WEST CENTRAL EDUC. v. WEST CENTRAL SCHOOL

• Decision Date: 23 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 22394.,22394.
• Citation: 2002 SD 163,655 N.W.2d 916
• Parties: WEST CENTRAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Petitioner and Appellee, v. WEST CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 49-4 and Board of Education, Respondents and Appellants.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

655 N.W.2d 916

2002 SD 163

WEST CENTRAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Petitioner and Appellee, v. WEST CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 49-4 and Board of Education, Respondents and Appellants.

No. 22394.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued November 20, 2002.

Decided December 23, 2002.

Anne Crowson Plooster, General Counsel, SDEA, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorney for petitioner and appellee.

Gerald L. Kaufman, Jr., Kaufman Law Office, Huron, South Dakota, Attorney for respondents and appellants.

ZINTER, Justice.

[¶ 1.] West Central Education Association (Association) filed an unfair labor practice complaint against the West Central School District and the West Central Board of Education (collectively referred to as School Board). It filed the complaint because the School Board refused to engage in collective bargaining with the Association over the school calendar. The Department of Labor (Department) found no unfair labor practice because it concluded that the school calendar was not a subject of mandatory negotiation. On appeal, the circuit court, the Honorable Richard Bogue, reversed the Department. The circuit court concluded that the school calendar was a mandatory subject of negotiation in public employee collective bargaining. We reverse the circuit court and affirm the Department.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶ 2.] Prior to the 1988-89 school year, the school calendar¹ was negotiated at the bargaining table along with Association proposals regarding salary and other conditions of employment. Although there is some dispute about the matter, in 1988, it appears that the parties agreed to remove the calendar as a negotiable item from the bargaining table. Instead, they agreed to address the calendar through a calendar committee. The calendar committee considered the views of a number of groups including the Association. However, the School Board made the ultimate decision without collective bargaining.

[¶ 3.] By 1994, the School Board formally implemented a policy defining how it would determine the school calendar. Although the 1994 written policy allowed input from the Association through the calendar committee, the policy did not require collective bargaining with the Association. The written policy provided:

1. The superintendent shall submit next year's calendar to the Board for Board consideration, changes and approval;

2. The Board will consider the recommendations of the Association concerning the starting and ending date for school, vacations and holidays, and student and teacher days;

....

The Association did not file a grievance when this policy was adopted in 1994 or when it was amended in 1995.

[¶ 4.] However, in 1997, the Association informed the superintendent of the school that the Association would not participate on the calendar committee, "and [the Association] decided to have the calendar back in negotiations." Consequently, the Association refused to meet with the calendar committee and the superintendent for purposes of developing a proposed calendar to present to the School Board. At the same time, the School Board rejected the Association's demand to negotiate the calendar because the School Board took the position that the calendar was not a mandatory subject of negotiation with teachers or their Association.

[¶ 5.] The School Board and Association did, however, engage in collective bargaining that year. The parties ultimately reached impasse on three issues, one of which was the negotiability of the calendar. Following mediation, the parties sought assistance from the Department in resolving the impasse under SDCL 60-10-2.² With respect to the school calendar, the Department recommended that the parties engage in collective bargaining. However, the School Board chose not to adopt the Department's recommendation.

[¶ 6.] Instead, the School Board refused to negotiate the calendar and it refused to impose calendar language in the contract. See SDCL 3-18-8.2.³ The School Board refused to impose any language into the collective bargaining agreement regarding the calendar because the School Board took the position that its last proposal was that the calendar was not a mandatory subject of negotiation. The School Board believed that there was no reason to impose such contract language on a "non-negotiable item." [¶ 7.] As a result of the School Board's action, the Association filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the Department. The Association alleged that the School Board had committed an unfair labor practice when it declined to negotiate the school calendar. On administrative review, a hearing examiner concluded that the calendar was not a mandatory subject of negotiation, and therefore, the School Board did not commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to negotiate that subject.

