West Chester Borough v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Company
| Decision Date | 07 March 1910 |
| Docket Number | 320 |
| Parties | West Chester Borough, Appellant, v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Company |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued February 8, 1910
Appeal, No. 320, Jan. T., 1909, by plaintiff, from decree of the Superior Court, Oct. T., 1908, No. 181, affirming decree of C.P. Chester Co., August T., 1907, No. 22, in proceeding to determine reasonableness of license fees in case of the Borough of West Chester v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Company. Affirmed.
Petition under the Act of April 17, 1905, P.L. 183, to determine reasonableness of license fees on telegraph poles.
The court of common pleas, BUTLER, J., held that the act of 1905 was constitutional, and by decree reduced the license fees from fifty cents to thirty cents per pole.
The Superior Court on appeal, affirmed the decree, PORTER, J delivering the following opinion:
The borough of West Chester, by ordinance approved April 11 1906, ordained that each telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric railway company using poles with wires strung thereon within the limits of said borough should pay an annual license fee of fifty cents for each pole used by any of said companies in any street, alley or highway of the borough. The borough, in 1907, brought this action to recover of the defendant company the amount of the license fees imposed by this ordinance upon the poles which it maintained in the streets of the borough. The defendant company presented a petition to the court, under the provisions of the Act of April 17, 1905, P.L. 183, averring that the amount of the annual license fee imposed by the ordinance was unreasonable and excessive, that for this reason a dispute had arisen between the borough and the company, and prayed the court to hear the parties and determine the amount of the annual license fees which should be paid by the company to the borough in order to properly compensate it for the necessary cost of the service performed, or to be performed by it, for the inspection and regulation of the poles of the defendant company. The representatives of the borough and of the defendant company, respectively, then entered into a written agreement providing that, in this action, "in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Assembly, approved April 17, 1905, P.L. 183, the amount of annual license fees to be paid by said company, the defendant, shall be determined by the court, at such time as to the court shall seem proper; and that the decision of the court shall have the same effect as if no suit had been begun, and as if the petition had been presented pursuant to the act of assembly aforesaid, and all subsequent proceedings by reason thereof had been in accordance with the said act." The effect of this agreement is simply to constitute this a proceeding under the act of April 17, 1905. The court below after hearing the parties and considering the evidence which they presented entered a decree fixing the amount of the annual license fee to be paid by the defendant company upon its poles in the streets of the borough at thirty cents per pole. The borough appeals and contends that the decree of the court below should be reversed upon two grounds: first, that the Act of April 17, 1905, P.L. 183, is unconstitutional and, second, that the evidence produced established that the charge imposed by the ordinance was reasonable and ought not to have been reduced by the court below.
The ground upon which the borough contends that the statute is unconstitutional is that it is special legislation in that it does not apply to all public service corporations maintaining poles in the public streets. The act applies to telegraph telephone, light and power companies, and would thus seem to embrace all companies known to modern conditions which use poles carrying wires for the purpose of the transmission of messages, light or power. The learned counsel representing the borough, contends, however, that "trolley companies" also maintain poles in the streets for the purpose of sustaining wires carrying an electric current to be used in the movement of their cars, and that because the statute does not mention and include such companies, it therefore does not apply to all property within the class and must be held to be special legislation, within the prohibition of the constitution. The sole objection to the statute is that because electric street railway companies are not subject to its provisions, although it is conceded that all other companies having the right to erect poles, sustaining wires carrying an electric current, are so subject, this involves a classification of subjects which renders the act unconstitutional. The fact that "trolley companies," or...
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