West v. Buncombe Cnty.
| Decision Date | 03 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-CV-00088-MOC-DSC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | NATHANIEL G. WEST, Plaintiff, v. BUNCOMBE COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES, ABIGAIL OWOLABI, AMANDA STONE AND VANESSA HILL, Defendants. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on "Defendant Amanda Stone's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)," Doc. 6, filed June 3, 2014, and "Defendants Buncombe County Health and Human Services, Child Protective Services, Abigail Owolabi and Vanessa Hill's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)," Doc. 11, filed June 30, 2014 , and the parties' associated briefs and exhibits, Docs. 13-15.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and these Motions are now ripe for consideration.
Having fully considered the arguments, the record, and the applicable authority, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss be granted, as discussed below.
Accepting the allegations of the pro se Complaint, Doc. 1, as true, Plaintiff purports to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants failed to notify him about felony child abuse being committed upon his biological son.1 Plaintiff alleges that the Buncombe County Department of Health and Human Services ("BCHHS"), Child Protective Services ("BCCPS") and the director, Amanda Stone, violated federal law by failing to notify him of twelve child protective service cases over a fifteen year period involving his son. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Owolabi and Hill, social workers at BCHHS, failed to notify him when the child's mother admitted to felony child abuse. Plaintiff fails to identify how Defendants' purported inaction violated his constitutional rights.
On June 3, 2014, Defendant Stone filed her Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a Section 1983 claim against her in her official or individual capacity. On June 30, 2014, Defendants BCHHS, BCCPS, Owolabi and Hill filed their Motion to Dismiss also arguing that Plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to support a Section 1983 claim against them.
Defendants' Motions have been briefed as set forth above and are ripe for determination.
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "the court should accept as true all well -pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff's "[f]actual allegationsmust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563. A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains enough facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step process for determining whether a complaint meets this plausibility standard. First, the court identifies allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (allegation that government officials adopted challenged policy "because of" its adverse effects on protected group was conclusory and not assumed to be true). Although the pleading requirements stated in "Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] mark[] a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era ... it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Id. at 678-79.
Second, to the extent there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their truth and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679. "Determining whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief "will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. "Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court toinfer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief,'" and therefore should be dismissed. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In other words, if after taking the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true, a lawful alternative explanation appears a "more likely" cause of the complained of behavior, the claim for relief is not plausible. Id.
The Court is mindful of the latitude extended to the pleadings of pro se litigants. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (courts should "[c]onstru[e] petitioner's inartful pleading liberally"). However, courts cannot act as the pro se plaintiff's advocate or develop claims which the plaintiff failed to raise clearly on the face of his complaint. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978) (). See also Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). As a result, even a pro se plaintiff's claim for relief "requires more than labels and conclusions...." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Like plaintiffs who are represented by counsel, a pro se plaintiff must still "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [the] claim." Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003). Conclusory statements with insufficient factual allegations, even when asserted by pro se plaintiffs, will not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Section 1983 provides relief for civil rights violations committed under color of state law. Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997). "Under [ ] § 1983, a plaintiff must establish three elements to state a cause of action: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting under color of state law." Id. Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rightselsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, fn. 3 (1979).
In order to successfully allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show that a "person" acting under the color of state law violated his constitutional rights. "The capacity of a governmental body to be sued in the federal courts is governed by the law of the state in which the district court is held." Avery v. Burke Cnty., 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)). In North Carolina, in the absence of a statute, "the capacity to be sued exists only in persons in being." McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat. Bank of Elizabeth City, 81 S.E.2d 386, 397 (N.C. 1954). "Therefore, departments of municipalities and counties are not susceptible to suit without statutory authorization." Evans v. Pitt Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 972 F. Supp. 2d 778, 788 (E.D.N.C. 2013). See also, Martin v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Park & Recreation Dep't, No. 3:06-CV-290, 2006 WL 3780418, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2006). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-11 provides that a county is a legal entity which may be sued. However, there is no corresponding statute authorizing suit against a county's health and human services department. Plaintiff's claims against BCHHS and BCCPS must be dismissed since those entities lack the legal capacity to be sued. See Moua v. Alexander Cnty., No. 5:09-CV-19, 2012 WL 252648, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2012) (). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted and that all claims against Defendants BCHHS and BCCPS be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff sole allegation against Defendant Stone is that she failed to notify him about twelve child protective services cases involving his son over a fifteen year period. There are no allegations that Stone interfered in his relationship with his son. Plaintiff did not specify whether he was suing Stone in her official or individual capacity.
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity does not protect an official who violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in that position would have known of the right. Id.
Determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity requires a two-step inquiry. See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Courts must consider "whether the facts...
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