West v. Saul
Decision Date | 26 February 2020 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-2100 |
Parties | PHILLIP H. WEST v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security Administration |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Phillip H. West, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying his claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act").
Plaintiff filed a Brief and Statement of Issues in Support of Request for Review ("Pl.'s Br."), defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff's Request for Review ("Def.'s Br."), and plaintiff filed a reply thereto ("Pl.'s Reply"). For the reasons set forth below, the court recommends that plaintiff's Request for Review be GRANTED.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on October 26, 2016, alleging disability beginning October 3, 2016. (R. 247-48.)2 Plaintiff's claim was denied initially and he filed arequest for a hearing. (R. 62-97, 103-09.) A hearing was convened on April 15, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") John Gehring, but was postponed shortly after it began so that plaintiff could obtain representation. (R. 34-39.) A second hearing was held on August 16, 2018, before ALJ Gehring. (R. 40-61.) Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. Donna Nealon, a vocational expert ("VE"), also appeared and testified. In a decision dated October 25, 2018, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (R. 20-33.) The ALJ made the following findings:
(R. 22-28.)
Plaintiff filed a request for review of the decision of the ALJ that was denied and the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-6, 233-36.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The role of this court on judicial review is to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. Hagans v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1204 (2014); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but may be less than a preponderance of the evidence. Jesurum v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995). This court may not weighevidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)). As the Third Circuit has stated, "so long as an agency's fact-finding is supported by substantial evidence, reviewing courts lack power to reverse . . . those findings." Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1191 (3d Cir. 1986).
To be eligible for benefits, the claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Specifically, the impairments must be such that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Under the Act, the claimant has the burden of proving the existence of a disability and must furnish medical evidence indicating the severity of the impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5).
The Social Security Administration employs a five-part procedure to determine whether an individual has met this burden. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.3 This process requires the Commissioner to consider, in sequence, whether a claimant: (1) is currently employed; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment which meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) can perform past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether the claimant is able to perform other work, in view of his age, education, and work experience. See id. The claimant bears the burden of establishing steps one through four of the five-step evaluation process, whilethe burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in large numbers in the national economy. Poulos v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007).
At the commencement of the August 16, 2018 administrative hearing, plaintiff's counsel informed the ALJ that plaintiff's impairments followed a severe motorcycle accident which resulted in several fractures requiring multiple surgeries and ensuing low-back, knee, and shoulder pain and weakness. (R. 43.) Plaintiff avers that he is unable to return to his past work due to his injuries, and due to his age, should be found disabled under the Commissioner's regulations. (R. 43-44.)
Plaintiff testified that he was born on September 29, 1957, and thus was sixty years old on the date of the administrative hearing. (R. 46.) At the time of the administrative hearing, plaintiff lived with a member of his church.4 (R. 45.) Plaintiff earned an associate's degree in sociology and psychology. (R. 46-47.) Plaintiff does not have a driver's license; he was driven to the administrative hearing by the church member with whom he lived. (R. 47.)
With respect to his daily activities, plaintiff indicated that he does not perform any household chores such as cooking, shopping, or cleaning. (R. 53.) Plaintiff does not have any pets and does not participate in social clubs. (R. 53-54.) He sometimes watches television, but explained that he wears glasses and watching television bothers his eyes. (R. 53.)
With respect to his work history, plaintiff testified that when he worked for Pennsylvania Transit Company, he was a supervisor and was responsible for schedulingtransportation for the firm's clients. (R. 48, 52.) In this job, plaintiff also was required to inspect vehicles and to fill-in as a driver if needed in an emergency. (R. 48.) In addition, plaintiff worked for Security Alarm Monitoring Incorporated and Universal Atlantic Systems Incorporated, alarm systems companies that monitored residential and commercial properties. (R. 49.) Plaintiff was responsible for implementing the proper protocol when a signal was activated. Id. Plaintiff's past work also included employment by a technical staffing company that placed him with Vanguard as a global support specialist. (R. 49-50.) In this role, plaintiff worked as a monitor and was responsible for assigning work crews to various tasks. (R. 50.) Plaintiff also worked for a trucking company, scheduling drivers and shipments. (R. 51.) This position required plaintiff to move among various departments of the building in which he worked. Id. In the year prior to the administrative hearing, plaintiff attempted to work as a parking lot cashier, but was unable to maintain such employment because he could not find private transportation to the job, and due to his impairments, was unable to utilize public transportation. (R. 52.)
In response to questioning by his attorney, plaintiff elaborated that he would be unable to perform the systems monitor jobs...
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