West County Care Center, Inc. v. Missouri Health Facilities Review Committee

• Decision Date: 27 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: West County Care Center, Inc. v. Missouri Health Facilities Review Committee, 773 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. App. 1989)
• Parties: WEST COUNTY CARE CENTER, INC., Appellant, v. MISSOURI HEALTH FACILITIES REVIEW COMMITTEE, Respondent, Health Services Management Corporation on Behalf of the Lakes of Big Bend Health Care Center, Valley Park, Missouri, Intervenor. 40948.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 474

773 S.W.2d 474

WEST COUNTY CARE CENTER, INC., Appellant, v.MISSOURI HEALTH FACILITIES REVIEW COMMITTEE, RespondentHealth Services Management Corporation on Behalf of the Lakes of Big Bend Health Care Center, Valley Park Missouri, Intervenor.

No. WD 40948.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District, En Banc.

June 27, 1989.

Harvey M. Tettlebaum, Jefferson City, for appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Simon Bolivar Buckner, IV, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, for respondent.

Jerry Wayne Venters, Jefferson City, for intervenor.

Before KENNEDY, C.J., and SHANGLER, TURNAGE, CLARK, MANFORD, NUGENT, LOWENSTEIN, BERREY, GAITAN, FENNER and ULRICH, JJ.

SHANGLER, Judge.

Health Services Management Corporation made application to the Missouri Health Facilities Review Committee for a certificate of need for a new intermediate care facility.The law prescribes that the Review Committee act to approve or deny a certificate of need application within 130 days of the presentation of application.§ 197.330.1(5), RSMoSupp.1987.The neglect to issue decision within that period constitutes approval and final administrative action on the certificate of need.§ 197.330.2, RSMoSupp.1987.Notwithstanding this stricture, the Review Committee announced that a decision would not be rendered on the application until the next regular meeting--some 28 days after the expiration of the 130 day statutory period.Health Services Management acquiesced by a formal pleading which waived any right that might accrue under the statute by operation of law from the agency inaction.

After the expiration of the 130 day period, but before the date of the meeting scheduled for the consideration of the Health Services Management application, the West County Care Center, Inc., as relator, brought a petition for writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court of Cole County that challenged the jurisdiction of the Review Committee over the application and sought to restrain the agency from any further exercise of judicial authority in the matter.West County operates an intermediate care facility within the area of the site proposed by Health Services Management and asserted the interest as competitor to enable its suit in prohibition against the administrative agency.Health Services Management was allowed to intervene in the prohibition proceedings, and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that West County lacked standing to maintain the action.

The court determined that the agency action posed no actual or threatened injury to an interest of the relator that the law protects, hence West County was without standing to prohibit the Review Committee proceedings, and dismissed the petition.The relator West County appeals from that judgment.

The relator asserts that the certificate of need statute constitutes a competitor facility a person affected by the application of another for a new service and hence invests an interest sufficient to maintain prohibition to enjoin an arrogation of jurisdiction by the administrative agency in the adjudication of that license.The relator asserts also--the role of the statute apart--that common law principles enable West County, as a competitor, access to the prohibition remedy.

Indeed, certificate of need statute§ 197.305(1) defines affected person to include both an applicant for a new health care service and a competitor already licensed.¹An affected person, under the law, is entitled to written notice of a review for a certificate of need for a new health facility within the service area, and the Review Committee is charged with that duty.§ 197.330.1(2), RSMoSupp.1987.It is the duty of the Review Committee, as well, to conduct a public hearing on any application upon a request in writing by any affected person made within thirty days from the date of notice.§ 197.330.1(3), RSMoSupp.1987;19 CSR 60-50.080.An affected person who invokes a public hearing by a timely request may invite the Review Committee to postpone decision for thirty days beyond the prescribed one hundred days, and is entitled to the findings, conclusions and decision entered.§ 197.330.1(5), (6)RSMoSupp.1987.These are the full dispensations owed an affected person under the certificate of need law.St. Joseph's Hill Infirmary, Inc. v. Mandl, 682 S.W.2d 821, 823(Mo.App.1984);PIA Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc. v. Missouri Health Facilities Review Comm., 724 S.W.2d 524, 525(Mo.App.1987).That is to say, an affected person who invokes participation in the administrative certification proceeding because of the status of competitor is a stranger to that proceeding for every other purpose than the statutory purpose invested by § 197.330.

That scheme of the statute is made the more emphatic by § 197.335, which vests the right of appeal only in the applicant and health systems agency ²--and so confirms that a competitor affected person is a stranger in interest to all but the information gathering phase of the certificate of need proceedings.PIA Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc. v. Missouri Health Facilities Review Comm., 724 S.W.2d at 525.

There is no allegation in the petition for writ of prohibition, nor any assertion in the briefs or arguments of West County, that the relator was denied the participation or protection of any interest § 197.330 accords a competitor affected person.Nor could there be any claim to those prerogatives in any event, since the pleadings in prohibition and the record on the merits preclude inference that a public hearing was convoked at the instance of any affected person, whether competitor or member of the public.Whatever participation West County was allowed in the certificate of need proceedings endowed no interest the law will protect under the statute.To engage the power of a court to adjudicate the prohibition remedy, the ground for the issuance of the writ must clearly appear and every fact requisite for its issuance be alleged.State ex rel. Brncic v. Huck, 296 Mo. 374, 246 S.W. 303, 305(banc 1922);State ex rel. Hartman v. Casteel, 678 S.W.2d 816, 818[2, 3](Mo.App.1984).The interest the certificate of need law accords to a competitor affected person is to be given notice of a review for a new health care service within the area, to invoke a public hearing for the presentation of its views to the licensure committee, and to be informed of the decision.It is that interest--if any at all--of a competitor which the law will protect by extraordinary remedy.The relator makes no claim that any such interest was infringed or threatened by any action of the administrative tribunal, and otherwise has no other interest to assert for the prohibition remedy.The relator has no standing to interfere with the Review Committee action to postpone the decision on the certificate of need of another applicant, and the petition was properly dismissed.

The relator cites and asserts the authority of State ex rel. Missouri Health Care Ass'n v. Missouri Health Facilities Review Committee, 768 S.W.2d 559(Mo.App.1988), a prior opinion of a panel of this court.The decision expresses the rationale that the status of competitor affected person suffices per se to invest standing for a writ of prohibition, not only to protect the interest the statute confers on a competitor to present its views to the licensure committee at a public hearing, but also as to any phase of the adjudication of a certificate of need application.In that respect we deem State ex rel. Missouri Health Care Ass'n to be mistakenly overbroad as a matter of statutory right and of decisional law, and should not be followed.

The relator argues that the strictures of the certificate of need statute apart, principles of the common law accord West County standing for the writ of prohibition, and hence the judgment of dismissal entered by the trial judge on the petition was error.These principles [the argument goes] accord a person, a stranger to the record, standing for prohibition.

The procedure and practice of our prohibition remedy, since reformulated as statutes and rules, reflect the doctrines of the common law.State ex rel. Darst v. Wurdeman, 304 Mo. 583, 264 S.W. 402, 404(banc 1924);§§ 530.010-530.090, RSMo 1986;Rule 97.It was the means whereby the sovereign compelled the ecclesiastical and other courts to conform to the common law of the realm as expounded by the superior courts.Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 232, 248(1865).An infringement of this scheme of ordered jurisdiction was chargeable not only as a grievance to the party injured, but as a contempt of the sovereign as well.The common law met this exigency of public concern for affront to the sovereign and the laws in arrogated judicial power by the grant of standing to a stranger to petition for the writ.State ex rel. Darst v. Wurdeman, 264 S.W. at 404;High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies§ 779 (3d ed. 1896).That practice of the prohibition remedy remains intact in our procedure.State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Stussie, 556 S.W.2d 186, 187(Mo. banc 1977);State ex rel. Eagleton v. Hall, 389 S.W.2d 798, 802(Mo. banc 1965).

A person, stranger to the proceeding at which the writ is aimed, may indeed seek prohibition, but not a person, stranger in interest to that proceeding.The writ does not issue when its operation would not in any way affect the interest of a party who seeks it.State ex rel. Helm v. Duncan, 225 Mo.App. 393, 36 S.W.2d 679, 681[6-8](1931).The interest may be to person or property, economic or noneconomic.State ex rel. Townsend v. Mueller, 51 S.W.2d 8, 11[4, 5](Mo. banc 1932);State ex rel. Priest v. Calhoun, 207 Mo.App. 149, 226 S.W. 329, 332[1, 2](1920);State ex rel. Darst v. Wurdeman, 264 S.W. at 404[4, 5];State ex rel. Eagleton v. Hall, 389 S.W.2d at 802.The interest that will sustain prohibition either by a stranger or nonstranger to the proceeding at which the writ is aimed is alike.It is "a personal stake...