West v. Holstrom

• Decision Date: 12 April 1968
• Citation: 261 Cal.App.2d 89,67 Cal.Rptr. 831
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Larry WEST, Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. Robert C. HOLSTROM, Defendant, Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Civ. 899.

Page 831

67 Cal.Rptr. 831

261 Cal.App.2d 89

Larry WEST, Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. Robert C. HOLSTROM, Defendant, Appellant and Cross-Respondent.

Civ. 899.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

April 12, 1968.

[261 Cal.App.2d 91] Rust, Hoffman, Newlan & Mills, Sacramento, Ellis J. Horvitz, Los Angeles, and David A. Tallant, Sacramento, for defendant and appellant.

James S. Eddy, Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

OPINION

GARGANO, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff, Larry West, is a former partner in a partnership known as the W & K Trucking Company. The partnership was dissolved, and upon dissolution plaintiff acquired the partnership's cause of action against defendant. In 1966 plaintiff acquired a $25,000 judgment against defendant Robert C. Holstrom in the Superior Court of Placer County. The judgment is for undercharges resulting from lumber hauling services performed for defendant by the W & K Trucking Company during the 19-month period commencing May 1962. West and Holstrom appeal from the judgment. To avoid confusion, we shall ignore the partnership and we shall refer to the parties as plaintiff and defendant.

Defendant is an experienced lumberman who has operated a sawmill for more than 20 years. In May 1962 he engaged plaintiff to haul green lumber from his sawmill. At the time plaintiff had obtained a license to operate as a radial highway common carrier. He had also obtained a schedule of the minimum tariff rates for the hauling of lumber as fixed by the Public Utilities Commission. However, during the entire period that plaintiff hauled defendant's lumber he was paid by the volume of the lumber hauled instead of the weight of the lumber as required by the minimum rates. Subsequently the Public Utilities Commission discovered that plaintiff had undercharged the defendant for hauling defendant's lumber. The commission fined plaintiff $1,000 and directed him to collect the undercharges. After defendant refused to pay the undercharges, plaintiff instituted this action in the superior court.

Defendant neither denies the undercharges during the period in question nor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the $25,000 awarded by the court. However, while conceding that the decisional law is against him, he nevertheless requests us to reverse the judgment by declaring 'a rule which will permit consideration of equitable principles so as to afford appellant (defendant) and other innocent shippers protection against a subsequent suit for undercharges by a carrier who has knowingly violated P.U.C. tariff schedules.'

A law established for a public reason cannot be countravened by private agreement (Civ.Code § 3513). Thus, it is firmly settled that a carrier has both the right and the duty to recover undercharges; recovery is essential to preserve the minimum rate structure for a vital quasi-public industry and to maintain the integrity of the orders of the Public Utilities Commission (Hischemoeller v. National Ice, etc., Storage Co., 46 Cal.2d 318, 294 P.2d 433; Gardner v. Rich Mfg. Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 725, 158 P.2d 23; Gardner v. Basich Bros. Construction Co., 44 Cal.2d 191, 281 P.2d 521). In fact, it has been repeatedly stated that the collection of undercharges is one of the most effective means of preserving the minimum rate schedule and of eliminating collusion between carriers and shippers (People ex rel. Public Util. Com. v. Ryerson, 241 Cal.App.2d 115, 50 Cal.Rptr. 246). As the court said in Transmix Corp. v. Southern Pac. Co., 187 Cal.App.2d 257, 265, 9 Cal.Rptr. 714, 719:

"* * * The reason why there must be Inflexibility in the enforcement of the published rate Against all and every suggestion for relaxation rests upon the practical impossibility otherwise of maintaining equality between all shippers without preferential privileges of any sort. The rate when published becomes established by law. It can be varied only by law, and not by act of the parties."

Consequently, if defendant hopes to change this salutary public policy he must appeal to our Supreme Court, and if he does so, he should present reasons superior to those he has presented to us.

Moreover, defendant's argument subtly suggests that he was an innocent shipper. However, defendant's good faith was not placed in issue by the pleadings or the pretrial conference order. And, significantly, the trial court made no findings on this issue. The court merely found that plaintiff was Not estopped by his own conduct from recovering the undercharges.

