West Fargo Public School Dist. No. 6 of Cass County v. West Fargo Ed. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 26 October 1977
• Docket Number: No. 9351,9351
• Citation: 259 N.W.2d 612
• Parties: 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361 WEST FARGO PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 6 OF CASS COUNTY, State of North Dakota, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WEST FARGO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION and Beverly Pratt, Defendants and Appellees. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 612

259 N.W.2d 612

97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361

WEST FARGO PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 6 OF CASS COUNTYState of North Dakota, a Municipal CorporationPlaintiff and Appellant, v.WEST FARGO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION and Beverly PrattDefendants and Appellees.

Civ. No. 9351.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Oct. 26, 1977.

Ohnstad, Twichell, Breitling, Arntson & Hagen, West Fargo, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Jon M. Arntson, West Fargo.

Daniel J. Chapman, Bismarck, for defendants and appellees.

SAND, Justice.

The West Fargo Public School District(hereinafter Board), has appealed from an order of the Cass Countydistrict court denying its motion requesting the court to decide all issues raised by the pleadings in the declaratory judgment action and from the judgment of the court.

The Board brought this declaratory judgment action pursuant to Chapter 32-23, North Dakota Century Code, in order to obtain a declaration of its rights and obligations under the contract negotiated between the Board and the teachers of the school district, represented by the appellee, West Fargo Education Association(hereinafter Association).This action arose out of a grievance filed under the contract by co-appellee, Beverly Pratt, a teacher represented by the Association.

Mrs. Pratt requested sick leave benefits for a period of disability due to maternity reasons in a letter dated 13 December 1975 to the Board's school superintendent.She asked for twenty sick leave days for the period of 5 January 1976 to 2 February 1976.

The Board met on 13 January 1976 and instructed the school superintendent to "correspond with Mrs. Pratt and inform her of the negotiated agreement and the availability of the other leave that could be used."By letter dated 14 January 1976, the school superintendent informed Mrs. Pratt that

"Since the leave policy in existence now and at the time you entered into your teaching contract has no provision under which your request could be granted and since the sick leave policy is an item in the negotiated agreement, it is impossible for me to grant your request."

The superintendent enclosed a copy of the Board's Policy 3-9100, dated 14 March 1972, relating to absence from work for maternity reasons.Policy 3-9100 provides, in part:

"It is recommended that no teacher begin the school year knowing that her services will be interrupted due to maternity leave.Exceptions will be at the discretion of the building principal.Leave without pay for maternity reasons will be granted up to twelve consecutive months to any teacher who becomes pregnant.Reinstatement must begin no later than the beginning of the following school year.Persons using such leave are encouraged to start their leave when their condition begins to interfere with their normal classroom duties as determined by the building principal or personal health as determined by their doctor.Sick leave does not apply in these cases. . . ."

On 13 February 1976 Mrs. Pratt filed a grievance report form with the principal of her school objecting to the Board's denial of paid sick leave benefits for her period of disability due to pregnancy.Mrs. Pratt listed 30 January 1976 as the "date cause of grievance occurred and/or grievant had knowledge thereof."She asserts that she should have received a check on that day, but that she did not receive one until 14 February 1976.

In filing the grievance report form with the principal of her school, Mrs. Pratt initiated step one of the grievance procedure outlined in The Procedural Agreement and Addendum adopted by the Board and the Association.According to the procedural agreement, "the receipt of the grievance at the Step One must be within 15 days from the date of the occurrence of the event giving rise to the grievance."The principal disposed of Mrs. Pratt's grievance by citing the procedural agreement's definition of a grievance and stating:

"Since I find no misinterpreted or inequitable application of established policy I believe that this is not a grievable (sic ) issue."

"Grievance" is defined in the procedural agreement and addendum "A grievance is a claim based upon an event or condition which affects the conditions or circumstances under which a teacher works, allegedly caused by misinterpretation or inequitable application of established policy or the terms of a contract.

"A grievance evolves out of the manner in which a policy has been interpreted."

