Western Ry. of Alabama v. McGraw

• Decision Date: 15 May 1913
• Parties: WESTERN RY. OF ALABAMA v. McGRAW.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

62 So. 772

183 Ala. 220

WESTERN RY. OF ALABAMA v. McGRAW.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 15, 1913

Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Lee County.

Action by C.T. McGraw against the Western Railway of Alabama. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

See also, 62 So. 1035.

George P. Harrison, of Opelika, for appellant.

Barnes & Denson, of Opelika, for appellee.

MAYFIELD J.

"Where *** it is shown that an accident happened upon a railway from which a passenger sustained an injury, by the breaking down or the overturning of the vehicle, or by derailment of the train or of some of the cars, or by a collision between two trains or between two cars, or by an unusual jerk or jolt of the train, or by the parting of the train, or by the breaking down of a bridge, or by the falling of some of the appliances within the vehicle, or by an obstruction, which the carrier has placed too near the track, striking the side of the train, a prima facie presumption will arise that the accident was due to the negligence of the company or its servants." 3 Hutchinson on Carriers, p. 1701 et seq., § 1414; Mallette's Case, 92 Ala. 209, 9 So. 363; Hill's Case, 93 Ala. 521, 9 So. 722, 30 Am.St.Rep. 65; Thompson on Carriers, 181 et seq.; Wood's Railway Law, 1096.

"Where however, the injury is received while the passenger is about the carrier's premises, or, if in the vehicle, where the accident causing the injury is to him and not to the vehicle, or where the injury is caused while the passenger is alighting from the vehicle by his stepping upon an object which has been left upon the depot platform, the mere fact of the injury will not be sufficient to charge the company with negligence. 'It is only,' said the court in Stager v. Railway, 119 Pa. 70, 12 A. 821, 'when the injury occurs from agencies peculiarly within the defendant's power that he can be presumed, without proof, to have acted negligently.' " 3 Hutchinson on Carriers, pp. 1705-06, § 1414.

"It generally happens, therefore, in actions against the carrier in which his liability depends upon the finding of negligence, that, in proving the injury the character of the accident is also shown, from which it can be seen whether there was negligence, or so strong a probability of its existence as to amount to a presumption against the carrier, and to cast upon him the burden of disproving it; and whenever it appears that the accident was of that kind which, according to common experience, does not usually occur except from some fault of the carrier himself or of his servants, or from some imperfection in his conveyance or its appliances, or from the unsafe condition of his road, a prima facie case is made against him, and to exonerate himself from liability he must show that the accident was inevitable, or that it could not have been avoided by the exercise of the utmost care and foresight reasonably consistent with the prosecution of his business." Id., p. 1706, § 1415.

Each count of the complaint alleged all the facts which are necessary to show prima facie liability of the carrier for the injury suffered by the passenger, and was therefore not subject to the demurrer interposed.

In such cases no particular or specific act of negligence, of omission or commission, is required to be alleged or proven to support the action. Rules of pleading in actions of this kind form an exception to the general rules of pleading in negligence cases. The fact that the law raises a presumption of negligence from the facts alleged relieves the pleader of the necessity of alleging any...