Western Union Tel. Co. v. INTERNATIONAL B. OF E. WORKERS

• Decision Date: 16 July 1924
• Docket Number: No. 4047.,4047.
• Citation: 2 F.2d 993
• Parties: WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 134, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

2 F.2d 993 (1924)

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 134, et al.

No. 4047.

District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

July 16, 1924.

West & Eckhart, of Chicago, Ill. (Wm. Rothmann and Wm. L. Bourland, both of Chicago, Ill., and Francis R. Stark, of New York City, of counsel), for complainant.

Hope Thompson and Timothy J. Fell, both of Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

WILKERSON, District Judge.

The facts stated in the bill and supporting affidavits, in my opinion, show an interference with interstate commerce. They meet the test laid down by Chief Justice Taft speaking for the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of America et al. v. Coronado Coal Co. et al., 259 U. S. 344, 408, 42 S. Ct. 570, 582 (66 L. Ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762). He said:

"We have had occasion to consider the principles governing the validity of congressional restraint of such indirect obstructions to interstate commerce in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375; United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525; United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199; Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563; and Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495. It is clear from these cases that, if Congress deems certain recurring practices, though not really part of interstate commerce, likely to obstruct, restrain, or burden it, it has the power to subject them to national supervision and restraint. Again, it has the power to punish conspiracies in which such practices are part of the plan, to hinder, restrain, or monopolize interstate commerce. But in the latter case the intent to injure, obstruct, or restrain interstate commerce must appear as an obvious consequence of what is to be done, or be shown by direct evidence or other circumstances."

The plaintiff here is a public utility. A large part of its business is the transmission of messages. It is required to serve the public without discrimination. If the plaintiff is to perform its public duty, the instrumentalities for the transmission of the messages must be installed and maintained. If the purpose of the combination here shown to exist is carried out, the commerce itself is destroyed. The intent to restrain interstate commerce therefore appears as an obvious consequence of the acts of the defendants.

But, if it were held that the intent to obstruct interstate commerce is not established, a case for equitable relief against an unlawful boycott is made out, in my opinion, in view of the diversity of citizenship of the parties. Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Association, 305 Ill. 331, 338, 137 N. E. 222, 27 A. L. R. 625; Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 49, 83 N. E. 928, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 85, 122 Am. St. Rep. 119, 13 Ann. Cas. 82; Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill. 355, 376, 377, 77 N. E. 176, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1001, 110 Am. St. Rep. 248; Chicago, Wilmington & Vermillion Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 73 N. E. 770.

The right of plaintiff to relief being sustained, we come to consider the scope of the injunction to be granted. In this connection it is to be considered that acts lawful in themselves may be a step in the execution of the plan of an unlawful or criminal conspiracy. In Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 206, 25 S. Ct. 3, 6 (49 L. Ed. 154), it was said:

"No conduct has such an absolute privilege as to justify all possible schemes of which it may be a part. The most innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punishment of the plot by law."

In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 253, 38 S. Ct. 65, 73 (62 L. Ed. 260, L. R. A. 1918C, 497, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461), it was said:

"The cardinal error of defendants' position lies in the assumption that the right is so absolute that it may be exercised under any circumstances and without any qualification; whereas in truth, like other rights that exist in civilized society, it must always be exercised with reasonable regard for the conflicting rights of others."

And in Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U. S. 433, 440, 30 S. Ct. 535, 538 (54 L. Ed. 826), the Supreme Court said:

"That any one of the persons engaged in the retail lumber business might have made a fixed rule of conduct not to buy his stock from a producer or wholesaler who should sell to consumers in competition with himself is plain. No law which would infringe his freedom of contract in that particular would stand. But when the plaintiffs in error combine and agree that no one of them will trade with any producer or wholesaler who shall...