West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council of Town of West Hartford

• Citation: 228 Conn. 498,636 A.2d 1342
• Decision Date: 08 February 1994
• Docket Number: No. 14686,14686
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: WEST HARTFORD INTERFAITH COALITION, INC. v. TOWN COUNCIL OF the TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD.

Page 1342

636 A.2d 1342

228 Conn. 498

WEST HARTFORD INTERFAITH COALITION, INC. v. TOWN COUNCIL OF the TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD.

No. 14686.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 26, 1993.

Decided Feb. 8, 1994.

Marjorie Wilder, Corp. Counsel, for appellant (defendant).

Jeffrey J. Mirman, with whom was Robin Messier Pearson, for appellee (plaintiff).

Philip D. Tegeler filed a brief for the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. as amici curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the defendant, the West Hartford town council, acting in its capacity as the zoning authority for West Hartford, ¹ properly denied the application of the plaintiff, West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc., for a zone change and special development district designation to construct ten units of affordable housing on property located in West Hartford. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, pursuant to General Statutes § 8-30g, ² from the defendant's denial of its application. The trial court sustained the plaintiff's appeal, reversed the defendant's decision and granted the plaintiff's application. Thereafter, the defendant petitioned the Appellate Court for certification to appeal. ³ After the Appellate Court granted the petition, we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff is a private nonprofit organization composed of individuals from the West Hartford community and eleven local churches and synagogues, created for the purpose of " 'provid[ing] entry level home ownership opportunities for individuals and families of low and moderate income.' " At all material times, the plaintiff held an option to purchase approximately one and one-fourth acres of undeveloped property at 2561 Albany Avenue, West Hartford. ⁴ On May 6, 1991, pursuant to § 8-30g, the plaintiff submitted an application to the defendant requesting for the property: (1) a zone change from an R-13 single-family zone to an RM-4 multifamily zone; ⁵ and (2) a special development district designation. ⁶ The application, designed to meet the affordability requirements of § 8-30g for an "affordable housing development," sought approval for ten affordable housing units in three buildings on the property. ⁷

On June 17 and June 27, 1991, the defendant held a public hearing on the plaintiff's application. At the two-day hearing, the West Hartford town planner, a representative of the Northwest Homeowner's Association and several members of the public testified in opposition to the application. The plaintiff's executive director, its counsel, a local real estate appraiser, the president of the League of Women Voters and several members of the public, among others, testified in support of the application. In total, an equal number of people, approximately twenty-six, spoke both for and against the application. ⁸

Following the conclusion of the hearing, at an August 6, 1991 meeting, the defendant voted unanimously to deny the plaintiff's application. In a letter dated August 8, 1991, the defendant informed the plaintiff of its decision. Although the deliberations concerning the application, reflected in the minutes of the defendant's August 6 meeting, revealed various concerns relating to the plaintiff's application, the letter failed to state any reasons for the defendant's decision. ⁹

On August 30, 1991, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the defendant's decision to deny its application. During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the proposed project was neither "assisted" nor deed restricted and, accordingly, did not constitute an "affordable housing development" as defined in General Statutes § 8-30g(a)(1)(A) and (B). After receiving testimony and hearing oral argument on June 10, 1992, the trial court denied the defendant's motion.

Subsequently, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court sustained the plaintiff's appeal and granted the plaintiff's application. The defendant has appealed, raising five issues. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) implicitly concluded that the affordable housing land use appeals procedure set forth in § 8-30g applies to legislative zone changes; (2) failed to apply traditional concepts of zoning review to the plaintiff's affordable housing appeal; (3) failed to consider the affordability of all housing in West Hartford in assessing the need for "affordable housing" under § 8-30g(c); (4) failed to require the plaintiff to establish a likelihood that it would succeed in providing affordable housing; and (5) ordered a zone change and approval of the special development district designation in lieu of remanding the plaintiff's application to the defendant. Additional facts will be set forth hereinafter where relevant.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly concluded, by implication, that the procedure governing the affordable housing land use appeals set forth in § 8-30g applied to the defendant's legislative decision ¹⁰ to deny the plaintiff's requested zone change. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff's application requested two distinct but interdependent actions: first, the plaintiff requested a zone change on the subject property from single-family to multifamily; and second, in the event that the defendant granted the zone change, the plaintiff requested approval of a special development district designation (special designation), which included, inter alia, requests for waivers of certain standards in the underlying zone change solicited by the plaintiff. The defendant further asserts that, under § 177-44.A of the West Hartford Code of Ordinances, a special designation may be granted only if the request pertains to "permitted uses of land in the zoning district in which it is located." The defendant contends that when the plaintiff applied for the special designation, its proposed multifamily residential use for the subject property was not permitted in the underlying single-family zone. Thus, the defendant asserts, approval of the plaintiff's request for a special designation would have required prior approval of the plaintiff's requested multifamily zone change.

In light of these factors, the defendant contends that § 8-30g does not apply to the plaintiff's first and separate request for a zone change on the subject property because such a request is not "in connection with" the plaintiff's affordable housing development application, as required by § 8-30g(a)(2). ¹¹ In response, the plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that the defendant never raised the issue of the applicability of § 8-30g to legislative decisions at any point prior to seeking this appeal; consequently, the plaintiff argues that this court should not now consider the claim.

Although our examination of the record confirms that the defendant did not raise this claim below, ¹² the record that is before us regarding the claim is nevertheless adequate for our review. In view of the adequate record, the public character of this case and the significance of the issue to both the parties and the surrounding community, we elect to invoke, pursuant to Practice Book § 4183, our general power of supervision and control over proceedings on appeal. Matza v. Matza, 226 Conn. 166, 189, 627 A.2d 414 (1993); Pisel v. Stamford Hospital, 180 Conn. 314, 330, 430 A.2d 1 (1980); Silverman v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 168 Conn. 160, 171, 363 A.2d 22 (1975). Pursuant to this power, we will address the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly concluded by implication that § 8-30g applies to legislative zone changes and hold that the trial court's implicit application of the statute to the defendant's decision to deny the plaintiff's application was proper.

"Ordinarily, the construction and interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the courts ... particularly where, as here, the statute has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny or time-tested agency interpretations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jutkowitz v. Department of Health Services, 220 Conn. 86, 106, 596 A.2d 374 (1991). "In construing a statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, 224 Conn. 382, 390, 618 A.2d 1340 (1993). "In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement and to its relationship to existing legislation...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McVeigh, 224 Conn. 593, 607, 620 A.2d 133 (1993).

In construing § 8-30g, we must start with the language employed by the legislature. United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 756, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992). Generally, "when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature's intent." American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 193, 530 A.2d 171 (1987). Further, we must interpret a statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116, 118, 441 A.2d 65 (1981). "When the language of a statute is unclear, [however,] we may ascertain the intent of the legislature by looking beyond the language to the statute's legislative history and the purpose that the statute was intended to serve." Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co., 223 Conn. 336, 341, 612 A.2d 1203 (1992). "A statute ... should not be interpreted to thwart its purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. State...