West v. Morris
Decision Date | 28 May 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 96-CV-39.,96-CV-39. |
Citation | 711 A.2d 1269 |
Parties | John WEST, Appellant, v. Fred D. MORRIS, Sr., et al., Appellees. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
John West, pro se.
Johnny M. Howard, Washington, DC, for appellee, Fred D. Morris, Sr.
Curtis J. Lewis, Washington, DC, for appellees, Temple Church of God in Christ, Inc., Warren G. Crudrup, Sr., Marietta Briley, Auz Chappel, Whillamenia Ginn, Oceola Hall, Herman Cannady, Mildred Linzy, Carrie D. Thaxton, George Sullivan, and Temple Church Board of Trustees.
Thomas Ruffin, Jr., Washington, DC, for appellee Thomas Ruffin, Sr.
Before SCHWELB, FARRELL, and RUIZ, Associate Judges.
John West alleged in his pro se complaint, filed on August 31, 1995, that the defendants, including the Temple Church of God in Christ, a non-profit corporation, and several church officials and related entities, failed to provide proper notice of a business meeting of the church at which one of the defendants, Fred D. Morris, Sr., was elected as pastor. West claimed that he was entitled to such notice pursuant to Section 15 of the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act (DCNCA), D.C.Code § 29-515 (1996). West sought an award of damages, a new election, and an order directing Morris to return all moneys that had been paid to him as pastor.
Shortly after the complaint was filed, all of the defendants except for Morris moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On November 14, 1995, in a 5-page written order, the trial judge dismissed the complaint as to the moving defendants. Believing the motion to be unopposed, the judge held that dismissal was required because West had failed to allege in his complaint that he was a bona fide member of the church.1 She also held that the designation of Morris as pastor was protected from judicial intervention by the First Amendment.
On November 24, 1995, West filed a notice of appeal from the order of November 14, contending that the complaint was erroneously dismissed.2 We affirm.
At the time West filed his appeal, this court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. "Subject to limited exceptions not applicable here, D.C.Code § 11-721 (1995) bars an appeal unless the order appealed from disposes of all issues in the case; it must be final as to all the parties, the whole subject matter, and all of the causes of action involved." Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 503 (D.C.1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "In the absence of the requisite determination and direction under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(b), an order disposing of claims against fewer than all of the parties is not appealable." Dyhouse v. Baylor, 455 A.2d 900, 901 (D.C.1983) (per curiam). An order is final only if it "disposes of the whole case on its merits so that the court has nothing remaining to do but to execute the judgment or decree already rendered." Camalier & Buckley, Inc. v. Sandoz & Lamberton, Inc., 667 A.2d 822, 825 (D.C.1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the trial judge's reasoning in her order of November 14, 1995 applied logically to West's claims against all of the defendants, one of those defendants—Fred D. Morris, Sr.—remained in the case. The order of November 14, 1995 did not dispose of the entire litigation, and at the time the notice of appeal was filed, the appeal was subject to dismissal as premature.
In this case, however, as in Robinson v. Howard Univ., 455 A.2d 1363, 1366 n. 1 (D.C.1983), "by the time the appeal was submitted to this panel, it was final." This is so because, on March 7, 1996, the complaint was dismissed against Morris, the only remaining defendant. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal from the November 14, 1995 order "even though the appeal was technically premature." Id.; see also Dyer v. William S. Bergman & Assocs., Inc., 635 A.2d 1285, 1287 (D.C.1993).
In granting defendants' motions to dismiss, the trial judge correctly stated:
In his complaint, West did not aver in so many words that he was a member of the church. He alleged, however, "that all the defendants violated plaintiff's rights pursuant to D.C. Code § 29-502(6)...." That provision, as we have seen, defines the term "member" as used in the DCNCA. Under conventional liberal rules of "notice" pleading, this indirect allegation of membership might well be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Dunn v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 192 F.2d 854, 855 (2d Cir.1951) (); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977) (); Control Data Corp. v. IBM Corp., 421 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir.1970) ().
Under our case law, however, the sufficiency of West's complaint cannot be evaluated by resort to conventional standards of notice pleading. The meeting in which West claims to have been denied the opportunity to participate related to the election and appointment of a pastor. West has asked that the election of Morris be set aside. The controversy thus implicates a core religious activity.3 In filing suit against the church in relation to such an issue, West "immediately confronted a potential First Amendment bar to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction." Bible Way Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith v. Beards, 680 A.2d 419, 427 (D.C.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997).4 This was so because the Free Exercise Clause precludes civil courts "from adjudicating church fights that require extensive inquiry into matters of ecclesiastical cognizance." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
680 A.2d at 430. After noting that in fraud cases, among others, "fairness to the defendant requires unequivocal, specific allegations signed by the plaintiff ... that verify the truth of the charges in detail," we concluded that "no less should be required when the Constitution severely circumscribes the court's subject matter jurisdiction over church controversies." Id.
Assessed against the Bible Way Church standard, West's complaint was insufficient. His allegations did not clearly establish that he was a member of the church, or that he was entitled, under the church's articles of incorporation or by-laws, to notice of, or the right to participate in, the election of the pastor.5 Accordingly, we sustain the trial judge's holding that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted.6
Affirmed.7
1 West filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal and pointed out that the motion to dismiss was not unopposed....
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