West v. State

Citation519 So.2d 418
Decision Date13 January 1988
Docket NumberNo. DP-61,DP-61
PartiesSamuel Tony WEST, a/k/a Tony Wells West v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

William B. Kirksey, Kirksey & DeLaughter, Jackson, for appellant.

Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Marvin L. White, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Donald G. Barlow and Felicia C. Adams, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

EN BANC.

ROY NOBLE LEE, Chief Justice, for the Court:

Samuel Tony West has appealed from a conviction of capital murder and judgment imposing the death penalty, entered in the Circuit Court of Warren County, Honorable John E. Ellis, presiding, and assigns ten (10) errors in the trial below. We reverse and remand the case for a new trial on both the guilt phase and the sentencing phase.

This is the second appearance of this case before the Mississippi Supreme Court. After the first trial and imposition of the death penalty, this Court reversed and remanded the case to the lower court because the State presented evidence of two murders committed in Georgia previous to the robbery/murder of Kirby Phelps in Warren County, Mississippi, and the introduction at the sentence phase of Georgia convictions, which recited that West had been found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to be executed. See West v. State, 463 So.2d 1048 (Miss.1985). The facts of the homicide are reported in West v. State, supra, and we relate only such facts as will render a coherent understanding of the case presently before us.

On December 13-14, 1982, Tony West and Kenneth Avery Brock drove from Chattooga County, Georgia, on Interstate Highway 20 west through Alabama into Mississippi and Warren County. They stopped at Bovina, Warren County, in a rest area and went to sleep. The next morning on December 15, 1982, West and Brock awakened and saw a brown Toyota automobile parked nearby. Inside was 26-year-old Navy Lt. Kirby Phelps, who also had stopped at the Bovina rest area and was asleep.

West and Brock were out of money and needed different transportation from the jeep in which they were traveling. They went to the Toyota, awakened Phelps, and, at gunpoint, handcuffed him with cuffs taken in Georgia. While Brock searched the Toyota for valuables, West took Phelps and, with the pistol pointed at him, walked two hundred to three hundred yards into woods adjoining the rest area. During that time, West shot Phelps three times in the head, killing him, and left his body in the wooded area. Later that day, Civil War relic hunters discovered Phelps' body and reported it to the Warren County sheriff.

West and Brock drove on Interstate 20 into Louisiana, where they abandoned the jeep, but continued in the stolen Toyota to Austin, Texas. There they pawned the stereo system, a camera and cassette tapes found in the automobile. They parted ways, and West drove the Toyota eastward back to his hometown of Chattanooga, Tennessee, and, on December 25, 1982, voluntarily surrendered to police. 1

I.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN THE CASE FOR THE

PROSECUTION.

Facts

A.

Appellant contends that the trial judge was actively involved in the case on behalf of the prosecution, conducted by District Attorney Frank Campbell, and that the appellant did not receive a fair trial because of the aggressive assistance of the trial judge on behalf of the prosecution. We set out a sample of the record in considering this assigned error.

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF APPELLANT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY, DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE:

Q. All right. Do you affirm or do you deny that you told that to Sheriff McConnell on December the 25th of 1982?

A. I am saying that I am telling the truth. I walked him in the woods. Me and him had conversation while we was walking.

BY MR. CAMPBELL: The Court's indulgence just one second.

(Whereupon a brief pause was had.)

BY THE COURT: What was the extent of the conversation you had? Were you in front of him, beside him or behind him?

BY THE WITNESS: I guess at this time--

BY MR. KIRKSEY: (Interposing) Your Honor, I believe the witness has already answered that in his direct examination from counsel.

BY THE COURT: Yes, sir.

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: Your Honor, we further object to the Court conducting an examination of the witness in the presence of the jury. The district attorney is--

BY THE COURT: (Interposing) Well, he is leaving something blank here. He said he had conversation--

Q. Every shot you ever fired at Kirby Phelps, he was facing you.

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: Objection, Your Honor.

BY MR. CAMPBELL: (Interposing) Not being able to--

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: (Continuing) No, I object to any question I deem proper and the Court can rule on it, Mr. Campbell.

BY THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: I haven't even stated my grounds, Your Honor. You don't want to hear my grounds?

BY THE COURT: He is on cross examination. Would you approach the bench and assign your grounds. Approach the bench and assign your grounds.

BY MR. KIRKSEY: Approach the bench and assign your grounds.

BY THE COURT: But I don't want speaking that would guide a witness on how to give an answer. So state your grounds--

* * *

[BY MR. CAMPBELL]:

Q. And where did that happen?

A. It was slipped to me.

Q. Okay. I know, but where?

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: Your Honor, we object.

BY THE COURT: Ask him where or when? It could have been two hours earlier.

BY MR. CAMPBELL:

Q. Okay. When and where and from whom were you--

BY THE COURT: Not when, where and whom just to when is all.

BY MR. CAMPBELL:

Q. When were you given or supposedly given this LSD?

The following excerpts occurred at the bench or while the jury was out of the courtroom.

BY THE COURT: Where are you going with this question?

BY MR. CAMPBELL: He is probably going to talk about something about parole.

BY THE COURT: My god, you are going to get a reversal error. They are not suppose [sic] to know about parole.

BY MR. CAMPBELL: That is [sic] matters in the question.

BY THE COURT: You had better be quiet on that question.

BY MR. CAMPBELL: What are they asking this question for?

BY THE COURT: You let them--you let him repeat the answer back to them on it, but parole means--

BY MR. CAMPBELL: (Interposing) All right.

BY THE COURT: (Continuing) You can't bring that out.

