West v. East Coast Cedar Co.

• Decision Date: 04 February 1902
• Docket Number: 426.
• Citation: 113 F. 737
• Parties: WEST v. EAST COAST CEDAR CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

113 F. 737

WEST v. EAST COAST CEDAR CO.

No. 426.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

February 4, 1902

Thomas B. Womack, for plaintiff in error.

F. H Busbee (E. F. Aydlett, on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before GOFF and SIMONTON, Circuit Judges, and JACKSON, District Judge.

SIMONTON Circuit Judge.

This case comes up by writ of error to the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of North Carolina. The action below was to try the title to certain lands in the state of North Carolina. By stipulation between counsel, duly made part of the record, the case was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury. At the conclusion of the testimony for plaintiff and defendant the plaintiff asked the court to hold, on all the facts of the case, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the one undivided third part in the land sued for, less two-sixteenths thereof. This the court declined to do, and plaintiff excepted. The court then held that upon the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, answering the issue on this point, 'No.' To this ruling plaintiff formally excepted. Judgment was entered for defendant. Petition for writ of error was allowed, and the case is here on assignment of errors.

The plaintiff, in his complaint, alleges that he is the owner and entitled to the immediate possession of one undivided third part of a tract of land in the county of Dare, state of North Carolina, being a portion of a tract of land known as the 'Northern Half of the McRae Patent,' which tract is then described by metes and bounds; that the defendant is in possession of the whole of said tract, and withholds unlawfully the possession of one undivided third part from plaintiff; that the defendant claims title to the whole tract from certain heirs at law of one Bannister H. Jarvis and one Levi Walker. The complaint then goes on and recites that Bannister H. Jarvis and Levi Walker, on April 22, 1851 received conveyance by deed of a tract of land, of which the lands described in the complaint constitute a part and portion, from one John Sikes, Sr.; that on January 28, 1813 John Sikes, Jr., received a conveyance of this tract of land in fee from John Sikes, Sr.; that John Sikes, Sr., had acquired an undivided interest in said lands with one Joseph Spence from Daniel Sawyer; that on May 6, 1812, Joseph Spence conveyed an undivided third to one Samuel Spruill, and that plaintiff holds this undivided third by sundry conveyances from the heirs of Samuel Spruill. So plaintiff and defendant claim title from the same person, Daniel Sawyer, who claimed under the McRae patent. The complaint then alleges that on information and belief defendant also claimed title under Samuel Spruill, which claim, however, is insufficient in law to establish title, yet it estops defendant from denying the title of Samuel Spruill. The answer sets up a claim of title by adverse possession under color of title by Jarvis and Walker, admits the Sikes deed to Jarvis and Walker, but denies that any other claim was made under it, except as color of title. Its claim of title is set out in these words:

'Answering the allegations of section 15 of the complaint, defendant denies that it claims any title by virtue of any conveyance from Samuel Spruill, but that Bannister H. Jarvis and Levi Walker owned, were in possession of, and claimed the land known as the 'Northern Half of the 'Northern Half of the McRae Patent,' which includes the land described in section 2 of the complaint, and claimed the same under color of title from Joshua T. McCoy and John Sykes; that they claimed title to the entire northern half of the McRae patent; that they had adverse possession of it, which was of sufficient length to ripen their title into a perfect title; and the plaintiff and the defendant both claim under Bannister H. Jarvis and Levi Walker, whose title had ripened under color from John Sykes and McCoy to said Jarvis and Walker. And the defendant avers that the plaintiff is estopped to deny the title of the said Bannister H. Jarvis and Levi Walker to the said northern half of the McRae patent, and also to the lands described in section 2 of the complaint.'

In the testimony was produced a grant or patent of all these lands to John Gray Blount, dated September 17, 1795. The McRae patent or grant is dated April 8, 1796. So the issues between the parties appear. His honor the trial judge did not make any special finding of facts with his conclusions of law. So the inquiry in this court must be limited to the sufficiency of the complaint and the rulings of law on the trial. Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U.S. 72, 13 Sup.Ct. 481, 37 L.Ed. 373.

The cause having been tried by the court without a jury, this court cannot review the weight of the evidence, and can look only to see whether there was error in not directing a verdict for plaintiff, or whether there was no evidence to sustain the verdict as rendered. Lancaster v Collins, 115 U.S. 222, 6 Sup.Ct. 33, 29 L.Ed. 373. If there be no special findings of fact, there can be no inquiry as to whether the judgment is supported. We must accept the general findings as conclusive upon all matters of fact, precisely as the verdict of a jury. Lehnen v. Dickson, supra. The trial court did not state separately its finding of facts and then its conclusions of law. This renders it difficult to consider this cause. But there can be found in the opinion of the court and in the exceptions the main facts in issue. These were: (1) The claim of the plaintiff that he holds a valid title, traced up to the McRae patent. This is denied by the defendant. (2) That the defendant holds title under the same patent. This the defendant also denies. (3) The existence of the patent to John Gray Blount as older th an the McRae patent. This does not seem to be denied. In seeking to establish his claim under the McRae patent, the plaintiff introduced conveyances from the heirs at law of Samuel Spruill. Defendant introduced a conveyance, dated May 22, 1832, purporting to convey, in the lifetime of H. G. Spruill, all his interest in the land. The deed is signed 'Samuel Spruill, by H. G. Spruill. ' With the deed is this certificate: 'This deed from Samuel Spruill to W. Foreman was exhibited in open court, and H. G. Spruill acknowledged that he signed it for Samuel Spruill, and by and with his direction and consent,'-- certified by the clerk. One of the questions of fact was whether this deed was executed by H. G. Spruill as attorney for Samuel Spruill, or whether he signed it in the presence of, and for and instead of, Samuel Spruill. The deed was over 40 years old. The trial judge passed upon the facts, and held on the evidence that plaintiff was not entitled to recover. This would seem to end the case. 'pit is well settled that when a trial court, to which a cause has been submitted, makes a special finding of fact, this court has no authority to inquire whether the evidence supports the finding, but only whether the facts found support the judgment. ' Syracuse Tp. v. Rollins, 104 F. 961, 44 C.C.A. 277. In ejectment the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, not on the weakness of...