West Bloomfield Tp. v. Chapman, 79

Decision Date01 October 1957
Docket NumberNo. 79,79
Citation351 Mich. 606,88 N.W.2d 377
PartiesTOWNSHIP OF WEST BLOOMFIELD, a Municipal Corporation, Oakland County, Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. William C. CHAPMAN, Defendant and Appellant. ,
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Edward N. Barnard, Detroit, for defendant and appellant.

Crossley, Bailey & Robbins, Detroit, for appellant.

A. Floyd Blakeslee, Pontiac, for plaintiff and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

VOELKER, Justice.

The opinion of the chancellor below follows:

'* * * This is an action brought by the Township of West Bloomfield, to restrain the defendant William C. Chapman from operating a manufacturing business (machine shop) in a residential zone in violation of a Township Zoning Ordinance.

'The defendant herein, William Chapman, is the owner of a 13-acre parcel of land, with a dwelling and buildings thereon, in Section 19 of West Bloomfield Township. Exhibit 5 is a Zoning Map and the Zoning Ordinance here involved. Defendant's property has a frontage of some 300 feet on the Pontiac Trail and extends back slightly past the railroad. Defendant purchased said property the latter part of 1951 for the purpose of using the same for manufacturing purposes.

'The Zoning Ordinance involved was passed by the plaintiff Township May 12, 1942 (effective date, June 9, 1942) pursuant to township authority granted by Act 302 of the P.A. of 1937 and without the sanction of any county authorities. Defendat's property is zoned as Residence Zone 2. The lands in said zone shall be used for dwelling and farming purposes only. Some of the acreage has been used for agricultural purposes and some has been used as a gravel pit and/or peat beds.

'On or about September 11, 1952 the defendant submitted to the Township authorities plans for the erection of a 'tool shed'. The application for building permit which accompanied the plans contained the following language in the handwriting of the defendant applicant and over his signature.

"This building to be used for agricultural purposes only.'

'The building inspector Underhill told defendant Chapman that in filing his application for building permit (Exhibit 2) the purpose of the structure must be inserted and declared under Paragraph 16 of Exhibit 2. It was discovered after the initial permit was issued on September 13, 1952 that the footings were larger than 40 X 60 X 16 feet whereupon a second permit was applied for and issued which permitted the building of a cement block building 42 X 75 X 16 feet. Said applications are signed by defendant Chapman.

'Said building, '* * * to be used for agricultural purposes only', is now being used as a power operated machine shop where the stamping of automotive parts is carried on. Among other things, some 7 or 8 punch presses and some drill presses are employed. Said stamping shop is within 175 feet of the home of one Don A. Smith and within 100 feet of the dwelling of the defendant herein. The building was never used for its declared purpose.

'The parties contend as follows:

'1. The plaintiff asserts that the normal and natural use to which this 13 acre plot could and should be put is residential and that the limitations of use imposed by the Zoning Ordinance of the Township are reasonable.

'2. (a) The defendant counters by asserting that said parcel is entirely unfit for residential purposes and that its best use is for manufacturing. (b) Defendant asserts that to compel him to use said property for residential purposes would be unreasonable and confiscatory.

'Don A. Smith who lives 175 feet from the shop, and others, testifying for the plaintiff, assert that said shop creates a disturbing noise, that the same is readily heard and is objectionable and that the same will depreciate the value of their property. Witness Smith asserted at one point that 'there is noise, I can hear it in my house and can hear it as soon as I get out of my car'. The witnesses for the plaintiff generally assert that they moved out into the country from their city homes to get away from city noises and to enjoy the peace and quietude of their country acres and that this deliberate intrusion on the part of the defendant has not only made their property less enjoyable from an aesthetic standpoint, but has grealty depreciated the value thereof.