[¶ 8.] The Association appealed the hearing examiner's decision to circuit court. Circuit Court Judge Richard Bogue reversed the hearing examiner. Judge Bogue concluded that the calendar was a mandatory subject of negotiation. Judge Bogue remanded the case to the hearing examiner to determine whether, in light of his ruling, the School Board had committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate the calendar.

[¶ 9.] On remand, the hearing examiner adopted Judge Bogue's ruling. However, the hearing examiner concluded that the School Board did not commit an unfair labor practice. The hearing examiner concluded that there was no unfair labor practice because she found that prior to Judge Bogue's decision, neither party knew⁴ that the calendar was a mandatory subject of negotiation. The School Board appealed that decision to circuit court. Circuit Court Judge William Srstka heard this appeal after remand. Judge Srstka concluded that the doctrine of the law of the case required that he follow Judge Bogue's ruling on the negotiability of the calendar. Consequently, Judge Srstka affirmed the hearing examiner. The School Board now appeals to this Court raising one issue:

Whether the circuit court erred in holding that the school calendar is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 10.] Our standard of review for administrative appeals is well settled.

The Court reviews agency findings in the same manner required of the circuit court when reviewing a decision from an administrative agency. This Court reviews findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, whereas questions of law are reviewed under the de novo standard. The issue on review [here] is a question of law, upon which we apply a de novo standard of review.

O'Toole v. Board of Trustees of the South Dakota Retirement System, 2002 SD 77, ¶ 9, 648 N.W.2d 342, 345 (internal citations omitted).

DECISION

[¶ 11.] SDCL 3-18-2⁵ gives public employees the right to join labor organizations. SDCL 3-18-2 also gives public employees the right to designate representatives for the purpose of meeting and negotiating conditions of employment. Those conditions of employment include "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." SDCL 3-18-3.⁶

[¶ 12.] However, these statutes do not give public employees the right to engage in negotiations over all issues relating to rates of pay, wages, hours and other conditions of employment. "[T]he state is different from a private employer inasmuch as it has the unique responsibility to make and implement public policy. Accordingly, the scope of negotiations in the public sector is more limited than in the private sector." Rapid City Education Association v. Rapid City Area School District No. 51-4, 376 N.W.2d 562, 564 (S.D.1985) (citing In re Local 195, IFPTE, AFL-CIO v. State, 88 N.J. 393, 443 A.2d 187, 191 (N.J.1982)).

[¶ 13.] Therefore, to determine whether any issue is mandatorily negotiable in public employment, one must not only determine whether the subject falls within SDCL 3-18-2 and SDCL 3-18-3, but also whether the issue is one properly decided by the political process or by collective negotiations. Rapid City, 376 N.W.2d at 562. In making that determination, the interests of the parties must be balanced to decide whether negotiations will significantly impair the state's ability to make policy decisions.

The role of the courts in a scope of negotiations case is to determine, in light of the competing interests of the State and its employees, whether an issue is appropriately decided by the political process or by collective negotiations. In making this sensitive determination, the mere invocation of abstract categories like "terms and conditions of employment" and "managerial prerogatives" is not helpful. To determine whether a subject is negotiable, the Court must balance the competing interests by considering the extent to which collective negotiations will impair the determination of governmental policy.

Rapid City, 376 N.W.2d at 564 (quoting IFPTE, 443 A.2d at 191).

[¶ 14.] To assist in making that sensitive determination, a three-part test is applied.

1. A subject is negotiable only if it intimately and directly affects the work and welfare of public employees.

2. An item is not negotiable if it has been preempted by statute or regulation.

3. A topic that affects the work and welfare of public employees is negotiable only if it is a matter on which negotiated agreement would not significantly interfere with the exercise of inherent management prerogatives pertaining to the determination of governmental policy.

Id. (citing IFPTE, 443 A.2d at 190-191).

[¶ 15.] School Board concedes that the school calendar is a subject that "intimately and directly affects the work and welfare of public employees" under part one of the test. Because we conclude that requiring a school board to negotiate its school calendar would significantly interfere with the exercise of inherent management prerogatives under part three, we proceed to examine that test, and we need not consider whether the subject has been preempted by statute or...