Western Printing & Lithographing Co. v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 04 December 1951
• Parties: WESTERN PRINTING & LITHOGRAPHING CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 410

50 N.W.2d 410

260 Wis. 124

WESTERN PRINTING & LITHOGRAPHING CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Dec. 4, 1951.

One Josephine S. Rekupero, (hereinafter referred to as the 'employee'), began working for the appellant, Western Printing & Lithographing Co., (hereinafter referred to as the 'employer'), on or about July 1, 1944, as a bookbinder. She worked regularly until April 9, 1947, at which time she quit her employment. Her reason for quitting was that her parents were moving to California and insisted that she go with them. At that time she was nineteen years of age and was unemancipated.

She was married in California in September, 1947, her husband's name being Morgan. On December 3, 1947, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under ch. 108, Wis.Stats., with the Alhambra office of the California Department of Employment. She reported weekly at such office at Alhambra, California, during the period for which benefits were subsequently allowed, but was unable to obtain suitable employment.

A deputy of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission, (hereinafter referred to as the 'commission'), determined on January 19, 1948, that the employee terminated her employment with the employer under circumstances whereby her reason for doing so was not good cause attributable to the employer, nor was it a compelling personal reason. The employee then appealed from such initial determination of the deputy.

Pursuant to the authority of sec. 108.09(6)(a), Stats., the commission transferred the proceedings to itself and directed that testimony be taken in California before a special referee of the employment stabilization commission of California, and the employee's testimony was taken before such a referee at Alhambra, California, on March 10, 1948, and a further hearing was held at Racine, Wisconsin, on April 2, 1948, before an examiner of the commission appointed as special deputy, at which time the testimony of the employer was taken. Under date of May 4, 1948, the commission entered its findings of fact and decision. The findings of fact, among other things stated:

'After arriving in California the employe lived in a metropolitan area where an active labor market prevailed. She registered for work at a public employment office and demonstrated that she was able to work and available for work.

'In view of the employe's youth and the fact that she had been living with her parents, she could not have reasonably been expected to disregard the orders of her parents that she remain with her immediate family. Under these circumstances she had no other reasonable alternative than to leave her employment.

'The commission therefore finds that the employe terminated her employment for compelling personal reason, within the meaning of sec. 108.04(7)(c) of the statutes, and that she was physically able to work and available for work within the meaning of that subsection.'

The decision reversed the initial determination of the deputy and allowed the employee benefits.

The employer thereupon instituted an action in the circuit court for Dane county to review the decision of the commission. The trial court filed a written memorandum decision wherein it was ordered that the commission's findings and order should be confirmed, and judgment in accordance therewith was entered April 2, 1951; and the employer appealed from such judgment.

Brach & Edwards and Fred W. Wheeler, all of Racine, for appellant.

Austin T. Thorson, Arnold J. Spencer, Madison, for respondents.

CURRIE, Justice.

The Wisconsin unemployment compensation act embraced in ch. 108, Stats., was originally enacted in 1932, and sec. 108.04(5)(b) thereof provided that an employee should not be eligible for benefits 'if he has left his employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer'. From the date of original enactment of the act in 1932, down to the time the act was amended by ch. 354 of the Laws of 1945, the only situation in which an employee was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits under the act in the event of a voluntary termination of employment, was that wherein the employee terminated his employment as a result of cause attributable to the employer.

The preamble to the act containing the public policy declaration which prompted its enactment is to be found in sec. 108.01, Stats., and contains the following statements of policy:

'Each employer's contribution rate should vary in accordance with his own unemployment costs, as shown by experience under this chapter * * *

'A sound system of unemployment reserves, contributions and benefits should induce and reward steady operations by each employer, since he is in a better position than any other agency to share in and to reduce the social costs of his own irregular employment.'

In other words, the theory of the act was to allow benefits only in those situations wherein the unemployment resulted from some act or omission of the employer. Unlike the Unemployment Compensation acts of many of the other states, each Wisconsin employer has his own individual reserve account to which his contributions are credited and from which disbursements for benefits are debited. Employers who are able to stabilize the employment of their employees and prevent unemployment are rewarded by having their contributions decreased or eliminated when a certain reserve has been built up.

Permitting an employee to be eligible to receive benefits as a result of a voluntary quitting of employment due to good cause attributable to the employer was in keeping with the declaration of policy enumciated in sec. 108.01, Stats., because it was within the power of an employer not to produce a cause which would justify the employee in quitting his employment.

However, the amendments to the act embodied in ch. 354 of the Laws of 1945, introduced features into the act in connection with voluntary termination of employment that were entirely foreign to the spirit of the policy declaration of sec. 108.01, Stats., in that an employee was made eligible for benefits in certain cases of voluntary quitting of employment under circumstances wherein the employer had no control over the situation whatsoever, and was powerless to prevent such circumstances from arising. These new provisions introduced into the act, as a result of the 1945 amendments, are to be found in sec. 108.04(7), Stats. of 1945, reading as follows:

'(7) Voluntary Termination of Employment.

'(a) If an employe terminates his employment with an employer, he shall be ineligible for any benefits based on such employment, and ineligible for benefits based on other previous employment for the week of termination and the 4 next following weeks, except as hereinafter provided.

'(b) Paragraph (a) shall not apply if the commission determines that the employe terminated his employment with good cause attributable to the employer.

'(c) Paragraph (a) shall not apply if the commission determines that the employe terminated his employment for compelling personal reason; provided that, if the commission determines that he is physically unable to work or substantially unavailable for work, he shall be eligible while such inability or unavailability continues.

'(d) Paragraph (a) shall not apply if the commission determines that the employe terminated his employment to take another job; provided, that he shall be ineligible, for benefits based on the employment terminated, until he has been employed within at least 7 subsequent weeks.'

These 1945 amendments were enacted as the result of recommendations made to the Legislature by the Advisory Committee on Unemployment Compensation created by the commission pursuant to sec. 108.14(5), Stats., the members consisting of an equal number of representatives of employers and employees, with a salaried commission employee as chairman. The Advisory Committee submitted an explanation to the Legislature of the changes recommended, and such explanation given with respect to the changes relating to voluntary termination of employment read as follows:

'The present provision relating to disqualification of employes who leave their employment (108.04(4)(b)) would be repealed, by sec. 6 of 303, S. A modified provision on the same subject would be created, as 108.04(7), under the subsection heading 'Voluntary Termination of Employment'.

'The existing provision of the law cancels an employe's benefit rights as to his last employer except in those cases in which the employe's termination was with good cause attributable to the employer. To so disqualify employes, without reference to the reasonableness of their conduct in terminating their employment, has been demonstrated by experience to be both inequitable and out of accord with the general basic purposes of an unemployment compensation program. It seems altogether clear that a person who is compelled to terminate his employment because of personal reasons should have a different treatment provided than another person who terminates his employment for no good reason whatsoever.

'Paragraph (c) of the proposed new subsection provides that an employe's eligibility for benefits is not affected by reason of having terminated his employment because of 'compelling personal reason'. However, it is further provided that if his 'compelling reason' is such that he is unable to work or unavailable for work, he is not to receive benefits while such inability to work or unavailability for work continues.

'It is to be noted that the phrase 'compelling personal reason' is not to be found in existing unemployment compensation acts, or, for that matter, in any statute of which your Advisory Committee has knwoledge. It must be interpreted by the commission, in the first instance, and by the courts, in the last analysis. However, the Committee, in its deliberations, considered that the phrase 'compelling personal reason' had reference...