West Texas Utilities Co. v. National Labor Rel. Bd.

Decision Date28 April 1953
Docket NumberNo. 10465.,10465.
Citation206 F.2d 442
PartiesWEST TEXAS UTILITIES CO., Inc. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Winthrop A. Johns, Assistant General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., for National Labor Relations Board.

Thurman Arnold, K. Norman Diamond, Washington, D. C., and Frank Cain, Dallas, Tex., for Price Campbell and West Texas Utilities Company, Inc.

Louis Sherman, Washington, D. C., for intervenor, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Unions No. 898, 920 and 1044, AFL.

Before EDGERTON, WILBUR K. MILLER and BAZELON, Circuit Judges.

Writ of Certiorari Denied October 19, 1953. See 74 S.Ct. 70.

BAZELON, Circuit Judge.

Voluminous pleadings supported by affidavits and argument trace the long trail which led an unhappy labor-management relationship to these civil contempt proceedings against the employer, West Texas Utilities Company, Inc., and Price Campbell, its President1 (respondents). The trail reaches back almost seven years to 1946 when the National Labor Relations Board, pursuant to an election, certified the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Locals No. 898, 920, and 1044, AFL, (the Union) as the exclusive bargaining representative for a unit comprising some 276 of the Company's employees. On July 10, 1950, this court affirmed a Board determination that the Company had refused, in violation of § 8(a) (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, to bargain collectively with the Union.2 Our decree dated July 24, 1950 enforcing the Board's order was issued on June 5, 19513 and directed the Company and its officers to

"1. Cease and desist from:
"(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Locals No. 898, 920, and 1044, AFL, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit involved here * * *; and
"(b) Interfering in any other manner with the efforts of the Union to bargain collectively on behalf of the employees in the * * * bargaining unit.
"2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board has found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
"(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit, with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement;
"(b) Post in its district and branch offices * * * copies of the notice attached hereto and marked Appendix A. Copies of said notice * * * shall * * * be posted by the petitioner Respondent-Company immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the petitioner Respondent-Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material * * *."4

Board charges that respondents violated this decree gave rise to these proceedings. Pleadings developed certain hotly disputed matters and freed others from doubt or controversy. Since admitted matters clearly sustain charges of civil contempt, a trial of the disputed issues is unnecessary.5 Upon the admissions we make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

Findings of Fact

1. The decree of this court dated July 24, 1950, was directed against respondent West Texas Utilities Company, Inc., and its officers.

2. Respondent Price Campbell, at all times herein material, has been President of respondent West Texas Utilities Company, Inc. He appointed a committee composed of, inter alios, one Harold D. Austin, to negotiate with the Union on all matters involving the Company and retained power to ratify the committee's recommendations, agreements, proposals, or contracts.

3. On or about August 10, 1951, respondent Company posted the notice to all employees required by paragraph 2(b) of the court's decree. This notice (the first notice) read in pertinent part:

"Appendix a
"Notice to all Employees
"Pursuant to
"A decree of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit enforcing an order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
"We will bargain collectively upon request with International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Locals No. 898, 920, and 1044, AFL, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described herein with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.6
* * * * * *
"We will not in any manner interfere with the efforts of the Union to bargain collectively with us as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit described above.

"West Texas Utilities Company Inc. (Employer)"

4. Six days later, on or about August 16, 1951, respondent Company posted another notice alongside the required first notice. This notice (the second notice) read in pertinent part:

"Notice to all Employees
"A routine form notice7 provided by the Labor Board and required to be posted by this company gave no explanation as to its why-for. Some of us have requested information as to why it was necessary, and I am sure others are wondering. We have received following information from attorney:
"* * * Out of over 80 unfair labor practices charged against this company by the union, the Company was completely exonerated of every one of them except one which is in doubt at the present time, both before the courts and the labor board. * * * Our company won every one of its points as against the union, but because of * * * one technicality on timing not finally settled in our case by either the Labor Board or the Court, the Company is now for the time being compelled to start bargaining in good faith with such union. OUR CASE AND THE QUESTION IS, HOWEVER, STILL BEFORE THE COURT FOR FINAL DETERMINATION.
"The U. S. Supreme Court recently held in a similar case, the Highland Park Case Number 71 S.Ct. 758, that such company did not have to bargain with a union which had not then signed the non-communist oath. If such a court finding is finally held in our case, there would have been no unfair labor practice of refusing to further bargain with a union, and the employees petitions therefore would be binding on the Labor Board for proper action."

"(Signed) Harold D. Austin"8

5. On and after August 8, 1951, bargaining sessions pursuant to paragraphs 1 (a) and 2(a) of the decree took place between respondent Company and the Union. No agreement was reached between the Company and the Union with respect to wages and rates of pay.9

6. On March 25, 1952, one Maurice V. Brooks, an attorney not connected with the Union but claiming to represent a large number of respondents' employees, requested a meeting with respondent Price Campbell to negotiate an adjustment of wages for respondent Company's employees "in accordance with the terms of Paragraph 9(a)" of the Act.10

7. On March 26, 1952, respondent Price Campbell, after consultation with respondent Company's attorneys, wrote Brooks that he understood the Company was compelled to negotiate with him "on the matter of wages to certain of our employees."

8. On March 28, 1952, the respondent Company met with Brooks and negotiated an agreement providing an 18 cents per hour average increase in wages for 205 of the 276 employees in the bargaining unit covered by this court's decree.11

Conclusions of Law

1. Respondents West Texas Utilities Company, Inc., and Price Campbell, its President, have at all times herein material been subject to this court's decree, and both are liable for any failure to comply therewith.12

2. By posting the second notice, respondents disobeyed, disregarded and violated paragraph 2(b) of the decree which expressly ordered the Company and its officers to take "reasonable steps" to insure

that the first notice is "not altered * * *."13 The second notice altered the first in important respects by erroneously implying that (1) the first notice did not explain its "why-for"; (2) the order of this court was not yet final; and (3) the Company was only required to bargain with the Union "for the time being." Its overall effect "leaves a reader with quite a different impression than that" intended by the first notice.14

3. Section 9(a) of the Act makes a duly certified union the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees of an appropriate unit with respect, inter alia, to "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment" although it permits "any individual employee or a group of employees * * * to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted * * * without the intervention of the exclusive bargaining representative."15 Although any grievance may be a subject of collective bargaining, not all subjects of collective bargaining are grievances. As we view the word "grievances" it does not encompass, for example, the setting of wage rates for a large percentage of the employees in a certified bargaining unit. The word "grievances," in the field of industrial relations, particularly in unionized companies, usually refers to "secondary disputes in contrast to disagreements concerning broad issues such as wage rates, hours and working conditions."16 The Supreme Court, in construing the Railway Labor Act of 1934,17 noted that grievances are of a "comparatively minor character" and traditionally "affect the smaller differences which inevitably appear in the carrying out of major agreements and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • MATTER OF GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION (90-3-2)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • October 9, 1990
    ...severity is available, including, inter alia, a. Imposing fines for each act of future noncompliance. See, West Texas Utilities Company, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 442 at 488 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855, 74 S.Ct. 70, 98 L.Ed. 369 b. Requiring the Government to pay costs and attorney ......
  • Bata v. Central-Penn Nat. Bank of Philadelphia
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • June 28, 1972
    ...592 (5th Cir. 1965); In re Federal Facilities Realty Trust, 227 F.2d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 1955); West Texas Utilities Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 92 U.S.App.D.C. 224, 206 F.2d 442, 448--449 (1953); Backo v. Local 281, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 308 F.Supp. 172 (N.D.N.......
  • Bata v. Central-Penn Nat. Bank of Philadelphia
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • June 28, 1972
    ... ... 355 Thomas J. BATA v. CENTRAL-PENN NATIONAL BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, and Jan T. Bata, ... 658 (7th Cir. 1955); West Texas Utilities Co., Inc. v ... N.L.R.B., 92 ... ...
  • International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., AFL-CI
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • August 29, 1974
    ...Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 745 v. NLRB, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 500 F.2d 768 (1974); West Texas Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 224, 206 F.2d 442, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855, 74 S.Ct. 70, 98 L.Ed. 369 27 Company Br. at 9, 17-18. 28 The union demand, made origina......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT