Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1905
• Docket Number: 26,601.
• Citation: 137 F. 435
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. PITTSBURG, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO.

137 F. 435

WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. PITTSBURG, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO.

No. 26,601.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Illinois.

April 20, 1905

J. F Dillon, Rush Taggart, Henry D. Estabrook, and Percy B Eckhart, for complainant.

Loesch Bros. & Howell, for defendant.

KOHLSAAT Circuit Judge.

Complainant is a New York corporation. Defendant is a corporation of the states of Pennsylvania Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Its constituent roads are the Pittsburg, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railway Company, the Indiana Central Railroad Company, the Cincinnati & Chicago Air Line Railroad Company, the Chicago & Great Eastern Railroad Company, the Toledo, Logansport & Burlington Railroad Company, and the Union Junction & Logansport Railroad Company. The bill asks (1) that complainant be decreed to be the owner of, and entitled to maintain and operate, certain telegraph lines therein set out; (2) that certain agreements and rights therein set out between complainant and said several underlying companies be declared to be still in force, and that defendant be required to perform them; (3) that if complainant is not entitled to construct, maintain, and operate on the right of way of defendant without compensation, the court shall ascertain and decree the amount of compensation to be paid under the terms of the act of Congress approved July 24, 1866, c. 230, 14 Stat. 221, and the further act approved June 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 308, c. 335, Sec. 201, and under the Constitution and laws of said four states, and that, if it is held that such compensation should be fixed by legal proceeding, upon such proceeding being had the court will decree a perpetual injunction restraining defendant from interfering with the location, maintenance, and operation of such lines on said right of way; (4) that the court will perpetually enjoin defendant from violating any of the provisions of said contracts, condemnations, and consents which the court shall require defendant to perform specifically, and from interference in location, construction, or operation of same as provided in the arrangements with the underlying companies; (5) that a temporary injunction be granted, etc. The cause comes now before the court on demurrer. The grounds alleged are want of equity and jurisdiction, and that complainant has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law.

The various facts set out are too voluminous to be here repeated. It appears that both of the parties hereto have been created by the acts consolidating various short lines or systems. In adjusting the terms upon which the railroad and telegraph lines were placed in cooperation, various agreements and condemnation proceedings were resorted to. These are shown as exhibits to the bill. Some of them name no time within which they shall be terminated, some require mutual consent, while some name definite periods, which in several cases have expired.

Considering the grounds of demurrer out of their order, I see no basis for the contention that complainant has a full and adequate remedy at law, and do not deem the point seriously urged.

It is insisted by defendant that the court is without jurisdiction to enter or enforce any order against the defendant, except as to that part or portion thereof situated within this district. That an existing consolidated railway corporation is a separate corporation in each state, although it has one capital stock, board of directors, and name, is now an established principle of law. Cook on Corporations, vol. 3 910; Nashua & Lowell R. Co. v. B. & L.R. Co., 136 U.S. 356, 10 Sup.Ct. 1004, 34 L.Ed. 363; Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v.

Wheeler, 1 Black, 286, 17 L.Ed. 130; In re Bank of Augusta, 13 Pet. 519, 10 L.Ed. 274; C. & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270, 20 L.Ed. 571; Fitzgerald v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (C.C.) 45 F. 812; St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U.S. 561, 16 Sup.Ct. 621, 40 L.Ed. 802. This, however, is held by the courts mainly for the purpose of jurisdiction. If the defendant in this case is, for the purposes of jurisdiction, a citizen of this district, manifestly it is the consolidated company that is now before the court, not merely that part thereof which is located in Illinois. The mere fact that this court cannot enforce its orders in another jurisdiction except by contempt or other personal proceedings would not be conclusive in determining what parties are before the court. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565, it is held that a state court may compel persons over whose persons it has jurisdiction to execute instruments in pursuance of contracts respecting property outside the court's jurisdiction, 'in such form and with such solemnities as to transfer the title. ' In Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S. 298, 25 L.Ed. 473, the court holds that:

'Where the necessary parties are before a court of equity, it is immaterial that the res of the controversy, whether it be real or personal property, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal. It has the power to compel the defendant to do all things necessary, according to the lex loci rei sitae, which he could do voluntarily, to give full effect to the decree against him. Without regard to the situation of the subject-matter, such courts consider the equities between the parties, and decree in personam according to those equities, and enforce obedience to their decrees by process in personam.'

This was held in Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444, and approved in Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 3 L.Ed 181. For these reasons, I do not deem the objection to the jurisdiction of the court well...