BY MR. CAMPBELL: Why do they ask this question?

BY THE COURT: Do what?

BY MR. CAMPBELL: Why do they ask this question?

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: Your Honor.

BY THE COURT: They can just set you up in a trap and go in there and try to ask about parole. You had better leave that alone.

BY THE COURT: You may continue, Mr. Campbell.

BY MR. CAMPBELL: We withdraw the question and we have no further questions of the witness.

* * * BY THE COURT [to the District Attorney]: But what I told them, I have never had this kind of testimony come in before. They could only offer him as an expert. They have left some [sic] authority on my desk that I haven't reviewed yet. You might want to call the Attorney General's Office and see if they can find some authority and, you know, as far as pro or con to the issue of him qualifying as an expert during the noon hour.

BY THE COURT: (Interposing) You don't have to be such a heavy weight to prove that, you just walk in to that. There is [sic] ways of getting evidence in without just jumping into the things.

BY MR. CAMPBELL: All right.

BY THE COURT: You can't prove flight from Georgia into the Mississippi matter. Instead of dressing it up as flight, Mr. Campbell, there are ways of doing it. Why were you in Mississippi, why didn't you go to a hotel, why didn't you, why did you have to stay at the roadside park.

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: Your Honor.

BY THE COURT: I know the answers because the answers are in West I. The reason he didn't go to--they were out of money, they were out of gas.

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: Your Honor.

BY THE COURT: You have got all of the statements as to why they are needing somebody to rob. But, robbery goes into the principle [sic] aspect of it. Why do they want to get rid of the jeep they were in instead of just getting as money and going.

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: Your Honor.

BY MR. KIRKSEY: Your Honor.

BY THE COURT: You want the man's mind that pulled that trigger here.

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: Your Honor.

BY THE COURT: Now, wait just a minute. The defendants have brought in, they have had the fellow examined once in Georgia, before he went to trial. He has been examined here by the psychiatrist on three different times. Twice in the last week and they keep coming up with something is wrong with him. And, he has got to have, something was wrong with his mind, I want a course of conduct to the trial. They are wanting me to muffle, muzzle the district attorney from going into matters that you have the right on cross examination. But, you can't walk around closing. You have got to ask them in a way that it has some relations to the part of the trial that the jury is now passing on.

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: Your Honor, for the record, we object.

BY MR. CAMPBELL: Wait, I have--

BY MR. DeLAUGHTER: (Interposing) We object to the extensive instructions from the Court to the district attorney as to how to proceed with his cross examination.

BY THE COURT: Well, I am explaining to him because if it comes floppy flop I have got to sustain your objections.

(R. 906, 917-18, 932, 479-80, 868-69, 953-54)

We have carefully examined the eight-volume record and find that there are thirty (30) instances where the trial judge improperly, or unnecessarily, interjected himself into the proceedings. Of those thirty instances, twenty are of the type which may be characterized as coaching the district attorney. 2 On nine occasions, the trial judge posed questions to witnesses where the district attorney's questions were ineffective. The questions by the trial judge generally served to strengthen the prosecution's case.

During closing argument for the prosecution, on two occasions, the appellant objected to portions of ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
147 cases
  • Stevens v. State, No. 2000-DP-00507-SCT.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • September 13, 2001
    ......State, 655 So.2d 824, 842-43 (Miss.1995) ; Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 846 (Miss.1994) ; Russell v. State, 607 So.2d 1107, 1110 (Miss.1992) ; Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 126 (Miss.1991) ; White v. State, 532 So.2d 1207, 1218 (Miss.1988) ; West v. State, 463 So.2d 1048, 1054 (Miss.1985) ; Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445, 456 (Miss. 1984) . .         ¶ 110. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 3.05 provides: Rule 3.05 VOIR DIRE . In the voir dire examination of jurors, the attorney will question the entire venire ......
  • Bennett v. State, No. 2003-DP-00765-SCT.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • May 11, 2006
    ......The standard for this Court's review of an appeal from a capital murder conviction and death sentence is abundantly clear. Death penalty cases must withstand "heightened scrutiny." Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 739 (Miss.1992) (citing Smith v. State, 499 So.2d 750, 756 (Miss.1986); West v. State, 485 So.2d 681, 685 (Miss.1985)). This higher level of scrutiny requires that all doubts be resolved in favor of the accused because "what may be harmless error in a case with less at stake becomes reversible error when the penalty is death." Balfour, 598 So.2d at 739 (quoting Irving ......
  • Brawner v. State, No. 2002-DP-00615-SCT.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • April 29, 2004
    .......          Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015 (Miss. 1992) . .          Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731 (Miss. 1992) . .          Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542 (Miss. 1990) . .          Bevill v. State, 556 So.2d 699 (Miss. 1990) . .          West v. State, 553 So.2d 8 (Miss.1989) . .          Leatherwood v. State, 548 So.2d 389 (Miss.1989) . .          Mease v. State, 539 So.2d 1324 (Miss. 1989) . .          Houston v. State, 531 So.2d 598 (Miss. 1988) . .          West v. State, 519 So.2d 418 ......
  • Walker v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • March 31, 2005
    ......According to Kennedy's testimony, Walker displayed no signs of sleep deprivation and Walker "appeared normal." Arnold testified that Walker's answers "were quick and responsive" during the questioning and while he was being given his Miranda warnings. .         ¶ 8. David West, who is also employed with the Arkansas State Police, was present during the interrogation. He also testified that no threats or promises or hopes of reward were made to Walker. West testified that Walker acted normal, did not appear drunk or tired, and never fell asleep during the interview; West ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT