discriminated unlawfully in the payment of salaries on the basis of sex. After the district court denied cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties settled. The taxpayers paid taxes on the settlement payments and subsequently sought a refund under Sec. 104(a)(2) as "damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness." Recognizing that neither the text nor the legislative history of Sec. 104(a)(2) offered an explanation of the meaning of personal injury, the Court linked identification of a personal injury to traditional tort principles relying on 26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.104-1(c), which defines "damages" as "an amount received ... through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights." In determining whether an action is based upon a tort or upon tort type rights, the Court examined the remedies available to the plaintiff. Under traditional tort law, a broad range of remedies are available, such as "pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation ... [and] punitive damages." 10 Relying on the lack of remedies available to the plaintiff, the Court held that a Title VII claim does not seek to redress a personal injury. Unfortunately, the Burke Court did not address what type of damages are excludable from gross income, as received "on account of" a personal injury.
Under Burke the threshold inquiry in determining whether a damage award is excludable from gross income pursuant to Sec. 104(a)(2) is to determine if the underlying cause of action seeks to redress a personal injury. 11 This inquiry requires consideration of Mississippi law. 12 The government contends that a cause of action sounding in bad faith is not one redressing a personal injury. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in the very case that gave rise to the damage award, characterized the cause of action as a bad faith claim with no personal injuries or actual damages other than the policy limits. 13 Though this language is curious, we do not agree with the Government's position on this issue. After reviewing Mississippi law, we conclude that a bad faith cause of action is one sounding in tort, and accordingly, one redressing a personal injury. The Wesson court, in affirming an award of punitive damages and this bad faith case, stated that punitive damages are not allowed absent such malicious, reckless, willful or gross disregard for the rights of the insured as to constitute an independent tort. 14 This language and ruling is consistent with a Burke-type personal injury. This does not, however, end our inquiry. As noted above, establishing that the underlying cause of action redresses a personal injury is a threshold inquiry.
The second step is to determine whether the damages were received on account of the personal injury. 15 Because the language "on account of" of Sec. 104(a)(2) is ambiguous we must " 'look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.' " 16 "The definition of gross income under the Internal Revenue Code sweeps broadly." 17 Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived," subject only to the exclusions specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Code. 18 "The Supreme Court has long held that this definition is to be given liberal construction 'in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted.' " 19 Accessions to wealth are generally presumed to be gross income unless the taxpayer can show that the accession falls within a specific exclusion. 20 Exclusions from income are construed narrowly. 21
The Supreme Court has recognized that the title or heading of a statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the text. 22 Section 104 is found in Part III of Subchapter B of the Code, entitled "Items Specifically Excluded from Gross Income." Section 104 is titled "Compensation for injuries or sickness." As the Reese court noted, "[c]ompensatory damages are commonly understood to mean damages such as will compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury." 23 The common meaning of "compensatory damages" is consistent with the underlying purpose of the section as recognized by the Ninth Circuit. " 'Damages paid for personal injuries are excluded from gross income because they make the taxpayer whole from a previous loss of personal rights--because, in effect, they restore a loss to capital.' " 24 We agree with the Reese court that section 104's enumerated exclusions, which encompass only the replacement of losses resulting from injury or sickness, are also consistent with this common meaning and further aid us in resolving this ambiguity. Section 104(a)(1) excludes from income amounts received...
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