West Flagler Amusement Co., Inc. v. State Racing Com'n

• Decision Date: 13 December 1935
• Citation: 122 Fla. 222,165 So. 64
• Parties: WEST FLAGLER AMUSEMENT CO., Inc. v. STATE RACING COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

165 So. 64

122 Fla. 222

WEST FLAGLER AMUSEMENT CO., Inc. v. STATE RACING COMMISSION et al.

Florida Supreme Court

December 13, 1935

En Banc.

Original proceeding by the West Flagler Amusement Company, Inc., for writ of certiorari against the State Racing Commission and others.

Certiorari quashed without prejudice.

See also, State v. Dupuis, 165 So. 66.

COUNSEL Loftin, Stokes & Calkins, for petitioner.

T. G Futch, McKinney Barton, Carl T. Hoffman, and L. L. Robinson for respondents.

OPINION

DAVIS Justice.

This is a writ of certiorari to have brought up and quashed an order of the state racing commission made under section 2 of chapter 17276, Acts of 1935, General Laws of Florida, relating to the apportionment of dog racing dates in Dade county, Fla., between the petitioner, West Flagler Amusement Company, Inc., and Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc., and Miami Beach Kennel Club, Inc. The charge of illegality is unjust and unlawful discrimination on the part of the respondent racing commission amounting to an abuse of authority entitling the petitioner, as one aggrieved thereby to seek judicial relief against the Commission's action.

In State ex rel. Pinellas Kennel Club, Inc. v. State Racing Commission, 116 Fla. 143, 156 So. 317, it was held that where the state racing commission's statutory powers are arbitrary or clearly erroneously exercised, their action is reviewable and subject to judicial avoidance in mandamus proceedinds, where no other adequate legal remedy exists. Compare State ex rel. Tullidge v. Driskell, 117 Fla. 717, 158 So. 277; State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 103 Fla. 801, 138 So. 372, and State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 150 So. 136, 156 So. 705, 95 A.L.R. 1416. On the other hand, in the case of Six Mile Creek Kennel Club, Inc., v. State Racing Commission, 119 Fla. 142, 161 So. 58, the use of a writ of certiorari against an alleged illegal order of the state racing commission revoking a permit and license to conduct dog races, on the ground of alleged nonpayment of fees, was allowed and recognized as an appropriate remedy for the situation there complained of.

So the point to be decided at the outset of this case is whether or not certiorari is an appropriate legal remedy for reviewing and quashing an order of the state racing commission made under authority of the quasi-legislative powers vested in such commission by section 2 of chapter 14832, Acts of 1931, as amended by section 2 of chapter 17276, Acts of 1935, General Laws of Florida, with reference to the exercise of the powers given under paragraph (1) of said section to fix and set the dates for racing in any county, where there are one or more licensed horse or dog tracks.

In State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 150 So. 136, 156 So. 705, 707, 95 A.L.R. 1416, the nature and quality of the statutory functions of legislative creations such as the state racing commission were adverted to in the following language which is quoted from that opinion:

'Legislative developments in recent years have brought into existence administrative tribunals set up by law and vested with limited statutory powers to make and enforce rules and regulations and to render factual decisions on conflicting issues that amount in substance to delegated exercises of special legislative and executive, and sometimes judicial, functions. Thus a vast extension of the field of governmental operations and control of things heretofore left unregulated by special provisions of law has been accompanied by the creation of administrative agencies possessing the advantage of dispensing with ordinary formalities and delays usually found unavoidable in court proceedings or the ordinary functioning of the Legislature.'

In that opinion also the distinction was clearly drawn between the quasi legislative and quasi judicial functions of administrative commissions; the test of the quasi judicial function being whether or not the statutory tribunal had exercised a statutory power given it to make a decision having a judicial character or attribute and consequent upon some notice or hearing provided to be had before it as a condition for the rendition of the particular decision made. Unless, therefore, a particular decision complained of can be said to have a judicial quality or attribute sufficient to stamp it as a quasi judicial, as distinguished from a quasi legislative or quasi executive commission function, certiorari, which is a remedy limited solely to judicial or quasi judicial determinations, will not lie. Sirmans v. Owen, 87 Fla. 485, 100 So. 734.

A judicial or quasi judicial act determines the rules of law...