West v. Laraway
| Decision Date | 13 January 1874 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | Augustus H. West v. Annie Laraway and another |
Submitted on Briefs October 28, 1874
Error to Bay Circuit.
Assumpsit. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Marston & Hatch, for plaintiff in error.
Holmes & Stoddard, for defendant in error, Annie Laraway.
Christiancy J., did not sit in this case.
Plaintiff sued Annie Laraway and her husband Henry Laraway jointly upon their joint promissory note, which had been given for a debt of the husband, on an extension of time. He allowed judgment to pass against him in the court below, but she defended and her defense was sustained. The points raised against her are: first, that she was personally benefited by the transaction; and, secondly, that she bound her separate estate by her express promise to pay, under the circumstances, so that the note became a charge upon it.
Under our present system, whatever contracts a married woman may lawfully make, may be made "with the like effect as if she were unmarried."--2 Comp. L., p. 1478. But she has now no general capacity to contract. She can only make such contracts as relate to her own property, while in regard to that she has very full powers. She may purchase property and bind herself for the purchase money.--Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447; Campbell v. White, 22 Mich. 178; Rankin v. West, 25 Mich. 195. But she cannot become personally liable except on account of her own matters; and cannot enter into an undertaking jointly with her husband merely as his surety.--De Vries v. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255. And she can never be held without affirmative proof that the contract is her own and within her powers.--Powers v. Russell, 26 Mich. 179; Emery v. Lord, 26 Mich. 431.
The first question presented is whether this is a contract concerning her own property. It is not so in form, and can only be made so by connecting it with some consideration which would show it to be so in fact. It is claimed that, so far as she is concerned, it was in fact given for the benefit of her estate, to save it from being directly charged in another proceeding threatened against it. There was evidence which was regarded in the court below as tending to show that the estate of her father was responsible for the debt of Henry Laraway, out of which the note originated, by reason of a contract of suretyship made by the father in his life-time to West, and that West informed Henry Laraway that he should proceed against the estate unless Mrs. Laraway would sign a joint note with him. There is no evidence that Mrs. Laraway herself entered into any contract with West whereby the latter agreed with her not to prosecute the estate; but there is evidence that she knew her father was her husband's surety.
As under this division of the case the contract, in order to bind her, must be a contract on behalf of her sole property, it should appear to have been made with that intent, as well as upon a consideration that would sustain it for that purpose.
The agreement to abstain from prosecuting a debt against particular persons or property is beyond doubt, a valuable consideration. Whether such an agreement as is relied upon here to abstain from prosecuting an estate is such an agreement on behalf of the separate property of one married woman out of several heirs as would support her promise to pay the whole, is a question which is worthy of consideration, but which does not really arise in this case.
There is not any evidence whatever which tends to show that Mrs. Laraway had any idea that she was supposed to be, or that she was in fact, making any bargain on her own behalf. The only evidence showing her understanding of the matter, shows it was to help her husband and save his wages, not to keep her own estate or her share in her father's estate from being prosecuted. While it is not desirable to throw any technicalities in the way of contracts really meant to refer to a wife's separate interests, it is neither just nor in harmony with the principles of law to assume that a contract must be made to refer to one subject, simply because it could have been made for that end, when in fact it was made for another and very different purpose. As we have always held, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show for what purpose she contracted, and to prove it clearly.
The case stands upon no different footing, in the absence of such proof, than if West had never possessed or asserted any right or claim against any estate in which she was interested. She cannot be held to a knowledge of the facts which induced her husband to procure her signature for an extension of his own debt, upon which she could not in any event be any more than a surety. There was no contract made with her whatever as an inducement to her agreement and if West had undertaken to prosecute his claim against the estate, whatever other defense she might have interposed against that proceeding, there is no agreement between himself and West that appears in this case which would make a specific defense as an agreement.
The argument was therefore chiefly rested on the other proposition, which is the only one of substantial importance in the case. That proposition rests on the claim that any married woman who joins in a promissory note with her husband for the absolute payment of money, does by that act in all cases create a charge upon such separate property as she may own; and that the charge thus created may be enforced by a legal action, and collected by execution upon the judgment, as it could formerly be enforced by decree in equity.
By the common law the disability of married women to make agreements personally binding was the same as in equity.
No court could enforce contracts so as to render personal judgment. But where property was held to the separate use of a married woman, the whole separate interest, being entirely of equitable creation, was held subject to such rules of control as equity chose to establish. But property not held to her separate use was subject to the rules of law, and could only be charged or disposed of in a...
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