Western v. Office of the Ind. Sec'y of State

Decision Date02 June 2016
Docket NumberNo. 49S02–1511–PL–668.,49S02–1511–PL–668.
Citation54 N.E.3d 349
Parties Andy Mohr WEST d/b/a Andy Mohr Toyota, Butler Motors, Inc. d/b/a Butler Toyota, and TW Toy, Inc. d/b/a Tom Wood Toyota, Appellants (Petitioners below), v. OFFICE OF the INDIANA SECRETARY OF STATE, Auto Dealer Services Division, and Carol Mihalik, in her Representative Capacity as Securities Commissioner of the Auto Dealer Services Division, and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Appellees (Respondents below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Geoffrey M. Grodner, Kendra G. Gjerdingen, Mallor Grodner LLP, Bloomington, IN, Robert C. Byerts, Bass Sox Mercer, Tallahassee, FL, Attorneys for Appellants.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Kyle Hunter, Kenneth Biggins, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee, Office of the Indiana Secretary of State.

John C. Trimble, Brett Y. Hoy, Lewis Wagner LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Steven A. McKelvey, Jr., Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Columbia, SC, Attorneys for Appellee, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02–1411–PL–812
MASSA

, Justice.

Three central Indiana Toyota dealerships protested the relocation of a fourth Toyota dealership. The Auto Dealer Services Division dismissed their action for lack of standing—affirmed by the trial court—concluding the dealerships were outside the “relevant market area,” as defined by the Indiana Dealer Services Act, Ind.Code § 9–32–2–20

(Supp.2015). We are asked to decide whether the Division's interpretation of that statutory definition was reasonable. Finding it was, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In an apparent effort to benefit from a growing customer base in Hamilton County, Ed Martin Toyota requested—and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. planned to approve—that Ed Martin relocate from its Anderson, Madison County location, where it operated for several years, to the Fishers area. Prior to the move, Toyota informed its other new motor vehicle dealerships in the region, including Andy Mohr Toyota, Butler Toyota, and Tom Wood Toyota (Dealers), and it filed the relocation plan with the Auto Dealer Services Division of the Office of the Indiana Secretary of State (Division).

The Dealers protested, seeking declaratory judgment and asking the Division to determine whether good cause existed for the move. See Ind.Code § 9–32–13–24(e)

(setting forth the process by which dealers can protest the establishment or relocation of a dealership), –24(f) (listing the circumstances the Division must consider in determining whether good cause exists for establishing or relocating a dealership). Toyota moved to dismiss, arguing each of the Dealers lacked standing because they were outside the “relevant market area” set forth in Indiana Code section 9–32–2–20 (“the Statute). The Statute defines the “relevant market area” as encompassing either a six- or ten-mile radius around the dealer's new site, depending on the type of dealer entering the area: the radius is six miles for “a new motor vehicle dealer who plans to relocate the dealer's place of business in a county having a population of more than one hundred thousand,” Ind.Code § 9–32–2–20(1) ; the radius is ten miles for a “proposed new motor vehicle dealer,” Ind.Code § 9–32–2–20(2)(A), or a “new motor vehicle dealer who plans to relocate the dealer's place of business in a county having a population of not more than one hundred thousand,” Ind.Code § 9–32–2–20(2)(B).

The Division determined the Dealers failed to show they were entitled to protest because it was undisputed “the anticipated relocation is in excess of a six-mile radius into a county of more than 100,000 people and therefore not a violation of the RMA of the closest dealer as defined by [the S]tatute.” App. at 44, 70, 94. In other words, because Toyota sought to relocate an existing dealership into a county with more than 100,000 people, the Division found Ed Martin fit the language of Subsection 20(1), with the relevant market area limited to a six-mile radius. Each Dealer was located outside that radius, so the Division dismissed their declaratory judgment actions for lack of standing.1

The Dealers sought judicial review, and after allowing Toyota to intervene, the trial court affirmed the Division's administrative determination.

The Dealers appealed, and a divided panel of our Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding the Division's interpretation of the Statute was not reasonable. Andy Mohr W., Inc. v. Office of Ind. Sec'y of State, 41 N.E.3d 704, 712–13 (Ind.Ct.App.2015)

. It determined “proposed new motor vehicle dealer” in Subsection 20(2)(A) could not be limited to newly created dealerships since another statutory section contemplates a proposed dealer's move: “the franchisor may not establish or relocate the proposed [new motor vehicle] dealer until the division has rendered a decision on the matter.” Id. at 708 (emphasis altered) (quoting Ind.Code § 9–32–13–24(e) ). Instead, a proposed new motor vehicle dealer is simply “a dealer that proposes to enter a market where that dealer is not already doing business.” Id. at 710. And, it found “in a county” in Sections 20(1) and 20(2)(B) must refer only to a dealer's moving “within a county”; otherwise—under the majority's definition of proposed new motor vehicle dealer—a relocating dealer could fall under both sections. Id. at 711–12. Under this construction, because Ed Martin is not making an intra-county move, it fits under Subsection 20(2)(A) with its relevant market area encompassing a ten-mile radius.

