West v. Brenner
| Decision Date | 27 October 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 9265,9265 |
| Citation | 396 P.2d 115,88 Idaho 44 |
| Parties | Virgil S. WEST and Doris M. West, his wife, Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants and Respondents, v. George J. BRENNER and Bertha Brenner, his wife, Defendants, Cross-Plaintiffs and Appellants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Thomas A. Madden, Lewiston, for appellants.
Morgan & Morgan, Lewiston, for respondents.
Under date of October 1, 1952, appellants, George and Bertha Brenner, as lessees, and respondents, Virgil and Doris West, as lessors, entered into a lease of certain farm lands located in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The lease term was for five years, terminating September 30, 1957, and it provided that the property was subject to sale during the term under circumstances and conditions set out in the paragraphs hereinafter quoted as paragraphs 7 and 8 of the lease.
Under date of December 28, 1956, respondents entered into an agreement with Winston B. Mader and Dorothy A. Mader, his wife (hereinafter referred to as Maders), under which certain lands, including the property covered by said lease, were allegedly sold to the Maders for $135,000.
On December 31, 1956 a written notice, signed by respondents and Maders, was served upon appellants, whereby appellants were notified of the claimed sale, which notice in part stated:
'You are hereby notified as follows:
'A. The sum of $1000.00, the same being in addition to your share of the crops for 1956.
'B. On acreage leased to you, the Lessors will pay you the fair value of plowing, weeding and seeding done by you. The Lessors hereby state that the fair value and that which is currently being paid in that community, is as follows:
1) Plowing, $3.50 per acre
2) Seeding, $1.50 per acre
3) Weeding, $1.00 per acre, for each time
4) Seed, $3.50 per acre."
Appellants refused to surrender possession of the leased premises and caused written notice of their refusal to be given respondents whereby they disputed the validity of the notice, the right to terminate the lease and the prices set forth for the work which had been done.
Thereafter, and by notice dated February 20, 1957, respondents notified appellants in substance that by reason of appellants' refusal to surrender possession Maders refused to carry out their purchase contract dated December 28, 1956, and in order to minimize respondents' losses they were compelled to, and did, contract with Maders that if the said Maders were unable to obtain possession of said premises and crops by March 1, 1957, the purchase price would be reduced as follows:
'The principal amount thereof would be reduced by the sum of $12,000.00.
'The interest to be paid to plaintiffs on the contract between the 28th day of December, 1956, and the 1st day of December, 1957, in the sum of $4,142.09, would be cancelled.
'The interest on the $34,650.00 mortgage accruing to the 1st day of February, 1958, in the sum of $1,559.25, would be paid by the plaintiffs.'
On March 12, 1957, respondents filed this action seeking a judgment against appellants for damages and costs in the sum of $18,701.34. On April 20, 1957, appellants filed their application for writ of injunction alleging that respondents had, during April 1957, wrongfully entered upon certain of the lands covered by the lease and commenced the doing of tilling work thereon. An injunction order, restraining respondents from entering upon the leased premises or interfering with appellants' possession thereof, was entered and filed May 23, 1957. Thereafter appellants continued to care for the crops growing upon the leased premises, harvesting them in the fall of 1957, and surrendered possession to Maders of each field as harvest was completed thereon, yielding complete possession by September 30, 1957.
On May 6, 1958, appellants filed their answer to respondents' complaint together with a cross-complaint alleging five separate causes of action for damages. Respondents moved for a dismissal of the first and fifth causes of action and for summary judgment for respondents on the second, third and fourth causes of action alleged in appellants' cross-complaint. The court disposed of said motions by awarding summary judgment to appellants upon the first cause of action in the sum of $1000 and upon the second cause of action in the sum of $201.73, and by dismissal of the third, fourth and fifth causes of action. Such order was dated and filed March 10, 1960.
Trial was commenced on October 12, 1961 and judgment for respondents entered August 16, 1962. Said judgment was based upon the court's finding that appellants' failure to comply with the notice and demand for possession made by respondents caused respondents damages in the following amounts:
(1) $12,000.00 reduction in selling price to Maders
(2) 4,142.09 interest which respondents would have received under the
Mader contract
(3) 1,559.25 interest which respondents were required to pay on the
mortgage existing on the premises sold
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$17,701.34 -- Total damages awarded
This total was reduced by the allowance of the following amounts as
credits:
(1) $1,000.00 per judgment on appellants' first cause of action alleged
in their cross-complaint
(2) 201.73 per judgment on appellants' second cause of action as
alleged in their cross-complaint
(3) 4,980.60 which was received by respondents as lessors' share of
the 1957 crops
----------
$6,182.33 -- Total credit
On the balance (amounting to $11,519.01) interest at 6% per annum from March 1, 1956 to date of judgment (August 16, 1962) in the amount of $3,744 was allowed, making a total judgment against appellants in the amount of $15,263.01. This appeal is taken from said judgment.
Appellants' assignments of error are primarily concerned with the basic issue of whether the lease was terminated pursuant to the notice served upon the appellants on December 31, 1956. The controlling facts are not in dispute.
The lease provided that the property thereby leased was subject to sale. Respondents contend that the agreement entered into with Maders, dated December 28, 1956, constituted a sale and that the lease was terminated when notice of such sale was given appellants on December 31, 1956. This contention was upheld by the trial court.
Appellants contend that since the subject matter of the claimed sale was the community property of respondents and the agreement of December 28, 1956 was not both signed and acknowledged by them as sellers of the property, the claimed contract of sale was void and unenforceable and therefore no sale occurred on December 28, 1956.
This places in issue the sufficiency of the instrument relied upon by respondents as constituting a sale within the meaning of the lease provisions. The following quoted portion of the lease (hereinafter referred to as paragraph 7) provides that:
It is axiomatic that a lease, like any other contract, is to be construed to give effect to the intention of the parties. Miller v. Belknap, 75 Idaho 46, 266 P.2d 662. It is also generally held that the interpretation of a written instrument derived solely from the language of the writing itself, unaided by extrinsic evidence of the intention of the parties or the surrounding circumstances is a question of law and the interpretation given it by the trial court is not binding upon an appeal. Meyer v. State Board of Equalization, 42 Cal.2d 376, 267 P.2d 257 (1954). In the present case extrinsic evidence offered by appellant was refused by the court.
Here the lease provided that the property leased was subject to sale. The instrument relied upon by respondents as constituting a sale is entitled 'Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement,' which is a printed form with the property description and other typewritten provisions inserted in the spaces left blank. In the body of this instrument it is repeatedly referred to as an offer and provides that it is...
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