In any event, this is not a compelling case to apply equitable principles to protect the defendant. The defendant was an experienced businessman who had been in the sawmill business for more than 20 years and hired transportation services since 1950. He was acquainted with the existence of the Public Utilities Commission and knew that the commission controlled lumber hauling. He testified that he always paid lumber truckers by the quantity of boardfeet hauled rather than by the weight of the lumber because it was not practical to weigh the lumber. Significantly, he experienced similar troubles with the Interstate Commerce Commission before he engaged the plaintiff.

We shall now direct our attention to plaintiff's cross-appeal. He contends that the evidence does not support the damages awarded and that the trial court should have allowed prejudgment interest.

Plaintiff presented into evidence a detailed statement of the hauling services he performed for the defendant during the 19-month period that he was engaged by defendant. This statement contains 692 entries and Inter alia shows the board-feet of lumber hauled, the rate charged per thousand board-feet, the amount billed, the weight of the board-feet and the total amount that should have been charged under the minimum rates. Defendant only disputed one figure; he asserted the weight instead of 4.0 pounds per board-foot instead of 4.0 pounds per boardfoot as plaintiff maintained. Plaintiff contends that the amount awarded by the court is contrary of every version of the evidence.

Plaintiff's contention is without substantial merit. The court applied the two-year statute of limitations (Code Civ.Proc. § 339) and restricted plaintiff's recovery of undercharges to lumber hauled on and after June 10, 1962; plaintiff's complaint was filed on June 10, 1964. According to the evidence, if the court found that the lumber weighed 3.4 pounds per board-foot (instead of 4.0 pounds per board-foot) the sum of $26,695.66 was the most that plaintiff was entitled to recover. And if a leeway of about 5 per cent is allowed to take care of miscalculations and other factors (as the court was also free to do under the evidence), it is evident the court's $25,000 judgment conforms to the evidence.

Plaintiff concedes that the two-year statute of limitations is applicable. Plaintiff apparently hauled defendant's lumber under an oral agreement and the statute of limitations relating to oral agreements applies (Pellandini v. Pacific Limestone Products, Inc., 245 Cal.App.2d 774, 54 Cal.Rptr. 290). Plaintiff asserts, however, that the parties 'permitted a bi-monthly lag between the completion of the haul and the payment therefor' and concludes that the statute of limitations did not run on any haul performed during the 15-day period prior to June 10, 1962. According to plaintiff's testimony defendant made out hauling tickets for each hauling service performed and furnished copies of these tickets to plaintiff's drivers. Then twice each month (on the 5th and 25th) defendant furnished plaintiff with a statement summarizing all services performed by plaintiff for the preceding 15-day period. The statement was accompanied by defendant's check in payment for the services.

This contention is also without substantial merit. If plaintiff's argument is carried to its logical conclusion it would mean that plaintiff can recover undercharges under an open account which was terminated, contrary to the rule articulated in Groom v. Holm, 176 Cal.App.2d 310, 1 Cal.Rptr. 410. In Holm the parties had adopted a billing procedure remarkably similar to the one employed in the instant case. The carrier attempted to invoke the four-year statute of limitations by asserting that the undercharges were due under an open account. The trial court, however, applied the two-year statute of limitations and the carrier appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court and held that the open account had terminated when the plaintiff struck a balance on a bi-monthly basis even though the balance struck may have rested on an illegal contract. The court also pointed to the 'Collection of Charges Rule' of the Public Utilities Commission and stated that the account an each separate hauling service could not remain open under this rule for more than 15 day. ¹

Moreover, plaintiff here cannot recover on the accounts that were stated for each bi-monthly period. An account stated is an express or implied agreement between the debtor and the creditor that a certain sum shall be accepted in discharge of the debtor's obligation. Significantly, plaintiff was paid in full for each bi-monthly account that the parties stated according to the balance that they struck.

Thus, it is manifest that plaintiff's right to recover undercharges in the instant case is based on defendan...