Western Union Telegraph Company v. Taggart
| Decision Date | 14 May 1895 |
| Docket Number | 17,200 |
| Citation | 40 N.E. 1051,141 Ind. 281 |
| Parties | Western Union Telegraph Company v. Taggart, Auditor, et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Marion Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed.
J. M Butler, Sr., A. H. Snow, J. M. Butler, Jr., W. Brown, C. W Wells and S. O. Pickens, for appellant.
W. A Ketcham, Attorney General, A. G. Smith, Attorney General, J W. Kern, A. J. Beveridge, L. O. Bailey, M. Moores, S. Claypool and J. W. Claypool, for appellees.
This was a suit for injunction, begun in the Marion Circuit Court against the auditors and treasurers of each of the counties of the State in which the lines of the appellant telegraph company are situated, to restrain the county auditors from apportioning to the several townships of such counties and entering upon the tax duplicates the amounts claimed as taxes against said appellant company for the year 1893, based upon the valuations certified to such county auditors by the state board of tax commissioners under provisions of an act of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, approved March 6, 1893, Acts 1893, p. 374, (R. S. 1894, section 8478, and following), and from delivering the tax duplicates containing such entries to the county treasurers. The grounds upon which the injunction was asked were that the act in question was not passed in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of the State of Indiana; and, if duly enacted, that it is in violation of said constitution and of the constitution of the United States.
To the complaint for injunction a demurrer was sustained, and this ruling of the court is the only error assigned on the appeal.
The first proposition argued by the able counsel for appellant is: That the act in question, and under the provisions of which the assessment of taxes was made, never became a law of the State of Indiana, for the reason that, as shown by the journals of the Senate and House of Representatives, the bill was passed by the Legislature and sent to the Governor within the two days next preceding the final adjournment of the General Assembly, in violation of article 5 section 14 of the State Constitution.
A demurrer admits facts well pleaded, but does not admit all the conclusions which may be drawn from such facts by the pleader. Because it is alleged in the complaint that the bill was passed and sent to the Governor on March 6, 1893, the last day of the session, it is not, therefore, admitted by the demurrer that the statute was enacted in violation of the constitution.
The exact point here made was made and decided against the contention of appellant in the case of Bender v. State, 53 Ind. 254. It was there contended, as it is here, that the courts have the power to go behind the statute and enquire whether or not the act was passed according to the constitution; and numerous authorities, as here, were cited in support of the contention. The court in that case, however, deemed it unnecessary to review the decisions cited or to consider the arguments advanced, for the reason that the question had been fully considered and finally decided in the case of Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514, saying, expressly: "We regard the question as settled and will not open it."
In Evans v. Browne, supra, after a complete examination of the question, including a discussion of the authorities in this and other states, it was held, that the courts of this State must take judicial notice of what is and what is not the public statutory law of the State, and also that where a statute is authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of the Legislature, the courts will not search further, to ascertain whether such facts existed as gave constitutional warrant to those officers to thus authenticate the act as having received legislative sanction in such manner as to give it the force of law.
These holdings have been since adhered to by this court, and we are of opinion that they are in accordance with the weight of authority. Edger v. Board, etc., 70 Ind. 331; Board, etc., v. Burford, 93 Ind. 383; Stout v. Board, etc., 107 Ind. 343, 8 N.E. 222; State, ex rel., v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N.E. 274; Hovey, Gov., v. State, ex rel., 119 Ind. 395, 21 N.E. 21.
In State, ex rel., v. Boice, 140 Ind. 506, 39 N.E. 64, we have again considered this question and reached the same conclusion. See, also, Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 36 L.Ed. 294, 12 S.Ct. 495, where the question is discussed.
The authentication of the act, in the manner provided in article 4, section 25, of the Constitution, that "all bills and joint-resolutions so passed shall be signed by the presiding officers of the respective houses," is conclusive evidence that the act was duly passed in conformity with the provisions of the organic law of the State. Under the guarantee of the constitution, the statute, enrolled and filed in the office of the Secretary of State, comes to us as by the solemn authentication of the Legislature itself, under the hand and seal of its presiding officers. Such authentication imports absolute verity as to the passage of the act; even as in the case of the acts of a court, which are authenticated by its certificate and seal under the hand of its clerk.
Counsel further contend: Second, that the act is invalid in that it fails to provide due process of law; third, in that it denies to the appellant the equal protection of the laws; fourth, in that it violates the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibit any State from laying any imposts or duties on imports or exports; fifth, in that it is in violation of the provisions of the State Constitution, which require a uniform and equal rate of taxation; sixth, in that it is in violation of the Constitution of the United States as being a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce; seventh, in that it is in violation of the Constitution of the State as being a local or special law; and, eighth, in that it is in violation of the State Constitution as conferring judicial powers upon executive and administrative officers.
We are of opinion that these propositions have already, in effect, been considered by this court and by the Supreme Court of the United States, and decided against the several contentions of appellant, in the Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Backus, and other Indiana railroad tax cases; Cleveland, etc., R. W. Co. v. Backus, Treas., 133 Ind. 513, 33 N.E. 421; Indianapolis, etc., R. W. Co. v. Backus, Treas., 133 Ind. 609, 33 N.E. 443; Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Backus, Treas., 133 Ind. 625, 33 N.E. 432; Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421-447, 38 L.Ed. 1031, 14 S.Ct. 1114.
It is to be remembered that the law under consideration (Acts 1893, p. 374; R. S. 1894, section 8478, and following), for the assessment and taxation of telegraph and other like companies, is supplementary to, and amendatory of, the general act for taxation (Acts 1891, p. 199; R. S. 1894, section 8408, and following); and also that the duties and powers of the State Board of Tax Commissioners and other assessing and taxing officers of the State, are defined and prescribed solely in said general tax law of 1891. The two acts are, therefore, to be treated not only as in pari materia, but as in fact but different parts of one and the same law of taxation; and, hence, all the sections of the act under consideration are to be so construed, if possible, as to harmonize the same with the provisions of the general law.
All questions raised on this appeal, therefore, in relation to due process of law, the equal protection of the laws, notice to appellant of the time and place of meeting of the State Board of Tax Commissioners, the right of appellant to appear before said board and be heard on the assessment of its property before the final assessment is made, taxation of interstate commerce, local or special laws, and the giving to executive and administrative officers judicial powers, were directly passed upon and the provisions of the statute fully sustained, in the Backus cases above cited.
The additional provisions of the act of 1893, p. 374, supra, so far as they affect this case, are as follows:
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Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart
... ... Supreme Court of Indiana. May 14, 1895 ... Appeal from circuit court, Marion county; E. A. Brown, Judge. Suit by the Western Union Telegraph Company against Thomas Taggart, auditor, and others, for injunction. A demurrer was sustained to the complaint, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed ... ...