West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc. v. Florida State Racing Commission, 32099

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DREW; ROBERTS
• Citation: West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc. v. Florida State Racing Commission, 153 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1963)
• Decision Date: 27 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 32099,32099
• Parties: WEST FLAGLER KENNEL CLUB, INC., et al., Appellants, v. FLORIDA STATE RACING COMMISSION et al., Appellees.

Page 5

153 So.2d 5

WEST FLAGLER KENNEL CLUB, INC., et al., Appellants, v. FLORIDA STATE RACING COMMISSION et al., Appellees.

No. 32099.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 27, 1963.

Rehearing Denied May 31, 1963.

M. L. Mershon of Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Simmons & Dunwody, G. Kenneth Kemper of Hoffman, Kemper & Johnson, Miami, for appellants.

J. Lewis Hall, of Hall, Hartwell & Hall, Tallahassee, Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Leonard Mellon, Asst. Atty, Gen., and Willard Ayres, Ocala, for appellees.

DREW, Justice.

The appellants, five pari-mutuel racing establishments, are controverting a decree of the Circuit Court for Leon County dismissing a complaint against the appellees, Florida State Racing Commission, Ponce de Leon Trotting Association, Inc., and South Florida Harness Raceways, Inc., seeking a decree enjoining the granting or transfer of a harness racing permit under Chapter 61-1940, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1961.

In 1946 a harness racing permit was issued to Ponce de Leon Trotting Association for operations in St. Johns County. Upon approval by referendum in that county, ¹ Ponce de Leon conducted racing in 1953, 1958 and 1960 pursuant to license from the Commission. Because of financial difficulties Ponce de Leon was placed in receivership in St. Johns County in 1960.

During pendency of negotiations for sale of its permit to the appellee South Florida Harness Raceways, Inc., the 1961 Florida Legislature enacted (the Governor's veto thereof to the contrary notwithstanding) Chapter 61-1940, which forms the basis for this litigation. The act provided in substance that harness racing permits issued and ratified since January 1, 1946, under which racing had been conducted during the five years preceding the act, 'are hereby declared valid and lawful permits for the purpose for which they were issued,' and holders of any such permit, upon certain conditions at variance with those prescribed in Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and applied by the Commission in the granting or racing permits generally, 'shall have the right to conduct horse racing in harness * * * in Broward County,' subject to referendum in Broward County, by which the act was subsequently approved. ²

Following the adjournment of the 1961 Legislature which had passed Chapter 61-1940, supra, upon rule to show cause addressed to Ponce de Leon and charging violations of F.S. Chapter 550, F.S.A., the Commission revoked its previously issued permit. The validity of this order is the subject of a certiorari proceeding which is here for final disposition with this appeal. ³

The complaint for injunction and other relief in this cause was filed by appellants on June 29, 1962, seeking to prevent any action by the Commission in compliance with Chapter 61-1940, and to obtain an adjudication that Chapter 61-1940 is invalid by reason of violation of Sections 16, 20 and 21, Article III, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., for (1) failure to provide for approval of a special act by referendum vote in St. Johns County, alleged to be 'territory affected' because it was the county of original issue for the only permit in fact affected by the Act; (2) failure to express in its title the subject affected, i. e. Ponce de Leon's permit; and (3) attempting by special act to regulate the jurisdiction and duties of a class of state officers, viz: the members of the Florida State Racing Commission. Appellants contend also that the terms of the act operate to deprive them of equal protection of the laws, in contravention of Section 1, Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

To preclude this contest of the statute for lack of sufficient interest in appellants or the Commission, as appellees urge, would constitute an inordinate and unjustified restriction on the litigation of such issues. To simplify the disposition of these proceedings, this point is resolved at the outset contrary to appellees' contentions. In further simplification of the issues, we hold on the basis of prior decisions ⁴ that the act is not one 'regulating the jurisdiction and duties of a class of state officers' so as to collide with the proscription of Sec. 20, Art. III, supra, against special legislation.

Of primary importance among the many constitutional points raised is the propriety of the alleged classification of permits affected by the act. The issue of classification for purposes of equal protection is one which applies, of course, to both general and special legislation, although the requirement of equality or uniformity among those in like situation pertains, in the case of special acts properly passed on a subject not required to be governed by genreal law, only to those in the area where the special act is made applicable. ⁵ In any event, whether the issue of arbitrary classification in the subject act should be determined on the basis of its effect as a special act applicable only in Broward County, or its effect among those involved in the racing industry elsewhere in the state, the act is fatally defective.

Whatever the motivation for the legislative method, Chapter 61-1940 does not in terms require the issuance of a new permit for operations in Broward County, and the propriety of such an act need not be considered. Nor can the legislation be justified as equivalent ot an administrative transfer of an existing permit. A transfer on the special conditions set forth in the act obviously could not be made under existing provisions in Chapter 550 and any legislative authorization for such a transfer would be subject to the same constitutional objections as the legislation here involved.

The provision is that holders of existing permits of specified characteristics shall under certain conditions have the right to obtain license for operation in Broward County. The existing permits are described and distinguished on the basis of such factors as time of issuance and time of operations conducted. Appellees do not attempt to demonstrate a reasonable relation between these factors and the primary purpose of the act, which was to provide for harness racing in Broward County on certain legislatively prescribed conditions, and we perceive none. Obviously, then, the effort is not to make the act applicable to a permit or permits of like kind, differing from others in some material respect, but instead the descriptive technique is employed merely for identification rather than classification. Upon analysis we think this legislation must be regarded as an enactment granting to certain permit holders, designated in terms not susceptible of generic application now or in the future, the right to conduct harness racing in Broward County upon compliance with its conditions. The act is therefore arbitrary and not uniform or equal in its specification of the thing as well as the county affected.

Appellees rely, in defending the act, upon the propriety of separate classification of harness racing permits for regulatory purposes. It is incontrovertible, however, that even if harness racing permits might reasonably require special regulations of this character Chapter 61-1940 does not purport to constitute harness racing permits a...