West v. Hous. Cnty.

Decision Date29 September 2015
Docket NumberNo. 5:13-CV-338 (CAR),5:13-CV-338 (CAR)
PartiesRICK WEST, Plaintiff, v. HOUSTON COUNTY, GEORGIA, CULLEN TALTON, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Houston County, CHARLES HOLT, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Major in the Houston County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Rick West brings this employment discrimination action against his former employers, Houston County, Georgia and Sheriff Cullen Talton, and his former supervisor, Major Charles Holt, on the grounds that he was terminated on the basis of his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 as well as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"). Currently before the Court is Defendants Houston County and Sheriff Talton's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 32]. Having carefully considered the Motion, the response and replies thereto, and the applicable law, Defendants' Motion [Doc. 19] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment must be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."1 A genuine issue of material fact exists when "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party."2

When deciding a party's motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the evidence and all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.3 The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."4 If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact.5 If the non-moving party fails "to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has theburden of proof,"6 the motion for summary judgment must be granted.

For the purposes of this motion, the relevant facts are taken principally from the parties' statement of material facts and responses thereto [Docs. 32-2, 51-1, 51-2, & 52-1]. Under Rule 56, the district court need only consider the materials cited by the parties, though it may also consider other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court is not expected to scour the depositions, declarations, and exhibits to identify evidence that could create a genuine issue of material fact or establish the lack of.7 It is the parties' burden to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports their position on summary judgment.8

BACKGROUND

The facts, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-movant, are as follows:

In 1997, Plaintiff Rick West, an African American male, began working for the Houston County Sherriff's Department ("HCSD") as a detention officer. At the time of his termination fifteen years later, he was ranked as Sergeant and served as a supervisor in the inmate intake area at the Houston County Detention Center ("the Jail").9 Duringhis tenure, Plaintiff received "fully satisfactory" or "superior" performance reviews.10

On the evening of July 24, 2010, Plaintiff went to Seanna's Lucky Cabin ("the Lucky Cabin"), an illegal video gambling establishment in Warner Robins, Georgia, to pick up his girlfriend, Valerie Brown. At the time, Plaintiff was off-duty and not in uniform. He drove to Lucky Cabin after a telephone call with his girlfriend during which they argued over the fact she was gambling. Plaintiff did not want Brown to be at the Lucky Cabin because he knew the establishment was operating illegally.11

When Plaintiff arrived at the Lucky Cabin, he recognized the man who let him inside as Phil Campbell, a former inmate at the Jail. Campbell had numerous prior arrests and convictions.12 The parties dispute what happened thereafter: Plaintiff states that, when he arrived, he found Ms. Brown, tapped her on the shoulder, said "let's go," and escorted her out. Plaintiff did not push his girlfriend or curse at her.13 The owner of the establishment, Seanna Milam, walked out behind Plaintiff screaming and cursing.14 Campbell also followed them. As Campbell made his way to the door, Plaintiff pointed in his direction, told them that he knew the establishment wasoperating illegally, and threatened "to help [his] boys shut [the] place down."15 Campbell and Milam knew that Plaintiff worked for the HCSD.

After the incident, Plaintiff phoned the HCSD, spoke to Sergeant Guy Fussell, and reported that illegal gambling was taking place at the Lucky Cabin. The same night, Sergeant Fussell also received a message from Seanna Milam; she had called the HCSD and requested a phone call from an officer. When Sergeant Fussell returned her call, Milam did not request assistance at the Lucky Cabin; she only wanted to report Plaintiff's appearance there. Because the Lucky Cabin was located inside the city limits, Fussell referred the matter to the Warner Robins Police Department ("WRPD").16

An officer with the WRPD was dispatched and met with Milam that evening. According to his incident report, Milam alleged that, when Plaintiff arrived, he "snatched [Brown] out of her chair and pushed her out the front door." Milam stated that, as Campbell made his way to the door, Plaintiff put his hand on Campbell's forehead and pushed him back inside. Neither Plaintiff nor Brown was interviewed by the WRPD, and thus the incident report does include their side of the story.17 In a sworn declaration, Brown later stated that she left voluntarily and that Campbell's story was false. The WRPD did not pursue the matter; and Plaintiff was never arrested.18

Although Plaintiff was never arrested, a copy of the incident report was forwarded to the HCSD. After learning of the incident, Major Holt called Milam and spoke with her several times about what happened; he also obtained statements from Campbell and another witness.19 At that time, Holt was aware that Milam was the owner of an illegal casino and that Campbell was a former inmate at the Jail. He also presumed that their witness was either one of Milam's employees or someone who was gambling illegally at the Lucky Cabin.20

Major Holt did not question Plaintiff about the incident. Nor did he speak to Ms. Brown to find out whether she supported Milam's story. If he had, Major Holt may have learned that Ms. Brown left with Plaintiff voluntarily. She has since stated that Plaintiff did not hurt her and that Plaintiff did not put his hand on Campbell.21 Holt, however, simply took the word of persons involved in an illegal gambling enterprise and a former HCSD inmate who knew Plaintiff worked at the Jail. It was not unusual for inmates to make false charges against officers, and Holt admitted that it was not his usual practice to take the word of an inmate over the word of an officer.22

On Wednesday, July 28, 2010, Major Holt drafted a written recommendation for Plaintiff's termination.23 Though Holt had the authority to issue or recommend a lessor sanction, such as a suspension or demotion, he did not choose to take lessor action. In the memo to his superiors, Holt stated that he instead recommended termination because he believed Plaintiff lacked self-control and was a proven threat to his girlfriend, coworkers, inmates at the Jail, and members of the community.24 In support, Major Holt cited the Lucky Cabin incident and three former allegations of misconduct:

(1) Holt first referenced an incident involving the use of force on an inmate, Benjamin McLemore.25 The recommendation, however, failed to disclose that the inmate was injured after he grabbed Plaintiff and Plaintiff used a defensive tactic of striking him with an open hand, which is permissible in that situation. Here, it caused the inmate to fall and break his ankle; the hit also left hand mark. Plaintiff was later accused of using excessive force, but Holt never interviewed or questioned him about the incident.26
(2) Holt also cited an incident when Plaintiff argued with a subordinate white male, Daryl Foster.27 Major Holt failed to disclose, however, that there was a dispute as to what caused the altercation and what was said.
Plaintiff claims that Foster, a lower ranking officer, provoked him by intentionally and repeatedly calling him the wrong name. 28 Plaintiff felt that Foster was being insubordinate, but did not write him up because every time Foster was accused of insubordination, "Holt did nothing about it."29 So Plaintiff just got over it, and Holt never questioned him about anything he said to Foster.30
(3) Holt then described two incidents when inmates were able to smuggle contraband into the jail—one hid money in a cast on his arm and another consumed drugs.31 Major Holt later admitted that Plaintiff was not responsible for searching the inmate's cast, and the inmate who consumed drugs did so before he was inside the intake area.32

Also included with Holt's recommendation were the WRPD report and statements from witnesses who worked for in Milam at the Lucky Cabin. There was no statement from Plaintiff or his girlfriend. No one at the HCSD ever asked Plaintiff about the incident.33

Major Holt submitted the recommendation to his superiors, Chief Deputy Rape34and Sheriff Talton.35 Sheriff Talton served as the ultimate and final authority for personnel decisions at the HCSD,36 but he delegated full...

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