West v. J.O. Stevenson, Inc., 7:15-CV-87-FL

• Decision Date: 24 February 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 7:15-CV-87-FL,7:15-CV-87-FL
• Citation: 164 F.Supp.3d 751
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Charles E. West, Plaintiff, v. J.O. Stevenson, Inc.; Stevenson Automotive, Inc. ; SAG Payroll, LLC; Stevenson Automotive Holding Company, LLC, doing business as Stevenson Automotive Group; and John O. Stevenson, individually, Defendants.

164 F.Supp.3d 751

Charles E. West, Plaintiff,

v.J.O. Stevenson, Inc.; Stevenson Automotive, Inc. ; SAG Payroll, LLC; Stevenson Automotive Holding Company, LLC, doing business as Stevenson Automotive Group; and John O. Stevenson, individually, Defendants.

NO. 7:15-CV-87-FL

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Southern Division.

Signed February 24, 2016

Raymond Earl Dunn, Jr., Charles Jeffreys Cushman, Dunn Pittman Skinner & Cushman, PLLC, New Bern, NC, for Plaintiff.

Allison Cohan, Amy Holbrook Wooten, Kristi Lyn Gavalier, Brown Law LLP, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.

ORDER

LOUISE W. FLANAGAN

, United States District Judge

This matter is before the court on the motion to dismiss of defendants J.O. Stevenson, Inc. (“J.O. Stevenson”), Stevenson Automotive, Inc. (“Stevenson Automotive”), SAG Payroll, LLC (“SAG Payroll”), and Stevenson Automotive Holding Company, LLC (“SAG Holding”) (collectively the “Stevenson Automotive Group” defendants), made pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (DE 24). Also pending before the court is the motion to dismiss of defendant John Stevenson (“Stevenson”), made under those same rules. The issues raised have been briefed fully and are ripe for ruling. For the reasons stated more specifically below the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part, and certain of plaintiff's claims are dismissed without prejudice. Defendant Stevenson's motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, until his termination in February 2014, was the sales manager of Stevenson Kia of Jacksonville (“Stevenson Kia”), an automobile dealership located in Jacksonville, North Carolina. Stevenson Kia is one of several dealerships owned and operated by defendant J.O. Stevenson. Defendant J.O. Stevenson, in connection with the other Stevenson Automotive Group defendants, is part of the omnibus business entity, “Stevenson Automotive Group.” Defendant John Stevenson owns and operates each of the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants.

Plaintiff was employed by one of the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants. However, his employment was terminated on February 20, 2014, some two months after a car accident that left him with cognitive impairment. On May 4, 2015, plaintiff filed suit over the circumstances surrounding his termination, as well as certain allegedly improper payroll practices, which he noticed only after he received his final paycheck. Plaintiff alleges five claims against all defendants. In particular, plaintiff alleges:

• that defendants violated the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601

–2654, where defendants interfered with his rights guaranteed by the FMLA and terminated him in retaliation for taking FMLA-guaranteed leave (“Claim I”);

• that defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ,

where he was actually disabled and defendants failed to accommodate his temporary disability, interfered with the accommodation provided to him, terminated him in retaliation for requesting an accommodation, and terminated him in retaliation for using the accommodation provided to him (“Claim II”); and

• that defendants violated the ADAAA where plaintiff was “regarded as” disabled and defendants terminated him as a result of that belief (“Claim III”).

In addition, plaintiff contends that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of North Carolina public policy, as established by the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143–422.2

, where he was terminated on the basis of his disability (“Claim IV”), and that defendants violated the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (“NCWHA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95–25.1 et seq., where defendants improperly retained wages or other compensation owed to him from sometime in 2012 until after his termination (“Claim V”).

On July 2, 2015, the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. Those defendants contend that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over each of plaintiff's claims because plaintiff has failed to plead facts supporting the inference that any of them were his “employer,” as that term is used for the purpose of each statute. In addition, the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants contend:

• Claim I should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a claim for interference because he suffered no harm cognizable under the FMLA, and also because he has not shown he engaged in any protected activity that may be the basis for a retaliation claim;

• Claim II should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support the inference that he is disabled, and because he failed to plead sufficient facts to support the conclusion that his temporary disability was sufficiently serious to qualify as a “disability” under the ADA; and

• Claim III should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to allege facts to support the inference that defendants mistakenly believed he was disabled.