The decision drew a dissent, which would have deferred to the Division's interpretation of the Statute, finding it to be reasonable. Id. at 713

(Friedlander, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent deemed the majority's interpretation of “proposed new motor vehicle dealer” in 20(2)(A) inconsistent with the plain language of the Statute, which uses two distinct terms: ‘proposed’ dealers and ‘relocated’ dealers, clearly implying that the former is a planned/projected dealer while the latter is an established/existing dealer.” Id. at 714.

Toyota and the Division sought transfer, which we granted, thereby vacating the opinion below. Andy Mohr W. v. Ind. Sec'y of State, 43 N.E.3d 243 (Ind.2015)

(table); Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

The Dealers here appeal the trial court's judgment affirming the Division's dismissal of their administrative action. As the trial court reviewed a paper record only, we are in just as good of a position as the trial court was to resolve the case, and thus need not defer to its ruling. Equicor Dev., Inc. v. Westfield–Washington Twp. Plan Comm'n, 758 N.E.2d 34, 37 (Ind.2001)

; see also

Walczak v. Labor Works–Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind.2013). To navigate our analysis, we thus follow the same guideposts relied upon by the reviewing courts below. Amoco Oil Co., Whiting Refinery v. Comm'r of Labor, 726 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

Indiana's Administrative Order and Procedures Act sets forth those guideposts: we may set aside an agency action only if it is (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial evidence.” Ind.Code § 4–21.5–5–14(d) (2012)

. It is the party challenging the validity of the agency action that bears the burden of proof. Ind.Code § 4–21.5–5–14(a).

Our review of agency action is intentionally limited, as we recognize an agency has expertise in its field and the public relies on its authority to govern in that area. Ind. Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co. v. State ex rel. Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 695 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ind.1998)

. Although we generally review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, where the statute is interpreted by the administrative agency charged with enforcing it, that interpretation is entitled to “great weight.” Chrysler Grp. LLC v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.2012) (citing LTV Steel Co. v. Griffin, 730 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Ind.2000) ). Indeed, if the agency's interpretation is reasonable, we stop our analysis and need not move forward with any other proposed interpretation. Ind. Wholesale, 695 N.E.2d at 105 ; State v. Young, 855 N.E.2d 329, 335 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).

The Trial Court Properly Deferred to the Division's Reasonable Construction of the Statute.

In light of the standard of review, the issue facing us is a narrow one: whether the Division's interpretation of the Statute is reasonable.

The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and further the intent of the legislature. Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d 1133, 1137 (Ind.2014)

. To do so, we start with the plain language of the statute, giving its words their ordinary meaning and considering the structure of the statute as a whole. Tyson v. State, No. 45S03–1509–CR–528, 51 N.E.3d 88, 90–91, 2016 WL 756366, at *2 (Ind. Feb. 25, 2016). No word or part should be rendered meaningless if it can be reconciled with rest. Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind.2011). And when confronted with more than one statute on the same subject, we must try to harmonize any inconsistencies. Moryl, 4 N.E.3d at 1137. But we exercise caution so as not to add words or restrictions where none exist. Kitchell v. Franklin, 997 N.E.2d 1020, 1026 (Ind.2013).

Balancing changing market dynamics with the need for fair competition, our General Assembly has provided auto dealers who may be affected by another dealer's presence—whether a new establishment or the relocation of an existing one—with the right to formally protest. Ind.Code § 9–32–13–24

. This right, however, is not absolute but subject to certain standing requirements; for instance, the challenging dealer...

To continue reading

Request your trial
47 cases
  • Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Patterson
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • January 17, 2019
    ...review, a court is to give "great weight" to the agency's interpretation of the law. Id. (citing West v. Office of Ind. Sec'y of State , 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016) ). "In fact, ‘if the agency's interpretation is reasonable, we stop our analysis and need not move forward with any other p......
  • In re O.J.G.S.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • May 2, 2022
    ...up) (quoting ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep't , 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1200 (Ind. 2016) and West v. Off. of Ind. Sec'y of State , 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016) ).[22] In light of this second plurality opinion in less than a year, I urge the Supreme Court to speak on this matter, whi......
  • Serv. Steel Warehouse Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • May 3, 2021
    ...and further the intent of the legislature, and to do so, we give a statute's words their ordinary meaning. West v. Ind. Sec'y of State , 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016). Indiana's mechanic's lien statute requires only the performance of labor "for the erection of a building." Ind. Code § 32-......
  • Holcomb v. Bray
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • June 3, 2022
    ...bill. Our goal when interpreting a statute is to determine and further the Legislature's intent. West v. Off. of Ind. Sec'y of State , 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016). Noting that the statute is the best evidence of that intent, we "first examine whether the language of the statute is clear ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT