West v. State

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Fentress
• Citation: West v. State, 204 S.W. 994, 140 Tenn. 358 (Tenn. 1918)
• Decision Date: 09 August 1918
• Parties: WEST v. STATE.

204 S.W. 994

WEST v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

August 9, 1918.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Madison County; N. R. Barham, Judge.

J. W. West was convicted of an offense, and he appeals. Direction for sentence in accordance with the opinion.

T. W. Pope, of Jackson, for appellant. W. H. Swiggart, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

FENTRESS, J.

The plaintiff in error was convicted of having carnal knowledge of a female over twelve and under twenty-one years of age. His punishment was fixed at three years' imprisonment in the county jail or workhouse.

The penalty for the offense is imprisonment in the state penitentiary from three to ten years. Acts 1911, chapter 36; Thompson's Shannon's Code, 6456.

The judgment of the trial court was, evidently, predicated upon chapter 107 of the Acts of 1915. Section 1 of that act provides that:

"In all cases where any person shall be convicted of a felony, and the jury, trying the case, shall be of the opinion that the offense merits a punishment of five years or less, the court, in its discretion, may order said person confined in the county workhouse for the term of such sentence." Thompson's Shannon's Code, § 7206a.

We are of the opinion that the act does not apply to felonies for which the maximum punishment exceeds five years' imprisonment in the penitentiary.

To hold that the act applies to major felonies would put the General Assembly in the attitude of conferring authority upon juries and trial judges to fix the punishment, for grave offenses, at a small workhouse sentence. For illustration, the punishment of the plaintiff in error could have been fixed at a day in the workhouse. For any other crime committed, for which the minimum penalty is less than five years' imprisonment in the penitentiary, a similar punishment would be authorized. It is manifest that the Legislature had no such intention in mind. To give the act this meaning would set at naught many of our criminal statutes. In construing statutes, the rule is that the courts will not adopt a construction which would effectuate an absurd result. Riggins v. Tyler, 134 Tenn. 581, 184 S. W. 860; Wise v. Morgan, 101 Tenn. 273, 48 S. W. 971, 44 L. R. A. 548.

The inapplicability of the act of 1915 is further accentuated when considered in connection with chapter 8 of the Acts of 1913, generally known as the "Indeterminate Sentence and Parole Law."

Prior to the passage of this act the discretion was vested in juries and trial courts to fix the punishment of persons, convicted of penitentiary offenses, at imprisonment for a definite period, between the minimum and maximum terms defined as a penalty for the offense committed. By that act it was provided that:

"Whenever any person over eighteen years of age is convicted of any felony or other crime committed after the passage of this act, * * * punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, the court imposing such sentence, shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment, but shall sentence such person to the penitentiary for an indefinite period, not to exceed the maximum term nor to be less than the minimum term, provided by law, for the crime for which the person was convicted and sentenced." Thomp. Shannon's Code, § 7210a9.

Other sections of the act provide that the discretion to parole prisoners and to recommend to the Governor their final discharge is vested in the board of prison commissioners.

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