Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court, S038067

• Decision Date: 16 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. S038067,S038067
• Citation: 9 Cal.4th 559,888 P.2d 1268,38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 888 P.2d 1268 WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; AIR RESOURCES BOARD et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 139

38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139

9 Cal.4th 559, 888 P.2d 1268

WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent;

AIR RESOURCES BOARD et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. S038067.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Feb. 16, 1995.

Baker & Hostetler, Donna R. Black and Bradley R. Hogin, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Roderick E. Walston, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Walter E. Wunderlich, Asst. Atty. Gen., Douglas B. Noble and Charles W. Getz IV, Acting Asst. Attys. Gen., M. Anne Jennings, Deputy Atty. Gen., Michael P. Kenny and W. Thomas Jennings, Sacramento, for real parties in interest.

Demetriou, Del Guercio, Springer & Moyer, Jeffrey Z. B. Springer, Los Angeles, Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Steven R. Meyers, Andrea J. Saltzman, Rick W. Jarvis, San Leandro, Remy & Thomas, Michael H. Remy, Tina A. Thomas, James G. Moose, J. William Yeates and Whitman F. Manley, Sacramento, as amici curiae, on behalf of real parties in interest.

MOSK, Justice.

We granted review to determine whether evidence not contained in the administrative record is admissible in a traditional mandamus action to show that a quasi-legislative administrative decision was a "prejudicial abuse of discretion" within the meaning of Public Resources Code section 21168.5, a provision of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) ( Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.), either because the agency "has not proceeded in a manner required by law" or because the decision was not supported by "substantial evidence." We conclude that the substantial evidence standard of review prescribed by this statute is analogous to the substantial evidence standard of review applied by appellate courts to evaluate the findings of fact made in trial courts. Accordingly, just as appellate courts generally may not consider evidence not contained in the trial record when reviewing such findings, courts generally may not consider evidence not contained in the administrative record when reviewing the substantiality of the evidence supporting a quasi-legislative administrative decision under Public Resources Code section 21168.5. We also conclude that extra-record evidence is generally not admissible to show that an agency "has not proceeded in a manner required by law" in making a quasi-legislative decision. Such evidence is generally not admissible to challenge quasi-legislative decisions on non-CEQA grounds, and we see no reason to apply a different rule in CEQA cases.

FACTS

This case involves a challenge by the Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA), an oil industry trade group, to regulations adopted by the Air Resources Board (ARB) as part of its low-emission vehicle/clean fuels (LEV/CF) program. The ARB initially adopted the LEV/CF program to reduce harmful emissions from motor vehicles, particularly those emissions that react to form ozone, one of the primary ingredients in urban smog. The specific regulations challenged After filing an unsuccessful administrative petition for the repeal of the regulations, WSPA brought an action in superior court seeking both declaratory and mandamus relief on the grounds that the regulations were based on inaccurate and unsound data and that the ARB adopted them without complying with CEQA. The ARB denied WSPA's allegations in its answer. In response to WSPA's request for discovery, the ARB moved to limit the evidence to that contained in the administrative record. The court granted the motion with the proviso that specific items of evidence could be admitted later if WSPA made an offer of proof and could demonstrate the evidence was admissible.

[888 P.2d 1270] here establish a "reactivity adjustment factor" to be applied to the emission standards governing certain vehicles to account for the fact that much of the weight of the organic gas emissions of methanol-fueled vehicles consists of uncombusted methanol that has little potential to form ozone. In adopting these regulations, the ARB was required to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (Gov.Code, §§ 11340-11356). It prepared a notice of public hearing, an initial statement of reasons, and a technical support document. In accordance with the APA, the ARB provided the public access to each of these documents and held a public hearing. The ARB received extensive written and oral comment from WSPA and other companies and organizations during the public hearing. At the end of the hearing the ARB approved the regulations with certain modifications. It then circulated the regulations and received additional comment. After considering this additional information, the ARB approved the regulations and prepared a final statement of reasons, which summarized and responded to all the comments received. The Office of Administrative [9 Cal.4th 566] Law then gave its final approval. The complete administrative record of these rulemaking proceedings is over 5,000 pages long.

WSPA subsequently moved to admit eight items of evidence, none of which was contained in the administrative record. All WSPA's evidence related to the scientific bases of the regulations. The court declined to admit the evidence. WSPA then petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate its order and admit the evidence. The Court of Appeal granted the petition. ¹

DISCUSSION

I.

A party may seek to set aside an administrative decision for failure to comply with CEQA by petitioning for either administrative mandamus (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5) or traditional mandamus (id., § 1085). A petition for administrative mandamus is appropriate when the party seeks review of a "determination, finding, or decision of a public agency, made as a result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in a public agency, on the grounds of noncompliance with [CEQA]," generally referred to as an "adjudicatory" or "quasi-judicial" decision. (Pub.Resources Code, § 21168; see Langsam v. City of Sausalito (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 871, 879, 235 Cal.Rptr. 672 ["It is well established that the intent of the Legislature in enacting [Code of Civil Procedure section] 1094.5 was to authorize '... judicial review only of the exercise by an administrative agency of an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial function.' "]; see also Cal.Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 1989) § 1.1, p. 2 [administrative mandamus is the "procedure used to obtain judicial review of adjudicative decisions (i.e., decisions that determine what the facts are in relation to specific private rights or interests)"].) A petition for traditional mandamus is appropriate in all other actions brought "to attack, review, set aside, void or annul a determination, finding, or decision of a public agency on the grounds of noncompliance with [CEQA]." (Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.5; Del Mar Terrace Conservancy, Inc. v. City Council (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 712, 726-729, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 785; Cal.Administrative Mandamus, op. cit. supra, § 1.8, pp. 8-10.) Because WSPA's petition seeks review of a quasi-legislative action by the ARB--the adoption of air quality regulations--it is properly viewed as a petition for traditional mandamus. (Del Mar Terrace Conservancy, Inc. v. City Council, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 712, 726-729, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 785; Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 30, 39, 271 Cal.Rptr. 393; Langsam v. City of Sausalito, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d 871, 879, 235 Cal.Rptr. 672 ["where an agency is exercising a quasi-legislative function, judicial review must proceed under ordinary or traditional mandamus"]; see Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 833, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19, 377 P.2d 83; see also Cal.Administrative Mandamus, op. cit. supra, §§ 1.7-1.8, pp. 7-10, §§ 3.11-3.12, pp. 81-84.)

Courts have traditionally held that quasi-legislative actions must be challenged in traditional mandamus proceedings rather than in administrative mandamus proceedings even if the administrative agency was required by law to conduct a hearing and take evidence. (See 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 278-279, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 807, 878 P.2d 566; Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 218, 231, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 818; Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist. (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 271, 279, 63 Cal.Rptr. 889.) However, recent commentators argue that the proper form of action, i.e., administrative versus traditional mandamus, should not depend on whether the administrative action was quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative, but on whether the challenged action is reviewable under Public Resources Code section 21168, because a hearing was required by law, or under Public Resources Code section 21168.5, because no hearing was required. (Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 1993) § 23.44, pp. 956-957.) If some type of hearing was required by law, they argue, Public Resources Code section 21168 applies and, according to the plain language of that provision, administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is the appropriate remedy; if no hearing of any kind was required by law, Public Resources Code section 21168.5 applies and traditional mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 is the appropriate remedy.

The contention has at least one fatal flaw. When the Legislature drafted Public Resources Code section 21168 in 1972, it borrowed the words, "made as [a] result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in [a public agency]," from Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (a). It was well established in 1972 that an administrative mandamus action under Code of Civil...