In addition, the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants argue that the court should dismiss Claim V because it does not share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with Claim I, Claim II, or Claim III, and, thus, that it would be improper to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. In any event, the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants also contend that the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over both Claim IV and Claim V under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)

, where Claims I through III, the claims over which the court has original jurisdiction, should be dismissed.

On that same day, defendant Stevenson also filed a motion to dismiss. In large part, the arguments made in support of defendant Stevenson's motion mirror those made in support of the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants' motion. However, defendant Stevenson also contends that each of plaintiff's claims, to the extent they are asserted against him in his capacity as owner or manager of the Stevenson Automotive Group, should be dismissed because of his individual status.

In response to defendants' motions, plaintiff contends that, to the extent defendants argue the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over each of his claims solely because he has failed to plead the identity of his “employer” with sufficient specificity, defendants' motion should be denied, where proof any defendant “employed” the plaintiff is a substantive element of each of his claims, not a jurisdictional issue, and that, in any event, he has pleaded defendants' “employer” status with sufficient specificity to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff also contends that defendants' attack on Claim I, to the extent it sounds as a claim for retaliation, is misplaced, because his claim sounds as a “hybrid” interference/retaliation claim. In addition, as to Claim IV and Claim V, plaintiff argues that Claim IV and V share a common nucleus of operative fact with Claim I, Claim II, and Claim III, which are properly pleaded and over which the court has original jurisdiction.

As to Claim II and Claim III, plaintiff concedes that these claims fail as to defendant Stevenson to the extent they assert his liability in his individual capacity. However, as to Claim II against the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants, plaintiff contends that they over-state the “disability” threshold required by the ADAAA. As to Claim III against those same defendants, plaintiff argues that the ADAAA supplanted the ADA's “mistaken belief” requirement.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and summarizes the following facts pertinent to the instant motions to dismiss. Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc. , 576 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir.2009)

.

Plaintiff began “working for” defendant Stevenson Automotive, a constituent part of the Stevenson Automotive Group, in November 2003 as a sales consultant. (Compl., DE 8, ¶¶12–31).¹ After a short time, plaintiff began to rise through the ranks, becoming the Finance Manager and a Sales Manager for Stevenson Kia, an automobile dealership owned by defendant J.O. Stevenson, in 2007; eventually he became the General Sales Manager for Stevenson Kia in 2009. (Id. ¶¶12, 32–33). In his position as General Sales Manager of Stevenson Kia, plaintiff turned the sales of the previously-struggling dealership around, making it “one of the top Kia dealerships ... in the nation.” (Id. ¶¶41–44).

As General Sales Manager of Stevenson Kia, plaintiff reported directly to Paul McCarthy, the Stevenson Automotive Group's Corporate Executive General Manager, who was employed by all Stevenson Automotive Group defendants. (Id. ¶¶18.e, 30, 35–36). McCarthy, in turn, reported to defendant Stevenson, the owner, manager, and chief executive officer (“CEO”) of defendant J.O. Stevenson, as well as the other Stevenson Automotive Group defendants. (Id. ¶¶16, 18.f, 35). McCarthy was not the only shared employee; the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants employed a number of other overlapping executives including Charlie Daniel, the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants' Corporate Assistant General Manager; Steve Davis, the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants' Human Resources Director; and Wayne Fortier, the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants' Chief Financial Officer. (Id. ¶¶18.e, 30).

In addition to these shared employees, the Stevenson Automotive Group defendants overlap in other ways. For example, defendant SAG Payroll handles financial and employment matters for the remaining Stevenson Automotive Group defendants.

(Id. ¶¶18.a). The Stevenson Automotive Group defendants, along with their manager and CEO, defendant Stevenson, also use an integrated system to document sales made by...