Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Ingraham

• Decision Date: 16 September 1895
• Docket Number: 555.
• Citation: 70 F. 219
• Parties: WESTERN COAL & MINING CO. v. INGRAHAM.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

70 F. 219

WESTERN COAL & MINING CO. v. INGRAHAM.

No. 555.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

September 16, 1895

Where a miner was injured by the fall of the roof of that part of the mine where he was working, in consequence of the negligent manner in which the timbering had been done by other employes of the mine owner before such miner was hired, the defects being such as could be discovered by proper inspection, the doctrine of fellow servants had no application.

The plaintiff in error, the Western Coal & Mining Company, owned and operated a coal mine, and employed the defendant in error, Marcena Ingraham, to work therein. From the evidence in the record the jury might infer these facts: That the mine had been worked and many rooms therein driven up long prior to the employment of the plaintiff; that the roof of the mine had been timbered or propped by other miners months before the plaintiff went to work in the mine; that the plaintiff was set to work by the mining boss 'pulling a pillar' in the mine; that while so at work the timbers or props which supported the roof of the mine in the room in which the plaintiff was at work, and which were set by other miners two months or more before he commenced work, were knocked down by a mule attached to a car used to haul coal out of the mine and thereupon rocks and slate fell from the roof of the mine upon the plaintiff, and inflicted the injuries complained of that the props would not have been knocked down, or fallen if they had been properly set in the first instance; that an inspection of the timbering or props in the mine by a reasonably capable mining boss or inspector would have disclosed the fact that the props which fell were insufficiently and defectively set, and rendered the mine insecure and dangerous to work in; that the mule which knocked the props down was ungovernable and vicious, and that fact was known to the defendant; that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care when he was injured, and that no negligence of his in any respect contributed in any degree to the accident. There was conflict in the evidence on some of these points, but the jury were at liberty to find the facts as here stated. The plaintiff recovered judgment, and the defendant sued out this writ of error.

Geo. E. Dodge, B. S. Johnson, and C. B. Moore filed brief for plaintiff in error.

C. A. Severance (Thomas H. Barnes, William M. Mellette, C. K. Davis, and F. B. Kellogg, on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and THAYER, Circuit Judges.

CALDWELL Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, .

The duty which one operating a coal mine owes to his employes is not a new question in this court. In the case of Railway Co. v. Jarvi, 10 U.S.App. 444, 3 C.C.A. 433, and 53 F. 65, a miner was injured by the fall of a rock from the roof of the mine, and, in affirming the judgement he had recovered for the injuries he received, this court, in defining the duty of a mining company to its employes, said:

'It is the duty of the employer to exercise ordinary care to provide a reasonably safe place in which his employ may perform his service. It is his duty to use diligence to keep this place in a reasonably safe condition, so that his servant may not be exposed to unnecessary and unreasonable risks. The care and diligence required of the master is such as a reasonably prudent man would exercise under like circumstances in order to protect his servants from injury. It must be commensurate with the character of the service required, and with the dangers that a reasonably prudent man would apprehend under the circumstances of each particular case. Obviously, a far higher degree of care and diligence is demanded of the master who places his servant at work digging coal beneath overhanging masses of rock and earth in a mine than of him who places his employe on the surface of the earth, where danger from superincumbent masses is not to be apprehended. A reasonably prudent man would exercise greater care and watchfulness in the former than in the latter case, and, throughout all the varied occupations of mankind, the greater the danger that a reasonably intelligent and prudent man would apprehend, the higher is the degree of care and diligence the law requires of the master in the protection of the servant. For a failure to exercise this care, resulting in the injury of the employe, the employer is liable; and this duty and liability extend, not only to the unreasonable and unnecessary risks that are known to the employer, but to such as a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of ordinary diligence-- diligence proportionate to the occasion--would have known and apprehended. Cook v. Railroad Co., 34 Minn. 45, 24 N.W. 311; Hayden v. Manufacturing Co., 29 Conn. 548; Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59; Gibson v. Railroad Co., 46 Mo. 163; Nadau v. Lumber Co. (Wis.) 43 N.W. 1135, 1137; Hutchinson v. Railroad Co., 5 Exch. 343; Huddleston v. Machine Shop, 106 Mass. 282; Snow v. Railroad Co., 8 Allen, 441; Sullivan v. Manufacturing Co., 113 Mass. 396; Ryan v. Fowler, 24 N.Y. 410; Patterson v. Railway Co., 76 Pa.St. 389; Swoboda v. Ward, 40 Mich. 420.'

And, after stating that it is the duty of the servant to exercise that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would employ under like circumstances in order to protect himself from injury, the opinion proceeds:

'But the degrees of care in the use of a place in which work is to be done, or in the use of other instrumentalities for its performance, required of the master and servant in a particular case, may be, and generally are, widely different. Each is required to exercise that degree of care in the performance of his duty which a reasonably prudent person would use under like circumstances; but the circumstances in which the master is placed are generally so widely different from those surrounding the servant, and the primary duty of using care to furnish a reasonably safe place for others is so much higher than the duty of the servant to use reasonable care to protect himself in a case where the primary duty of providing a safe place or safe machinery rests on the master, that a reasonably prudent person would ordinarily use a higher degree of care to keep the place of work reasonably safe if placed in the position of the master who furnishes it than if place in that of the servant who occupies it. Of the master is required a care and diligence in the preparation and subsequent inspection of such a place as a room in a mine that is not, in the first instance, demanded of the servant. The former must watch, inspect, and care for the slopes through which and in which the servants work as a person charged with the duty of keeping them reasonably safe would do. The latter has a right to presume, when directed to work in a particular place, that the master has performed his duty, and to proceed with his work in reliance upon this assumption, unless a reasonably prudent and intelligent man, in the performance of his work as a miner, would have learned facts from which he would have apprehended danger to himself. Russell v. Railway Co., 32 Minn. 230, 20 N.W. 147; Hutchinson v. Railroad Co., 5 Exch. 343; Gibson v. Railroad Co., 46 Mo. 163; Cook v. Railroad Co., 34 Minn. 47, 24 N.W. 311.'

In the case of Mather v. Rillston, 156 U.S. 391, 15 Sup.Ct. 464, the supreme court of the United States, in defining the duties mine owners owed their employes, said:

'All occupations producing articles or works of necessity, utility, or convenience may undoubtedly be carried on, and competent persons, familiar with the business, and having sufficient skill therein, may properly be employed upon them, but in such cases where the occupation is attended with danger to life, body, or limb, it is incumbent on the promoters thereof and the employers of others thereon to take all reasonable and needed precautions to secure safety to the persons engaged in their prosecution, and for any negligence in this respect, from which injury follows to the persons engaged, the promoters or the employers may be held responsible and mulcted to the extent of the injury inflicted. The explosive nature of the materials used in this case, and the constant danger of their explosion from heat or collision, as already explained, was well known to the employers, and was a continuing admonition to them to take every precaution to guard against explosions. Occupations, however important, which cannot be conducted without necessary danger to life, body, or limb, should not be prosecuted at all without all reasonable precautions against such dangers

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