West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles

• Decision Date: 04 November 1867
• Citation: 55 Pa. 209
• Parties: The West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Company <I>versus</I> Miles.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

55 Pa. 209

The West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Company versus Miles.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 1, 1867.

November 4, 1867.

April 1st 1867.

Before WOODWARD, C. J., THOMPSON STRONG, READ and AGNEW, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.

E. S. Miller, for plaintiff in error, cited Coppin v. Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 875; Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumner 321; Gaines v. McCandless, 4 Phila. R. 255; Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 530; Conner v. Pierce, 7 Metc. 600; State v. Overton, 4 Zab. 434.

G. H. Earle and R. P. White, for defendant in error, cited Angell on Carriers, § 525, 533; Chitty on Carriers, § 15, p. 54, § 263, p. 346; 2 Kent Com. § 598; Pierce on Am. R. R. 489; Power v. Commonwealth, 6 Metc. 600; Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481; Jenks v. Coleman, 2 Sumner 221; Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 530; Conner v. Pierce, 7 Metc. 600; State v. Overton, 4 Zab. 441; Gaines v. McCandless, 4 Phila. 255; Derry v. Lowry, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, May 1st 1865, per Allison, P. J.; Kessler v. McConachy, 1 Rawle 436; O'Donnell v. Seybert, 13 S. & R. 57; Story on Bailments, § 591; Moore v. Fitchburg Railroad, 4 Gray 465; Beekman v. Saratoga Railroad, 3 Paige N. Y. 75; Galena Railroad v. Yarwood, 15 Ill. R. 472; N. & C. R. R. v. Messimo, 1 Sneeds. 220.

The opinion of the court was delivered, November 4th 1867, by AGNEW, J.

It is admitted no one can be excluded from carriage by a public carrier on account of color, religious belief, political relations or prejudice. But the defendants in their point asked the court to say that if the jury find that the seat which the plaintiff was directed to take was in all respects a comfortable, safe and convenient seat, not inferior in any of these respects to the one she was directed to leave, she could not recover. The case, therefore, involves no assertion of the inferiority of the negro to the white passenger, but, conceding his right to be carried on the same footing with the white man, it assumes it to be not unreasonable to assign places in the cars to passengers of each color. The simple question is, whether a public carrier may, in the exercise of his private right of property, and in the due performance of his public duty, separate passengers by any other well-defined characteristic than that of sex. The ladies' car is known upon every well-regulated railroad, implies no loss of equal right on the part of the excluded sex, and its propriety is doubted by none.

This question must be decided upon reasonable grounds. If there be no clear and reasonable difference to base it upon, separation cannot be justified by mere prejudice. Nor is merit a test. The negro may be proud of his service in the field as a defender of his country. But it was not thought indefensible to separate even white soldiers from other passengers. There was a clear and well-founded difference between the civil and military character, and the separation of soldiers from citizens implied no want of equality, but a sound regulation of the right of transit.

The right of the carrier to separate his passengers is founded upon two grounds — his right of private property in the means of conveyance, and the public interest. The private means he uses belong wholly to himself, and imply the right of control for the protection of his own interest, as well as the performance of his public duty. He may use his property, therefore, in a reasonable manner. It is not an unreasonable regulation to seat passengers so as to preserve order and decorum, and to prevent contacts and collisions arising from natural or well-known customary repugnancies, which are likely to breed disturbances by a promiscuous sitting. This is a proper use of the right of private property, because it tends to protect the interests of the carrier as well as the interests of those he carries. If the ground of regulation be reasonable, courts of justice cannot interfere with his right of property. The right of the passenger is only that of being carried safely, and with a due regard to his personal comfort and convenience, which are promoted by a sound and well-regulated separation of passengers. An analogy and an illustration are found in the case of an innkeeper, who, if he have room, is bound to entertain proper guests, and so a carrier is bound to receive passengers. But a guest in an inn cannot select his room or his bed at pleasure; nor can a voyager take possession of a cabin or a berth at will, or refuse to obey the reasonable orders of the captain of a vessel. But, on the other hand, who would maintain that it is a reasonable regulation, either of an inn or a vessel, to compel the passengers, black and white, to room and bed together? If a right of private property confers no right of control, who shall decide a contest between passengers for seats or berths? Courts of justice may interpose to compel those who perform a business concerning the public, by the use of private means, to fulfil their duty to the public, — but not a whit beyond.

The public also has an interest in the proper regulation of public conveyances for the preservation of the public peace. A railroad company has the right and is bound to make reasonable regulations to preserve order in their cars. It is the duty of the conductor to repress tumults as far as he reasonably can, and he may, on extraordinary occasions, stop his train and eject the unruly and tumultuous. But he has not the authority of a peace officer to arrest and detain offenders. He cannot interfere in the quarrels of others at will merely. In order to preserve and enforce his authority as the servant of the company it must have a power to establish proper regulations for the carriage of passengers. It is much easier to prevent difficulties among passengers by regulations for their proper separation, than it is to quell them. The danger to the peace engendered by the feeling of aversion between individuals of the different races cannot be denied. It is the fact with which the company must deal. If a negro take his seat beside a white man or his wife or daughter, the law cannot repress the anger, or conquer the aversion which some will feel. However unwise it may be to indulge the feeling, human infirmity is not always proof against it. It is much wiser to avert the consequences of this repulsion of race by separation, than to punish afterward the breach of the peace it may have caused. These views are sustained by high authority. Judge Story, in his Law of Bailments, stating the duty of passengers "to submit to such reasonable regulations as the proprietors may...