'One witness asserted that the noise from the defendant's machine shop disturbed his 'peace of mind', another that 'ordinary radios will not work'. All of plaintiff's witnesses who lived nearby stated that they could hear the 'noise'; that they purchased their property believing it would remain residential or rural in character; that they were trying to get away from machines, seeking 'a quiet place' in which to live and that said machine shop not only depreciates the value of their property but renders it uncomfortable and not enjoyable to live on. The defendant, who lives about 100 feet from the shop, says that the noise does not 'bother' him at all and cannot be heard except if one is virtually under the window of the shop.

'Plaintiff's witnesses who assert that the property is adaptable to residential purposes or could be adapted to residential purposes, say that the value of the land for such purposes would be from $600 to $700 per acre.

'Defendant's 13 acres has a farm home thereon as aforesaid, together with the said cinder block machine shop. Said buildings are located on the front of the property near the Pontiac Trail. Behind the buildings is a swamp or pond filled with water which, according to one witness, has some catfish in it. Behind the swamp is a high spot or what was once a 'hogback'. To the rear of this high ground which has been reduced in height is more swamp and then another high spot. Of the total 13 acres approximately 5 or 6 are low and/or swampy.

'Defendant's witnesses assert that the best use for the property is industry. The value for industrial purposes would be $500 to $600 per acre. They assert that if the property is to be used for single family residences as per the requirements of the zoning ordinance that said property would accommodate only three single residences which would border upon the road or Pontiac Trail.

'The area generally can only be described as rural. The homes in the area for the most part are small, located upon acreage that might be referred to as small farms. A branch of the Grand Trunk Railroad traverses the area and custs across the back end of the defendant's property. Industrial properties are to be found one-half mile away in an adjacent township. There is a gas station one-quarter mile west of the defendant's property.

'The prior use of the defendant's property has been at various times farming, the removal of gravel and peat, and general nursery uses. Considerable peat has been removed from the property, the same being found in spots to a depth of forty feet. The defendant has equipment, for the removal of peat, of the value of $6000. Defendant owner asserts that the property, except for three locations on the road or the front, is unfit for residential use.

'As aforesaid, the defendant purchased the property for the contended purpose of locating thereon a machine shop. He does not claim to have been misled as to the limitations placed on the property by the Zoning Ordinance. The value of the machinery in said shop amounts to some $25,000.

'Mr. Partridge, a well recognized realtor, stated that he believed the best use for the 13 acres would be for industrial purposes. For such purpose he places a value on the premises of $500 to $600 per acre. He asserts that for single residences it would be worthless except for three home sites on the road or along the 300 foot frontage. On cross-examination, he admitted that 'some houses' could be built on the high spots. Although Mr. Partridge is a capable and respected realtor, the Court is unable to agree with his overall conclusion that 'anyone who tried to subdivide the 13 acre parcel for residential uses would be out of his head'.

'In view of the testimony submitted, the Court must draw the following factual conclusions:

'1. That the machine shop is located in what can only be described as a rural residential area.

'2. That the said 5 or 6 acres of land that is swampy and/or low is no more adaptable to (nor valuable for) manufacturing purposes than it is to residential purposes. In this connection, it is the opinion of the Court that with some dragging out and dredging, plus the application of some everyday ingenuity in laying out the building sites, that the property, despite its present swampy and low spots, could be made both attractive and desirable for residential purposes.

'3. That the property here is located in a rural residential area of good character and is 'readily and reasonably adaptable to residential uses'.

'4. That the obvious effect of defendant's continued use of his 'Tool Shed' for machine shop will be to depreciate the value of the adjacent property.

'5. That the presence of the defendant's machine shop not only detracts from the value of the surrounding property but detracts from the aesthetic value of the adjacent premises.

'6. That in addition to the effects mentioned in paragraph 5, the presence of the machine shop in a real and substantial way, renders the adjacent properties far less enjoyable and robs the occupants of the peace and quietude which they sought and which they, within reason, have a right to.

'7. That the building of the 'Tool Shed' for an intended machine shop was a fraudulent approach on the defendant's part to breach or circumvent the ordinance.

'In view of the testimony and the factual conclusions and findings made therefrom, the Court is of the opinion that plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought because:

'1. The Zoning Ordinance here is reasonable. It is a basic rule that scarcely...

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