West v. State
Decision Date | 07 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 663,663 |
Parties | Tyrone Antonio WEST v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
James K. Smith (Student Attorney/Rule16) (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender and Bradford C. Peabody, Assistant Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Jason F. Trumpbour, Staff Attorney (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Gary E. Bair, Assistant Attorney General and Patricia Jessamy, State's Attorney for Baltimore City, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before JAMES R. EYLER, CHARLES E. MOYLAN, Jr. (Ret'd, Specially Assigned) and RAYMOND G. THIEME, Jr. (Ret'd, Specially Assigned), JJ. RAYMOND G. THIEME, Jr., Judge, Retired, Specially Assigned.
We are once again called upon to weigh, along that often enigmatic continuum we refer to as probable cause, the objectives of crime prevention and law enforcement against the individual protections provided to us through the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.
A jury for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted appellant Tyrone Antonio West of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession of cocaine, and possession of marijuana. West was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, the first ten years without parole, and to a concurrent term of one year. West appeals his convictions and presents the following questions for our review:
1. Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress the items seized from appellant's apartment?
2. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain appellant's convictions?
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
At approximately 2:30 p.m. on September 3, 1998, police officers executed at 4416 Marble Hall Road, Apartment 340, in Baltimore City, a search warrant that had been issued on August 21, 1998. As the officers entered the apartment, appellant and another suspect were spotted exiting the apartment through a bathroom window located at the rear of the apartment. Several officers pursued appellant, eventually apprehending him several blocks away, while other officers involved in the execution of the search warrant searched the apartment and discovered the following: a plastic bag containing one hundred vials of a "white rock substance" in a pair of trousers in the bedroom closet; four bags of marijuana in a pair of sneakers above the bed's headboard in the bedroom; a plastic bag containing sixteen vials of a "white rock substance" in the bathroom toilet; two hand-rolled cigarettes containing marijuana on the dining room table; appellant's Identification Card; and a gas and electric bill in appellant's name. Chemical analysis determined that the "white rock substance[s]" contained a cocaine base.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to Suppress the items seized. He argues that "[t]he information supplied in the affidavit to support the issuance of the search warrant was not sufficient to establish probable cause." We begin our analysis by turning to the affidavit that was utilized in obtaining the warrant in issue. It provided:
Additionally, the affidavit contained appellant's arrest record, which indicated that he had been arrested on ten separate occasions between July of 1987 and May of 1998. His last two arrests had been for possession of marijuana in August of 1997 and attempted murder in May of 1998.
We turn to the trial court's findings at the suppression hearing:
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Its counterpart on the state level, Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, also requires that no search warrant shall issue without probable cause. Probable cause means a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Birchead v. State, 317 Md. 691, 700, 566 A.2d 488 (1989).
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.... The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).
Our first issue concerns what standard of review should be employed by us to scrutinize the ruling of the suppression hearing judge. The authoritative word on that subject is found in Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Reviewing courts (at the suppression hearing level or at the appellate level) do not undertake de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause determination but, rather, pay "great deference" to that determination. Id. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317; Ramia v. State, 57 Md. App. 654, 655, 471 A.2d 1064 (1984). Reflecting a preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard...
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