West v. Bowen

• Decision Date: 11 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-1475,88-1475
• Citation: 879 F.2d 1122
• Parties: WEST, Marie, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BOWEN, Otis R. individually and in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services Lyng, Richard E. individually and in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture White, John F., Jr. individually and in his capacity as Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and Stovall, Don Jose individually and in his capacity as Executive Director of the Philadelphia County Assistance Office. Appeal of Marie E. WEST, individually and on behalf of the classes she represents, Class A and Class B.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 1122

879 F.2d 1122

WEST, Marie, individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated v. BOWEN, Otis R. individually and in his capacity as Secretary

of the United States Department of Health and Human Services

Lyng, Richard E. individually and in his capacity as

Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture

White, John F., Jr. individually and in his capacity as

Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare

and Stovall, Don Jose individually and in his capacity as

Executive Director of the Philadelphia County Assistance Office.

Appeal of Marie E. WEST, individually and on behalf of the

classes she represents, Class A and Class B.

No. 88-1475.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Dec. 1, 1988.

Decided June 30, 1989.

Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied Sept. 11, 1989.

George D. Gould, Peter D. Schneider, Community Legal Services, Inc., Philadelphia,

Pa., David A. Super (argued), Food Research & Action Center, Inc., Washington, D.C., for appellants

John R. Bolton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas H. Lee, II, Acting U.S. Atty., Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Constance A. Wynn (argued), Robert Greenspan, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Appellate Branch, Washington, D.C., for appellee, Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services.

LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Atty. Gen., Michael L. Harvey (argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., George R. Neuhauser, Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., John G. Knorr, III, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Chief, Litigation Section, Office of Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, Pa., for appellees, White & Stovall.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, MANSMANN, and GARTH, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

GARTH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff/Appellant, Marie West ("West"), individually, and as the representative of two different classes of individuals who claim that they have not received food stamp benefits to which they are entitled, appeals from a summary judgment order entered in favor of Defendant/Appellee, Bowen, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), and other governmental defendants with respect to both classes. We will affirm the district court's judgment as it concerns Class A, and reverse with respect to Class B. ¹

I.

While West's original complaint ² seeking SSI disability benefits was pending, West amended her complaint to include allegations that her rights under the Food Stamp Act were being violated by HHS, the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") and the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare ("DPW"). West alleged two separate violations: she first charged that although she received SSI disability benefits which accrued to her from the date she applied for the benefits (May, 1983) to the date she began receiving benefits pursuant to the district court's order, she only received food stamp benefits from the date of the district court's order awarding her disability benefits (July, 1985). West claims that just as she was entitled to SSI benefits from the date of her application, she was entitled to recover food stamp benefits retroactively, i.e., from the date of her disability application.

West's second complaint was that USDA in administering the food stamp program, improperly included as income, when calculating her food stamp benefits, monies which West received from DPW as reimbursement for utility expenses.

The district court certified two classes of claimants: Class A claimants who seek retroactive food stamp benefits, and Class B claimants who seek relief from the allegedly improper inclusion of utility rebates in income. All parties moved for summary judgment and the district court ruled against West on all of her class action claims. West appeals.

II.

Before turning our attention to the merits of West's claims, we address our standard of review. The issues presented here require us to review the Secretary of Agriculture's interpretation of the Food Stamp Act in accordance with the following instruction When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (footnotes omitted). See also Wheeler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir.1986) ("We must defer to [the Secretary's] construction, as long as it is reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious."); Pennsylvania v. United States, 752 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir.1984) ("[A] reviewing court must uphold the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable, notwithstanding the court's belief that some other policy was preferable.")

Thus, in the absence of Congress' unambiguously expressed intent, we are bound to defer to the Secretary's interpretation, if that interpretation is reasonable and based on a permissible construction of the statute, in this case 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2012(r), see note 3, infra.

III.

The Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2011, et seq. ("The Act"), establishes a federally funded, state administered program to supplement the food purchasing power of eligible individuals. Participants receive coupons which can be used to purchase food from regular stores. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2013(a). Eligibility for participation in the food stamp program is based on a household's gross income, which includes income from whatever source, subject to certain exemptions and deductions. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2014(d). Generally, as an individual's income goes up, the amount of his food stamp allotment goes down.

The Act affords special treatment for elderly and disabled people who apply for food stamps. For example, only elderly or disabled people may claim defined medical expenses as deductions when computing their income to determine their food stamp allotment, 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2014(e)(A), and only elderly or disabled individuals may deduct the full amount of their shelter costs when computing their income. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2014(e)(C). For the purposes of the Food Stamp Act, a disabled person is someone who "receives" Social Security disability payments. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2012(r)(2), (3). ³

It is this definition of "disabled" which has given rise to the present appeal of the Class A members. When an individual is already receiving Social Security disability benefits, an application for food stamps can be processed immediately. However, when an individual applies for both disability benefits and food stamps at the same time, the food stamp application is held pending a determination by the Social Security Administration that the individual applicant is entitled to disability benefits. This time period is referred to as the "disability determination period." In many cases, it is not uncommon for a substantial amount of time to elapse before a final determination is made that an individual is entitled to disability benefits. In West's case, it took over two years. During this time period, she did not receive benefits of any kind.

Because West was ultimately successful in her disability appeal from the ALJ to the district court, she received a lump sum payment from SSA covering the time period from the date she first applied for disability benefits through the date that she began receiving them pursuant to the district court's order. In other words, she received a lump sum payment for the entire "disability determination period." However, even though it was determined that she was also entitled to food stamps for the same time period, the USDA refused to issue food stamps for that period.

The USDA based its refusal to issue the stamps retroactively on its interpretation of the word "receive." As noted previously, 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2012(r) provides for food stamps based on the disability of an individual who is "receiving" Social Security benefits. USDA claims that since West was not actually "receiving" disability benefits during the "disability determination period," she was not entitled to retroactive food stamps covering that time period.

USDA initially took the position, i.e., that retroactive payments were inappropriate, with respect to all disabled applicants for food stamps. USDA subsequently modified its position and allowed retroactive payments of food stamps when the applicant was "categorically eligible." 51 Fed.Reg. 28196, 28200 (August 5, 1986). A "categorically eligible" person is someone who lives in a household where every member of the household receives some form of federal assistance. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2014(a). The regulation only allows for retroactive food stamp payments for "disability determination periods" after December 23, 1985, the date Congress enacted the statute which recognized "categorical eligibility". USDA concedes that this statute recognizing categorically eligible people, now codified at 7 U.S.C. 2014(a), does not require retroactive payments. (A. 461). Nevertheless, USDA has decided to make retroactive payments as a matter within its discretion.

To summarize: Since disability status for purposes of the Food Stamp Act is acquired only upon certification and notification to USDA of an individual's disability determination, the Secretary of Agriculture has taken the position that noncategorically eligible persons are barred from recovering retroactive food stamp benefits even for periods...