In disposing of Mrs. Pratt's grievance, the principal also disputed the timeliness of her filing.He noted that the Board acted on her request at its 13 January 1976 meeting; that a letter informing her of the Board's action was mailed 14 January 1976, and that he believed the last date available to her for filing a grievance was 27 January 1976.

Mrs. Pratt proceeded to step two of the grievance procedure on 25 February 1976, stating that

"The grievant and the Association contend that the Board has failed to comply with the EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) guidelines as they affect the interpretation of the negotiated sick leave benefits . . . ."

At the termination of step two in the grievance procedure, the superintendent communicated to Mrs. Pratt essentially the same statement and decision that the principal had earlier communicated to her after completion of step one.

Step three of the grievance procedure involved a special board of education meeting held 30 March 1976.After the step three process was completed, the president of the Board notified Mrs. Pratt of the Board's finding that she had not timely filed her grievance.The Board found that Mrs. Pratt was informed of the Board's decision to deny her sick leave pay for maternity reasons on 14 January 1976, and that 31 days elapsed between that date and the date Mrs. Pratt filed her grievance.As mentioned earlier, the step one process requires that a grievance be filed "15 days from the date of occurrence of the event giving rise to the grievance."

Although the Board noted that its decision was based on Mrs. Pratt's failure to timely file her grievance, it commented on the grievance:

"The Board policy in the instant case is very clear.The maternity leave policy is set forth in 3-9100.It states in part '* * * Sick leave does not apply in these cases * * *' Since no teacher has received sick pay while on maternity leave, there was no 'inequitable application of established policy' when the Board denied Mrs. Pratt sick leave.Furthermore, the policy is so clear there can be no 'misinterpretation' of established policy.

"Nor is there any 'misinterpretation or inequitable application of . . . the terms of a contract.'The contract, although providing for sick leave, does not apply sick leave benefits for periods of disability due to pregnancy."

The Board concluded that the issue of maternity sick leave should be presented at the negotiating table or at a meeting between the Board of Education and the Association, as provided by Article I, Section 3, of the contract.

In a letter dated 14 April 1976, the Association notified the Board that it was not satisfied with the step three disposition of the grievance and requested that the issue be submitted to binding arbitration, the fourth and final step outlined in the procedural agreement.

The Board, rather than submit the grievance to binding arbitration, brought this declaratory judgment action in Cass Countydistrict court on 30 April 1976.In its action it alleged that the provision for binding arbitration was unenforceable in accordance with § 32-04-12(3), NDCC, and that the alleged grievance by Mrs. Pratt did not come within this agreement.The Board also sought an interpretation of the contract and an adjudication of the rights of the parties thereunder.

After a hearing, the district court issued its memorandum opinion, dated 30 September 1976, which concluded that Mrs. Pratt and her representative, the Association, had the right under the contract to request binding arbitration, step four of the procedural agreement.The court also stated that the Board should abide by the terms of the contract and that "The issues of the dispute will then be resolved by the arbitor (arbitrator), and such determination will be binding on the parties."

The Board, on 13 October 1976, filed a motion requesting that no findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment or judgment be entered in this action until all issues presented to the court for its determination have been decided by the court.The Board further moved the court for a decision on all issues raised by the pleadings.

The Board, in support of its motion, argued that the trial court had not decided all the pertinent issues as required by the Declaratory Judgment Act, Chapter 32-23, NDCC, including:

1.Is the alleged grievance a grievance as defined by the contract?

2.Was the alleged grievance timely filed as required by the terms of the contract?

Following a hearing on the motion held 8 November 1976, the court denied the motion, finding that those issues were factual determinations to be decided by the arbitrator.On 23 March 1977, the Board filed a notice of appeal from the order of the court denying its motion, dated 10 November 1976, and from the judgment of the court, dated 31 January 1977.

The Board contends that binding arbitration is not enforceable, and in support of its position refers to § 32-04-12(3), NDCC, which provides:

"The following obligations cannot be enforced specifically:

3.An agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration."

This section had its origin in the 1877 Code and has not been amended.It contains other "unenforceable obligations," such as rendering personal service, or employing another for personal service.The statute obviously is based upon the proposition that a court order most likely would be futile because it would be impossible for the court to coerce the rendering of a personal service.The saying, "You can...