Western v. Henderson
| Decision Date | 27 May 1929 |
| Docket Number | No. 519,519 |
| Citation | 279 U.S. 639,49 S.Ct. 445,73 L.Ed. 884 |
| Parties | WESTERN & A. R. R. v. HENDERSON et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Fitzgerald Hall, of Nashville, Tenn., and John L. Tye, of Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
Mr. Reuben R. Arnold, of Atlanta, Ga., for appellees.
Appellee, Mary E. Henderson, sued to recover damages for the death of her husband. He was killed near Tunnell Hill, Ga., at a grade crossing of a public highway and appellant's railroad, in a collision between a motortruck that he was driving and one of appellant's railway trains. The jury returned a verdict for her, and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court of the State.
The question presented is whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated by section 2780 of the Georgia Civil Code. It follows: 'A railroad company shall be liable for any damages done to persons, stock, or other property by the running of the locomotives, or cars, or other machinery of such company, or for damage done by any person in the employment and service of such company, unless the company shall make it appear that their agents have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, the presumption in all cases being against the company.'
Plaintiff's declaration charges that the collision and death were caused by negligence of defendant and its employees: In leaving the crossing in a dangerous condition; in failing to sound the whistle to give warning or to keep a lookout ahead as the train approached the crossing; in that defendant's employees, after they saw the truck upon the crossing, failed to stop the train but accelerated its speed; in running at a dangerous speed; in not having the train under control when approaching the crossing; in operating the train by a 'practically blind engineer.' The answer denied that defendant or any of its employees was guilty of negligence and alleged that deceased came to his death as a result of his own fault.
Plaintiff proved that her husband was killed in the collision. She also offered some evidence of negligent maintenance and a dangerous condition of the crossing. And it necessarily appeared that the train failed to stop in time to avoid the collision. Plaintiff offered no evidence, and there was none in the case, to support her other alle- gations of negligence. Defendant offered much evidence tending to show that it and its employees exercised due care for the proper maintenance of the track and crossing and in the operation of the train, and that neither it nor any employee was guilty of any negligence charged.
The court's charge included the following:
Upon the mere fact of collision and resulting death, the statute is held to raise a presumption that defendant and its employees were negligent in each of the particulars alleged, and that every act or omission in plaintiff's specifications of negligence was the proximate cause of the death, and it makes defendant liable unless it showed due care in respect of every matter alleged against it. And, by authorizing the jury, in the absence of evidence, to find negligence in the operation of the engine and train, the court necessarily permitted the presumption to be considered and weighed as evidence against the testimony of defendant's witnesses tending affirmatively to prove such operation was not negligent in any respect.1
Appellee insists that section 2780 is valid, and argues that the presumption, being one established by statute, has the effect of evidence, and that it is for the jury to decide whether the company's evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption; that 'it should not as a matter of law be dissipated the instant any testimony is taken against it,' and that the issue is to be determined...
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Southern Railway v. Whetzel
...that is to say, he must prove his case. He must bear that burden which every other plaintiff bears. In Western & Atlantic Railroad Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445, 446, 73 L.Ed. 884, it appears that there is a Georgia statute which provides that "A railroad company shall be liable for......
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...61 L.Ed. 678; Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 1914, 235 U.S. 380, 35 S.Ct. 133, 59 L.Ed. 279. Cf. Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson, 1929, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445, 73 L.Ed. 884. For presumptions of criminal or fraudulent intent or knowledge, see Adler v. Board of Education, 1952,......
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Swan's Estate, In re, 8246
...the approval of distinguished commentators. It is not subject to attack for unconstitutionality under Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445, 73 L.Ed. 884, or kindred 'b. Application and reasons. A presumption, to be an efficient legal tool, must (1) be left in......
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...the place of fact in the judicial determination of issues involving life, liberty or property.' Western & Atlantic Railroad Company v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445, 73 L.Ed. 884; Manley v. State of Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. 215, 73 L.Ed. 575. The rule is firmly established that......
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28 APPENDIX U.S.C. § 301 Presumptions In Civil Cases Generally
...justified the application in question. Nineteen years later, in Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445, 73 L.Ed. 884 (1929), the Court overturned a Georgia statute making railroads liable for damages done by trains, unless the railroad made it appear that reasona......